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With the worldwide political changes brought about by the end of the Cold 
War, political Islam has gained new significance as a potential threat to U.S. 
interests. Assessments of the phenomenon have varied, ranging from an Islamic 
replacement for the communist global ideological menace to a more legitimate 
expression of social and political activism within Muslim countries. The United 
States does not have a coherent, long-term policy toward this resurgent ideological 
force. An objective assessment of political Islam must be developed to enable poli-
cy-makers to understand the true nature and aspirations of the Islamists, and to 
craft appropriate responses. This thesis argues that political Islam is not a 
monolithic "Green Menace"; while pervasive, and influenced by unifying aspects 
of a common Third World "crisis" environment and the "fundamentals" of the 
Islamic faith, it is paradoxically a diverse grouping of ideologies that is polycentric 
in character. These ideologies vary in specific origins and means of sociopolitical 
action, while emphasizing a political focus aimed primarily at the local, intrastate 
levels. Given the phenomenon's multifaceted nature, the U.S. must develop a 
similar diversity in its policy approaches. 
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With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the phenomenon 
of Islamic fundamentalism has been depicted as a potential new global ideological menace 
poised to fill the "threat vacuum" left by communism's collapse. Islam currently claims 
more than one billion adherents worldwide, and a Muslim majority exists in almost fifty 
countries across a geographic area extending from the West coast of Africa to Southeast 
Asia; the shear size and latent transnational power of Islam combine with lingering 
cultural stereotypes and past anti-Western extremist activities to raise the specter of a 
threatening, monolithic force of violence and fanaticism. Many analysts and political 
pundits currently see Islamic fundamentalists as the major threat to stability, not only in 
the region of the Middle East, but throughout the broader Muslim World. At the same 
time, other sources provide a less threatening perspective, pointing to positive aspects 
within the Islamic faith that correspond with Western notions of social justice and 
democracy. Terrorists and fanatics are placed on the far radical fringe of a much larger 
majority of Muslims who want to have good relations with the U.S. and the European 
countries, and welcome the opportunity to benefit from trade and general good relations. 
The dichotomy presented by such diverse reporting begs the questions: What is the true 
nature of Islamic fundamentalism? Just how powerful a phenomenon is it? What is the 
threat it represents? 
With what is described as a historical anti-Western world view, Islamic fundamen-
talism, or more appropriately political Islam, has been portrayed as a product of a time-
less religious faith and an associated backward-looking culture and, as such, forms the 
basis for a looming "civilization-level" conflict with the West. In contrast, this thesis 
focuses on the paradoxical aspects presented by the phenomenon's diversity-by showing 
how political Islam, though seemingly "unified" on religious grounds, is not some 
monolithic "Green Menace" set to sweep across the Greater Middle East region, but is 
instead a disparate, polycentric grouping of political ideologies that develop primarily as 
a response to specific political, economic and social conditions within individual Muslim 
countries. Due to differences in. a series of dialectical relationships inherent within the 
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phenomenon, the power of political Islam varies with time and place, and must be 
assessed within specific local contexts of the "transitional" states of the region to gain 
more meaningful insight. 
Since similar conditions can also be identified within non-Muslim developing 
countries in a broader contemporary context, political Islam must be understood as but 
one version of a "common response" to Third World "crisis" conditions brought on by 
the trials of modernization/secularization and development. Political Islam does draw 
upon common Islamic religious ideas and symbology to provide both an alternate vision 
of reality and a basis for political action for Muslims engulfed in an atmosphere of 
"crisis" that currently engulfs many of their countries. However, objective analysis 
indicates that "Islamic" themes and ideas should not obscure the root causes of unrest and 
popular interest in these alternative ideologies within regional states. Moreover, the 
majority of Islamists recognize the borders and most institutions of contemporary nation-
states-and most actually "work within the bounds" of the state in efforts promoting 
Islamic political thought and reform. Thus, rather than a "wave" of fundamentalism 
surging forth and engulfing regimes one-by-one across the Muslim world, danger from 
Islamists is principally an intrastate challenge to incumbent regimes-with interstate 
terrorism as a minor exception-arising from various localized, yet multifaceted, environ-
mental contexts. Therefore, analysis of-and guarding against potential threats to U.S. 
interests from-political Islam must be addressed in a correspondingly differentiated 
manner across the Greater Middle East region. 
U.S. policy makers must overcome the stereotypes identified with Islam and the 
ingrained "truths" associated with Western notions of modernization and development. 
Islam, like any great religion is a "lived" experience which incorporates various aspects 
of its local environment--especially when it assumes the character of a political ideology 
as is the case with political Islam. Modernization theorists have been perplexed by the 
political revitalization of religious groups across the globe-not just in the Greater Middle 
East-which directly contradicts the Western notions of modernization and secularization 
proceeding hand-in-hand. Thus, a more specialized means of interpreting the true 
XIV 
nature(s) of political Islam-accounting for its unifying aspects as well as the localized 
diversity of the various regional ideologies it incorporates-is required to permit an 
objective assessment and allow policy makers to gain appropriate implications from such 




With the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the phenomenon of 
Islamic fundamentalism has been depicted as a potential new global ideological menace 
poised to fill the "threat vacuum" left by communism's collapse. Islam currently claims 
more than one billion adherents worldwide, and a Muslim majority exists in almost fifty 
countries across a geographic area extending from the West coast of Africa to Southeast 
Asia; the shear size and latent transnational power of the religion combine with lingering 
cultural stereotypes and past anti-Western extremist activities to raise the specter of a 
threatening, monolithic force of violence and fanaticism. Many analysts and political 
pundits currently see Islamic fundamentalists as the major threat to stability, not only in the 
region of the Middle East, but throughout the broader Muslim World. They indicate such 
fears in characterizations found in articles with headlines such as: "The Roots of Muslim 
Rage" (Lewis, 1990), "The Sword oflslam" (Boston Globe, 1991), etc., and in works war-
ning of coming Holy Wars such as "The New Crescent of Crisis: Global Intifada" (Kraut-
hammer, 1990), or "America v Islam" (The Economist, July 3, 1993), or even "The Clash 
of Civilizations" (Huntington, 1993; also Lewis, 1990). At the same time, other sources 
provide a less threatening perspective, pointing to positive aspects within the Islamic faith 
that correspond with Western notions of social justice and democracy. Terrorists and 
fanatics are placed on the far radical fringe of a much larger majority ofMuslirris~who want 
to have good relations with the U.S. and the European countries, and welcome the 
opportunity to benefit from trade and general good relations. The dichotomy presented by 
such diverse reporting begs the questions: What is the true nature of Islamic 
fundamentalism? Just how powerful a phenomenon is it? What is the threat it represents? 
With what is described as a historical anti-Western world view, Islamic fundamen-
talism, or more appropriately political Islam, has been portrayed as a product of a timeless 
religious faith and an associated backward-looking culture and, as such, forms the basis for 
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a looming "civilization-level" conflict with the West. In contrast, this thesis will focus on 
the paradoxical aspects presented by the phenomenon's diversity-by showing how political 
Islam, though seemingly "unified" on religious grounds, is not some monolithic "Green Me-
nace" set to sweep across the Greater Middle East region, but is instead a disparate, poly-
centric grouping of political ideologies that develop primarily as a response to specific politi-
cal, economic and social conditions within individual Muslim countries. Through a series 
of dialectical relationships inherent within the phenomenon, it can be shown that the power 
of political Islam will vary with time and place, and must be assessed within specific local 
contexts of the "transitional" states of the region to gain more meaningful insight. 
Since similar conditions can also be identified within non-Muslim developing 
countries in a broader contemporary context, political Islam must be understood as but one 
version of a "common response" to Third World "crisis" conditions brought on by the trials 
of modernization/secularization and development. Political Islam does draw upon common 
Islamic religious ideas and symbology to provide both an alternate vision of reality and a 
basis for political action for Muslims engulfed in an atmosphere of "crisis" that currently 
engulfs many of their countries. However, objective analysis will indicate that "Islamic" 
themes and ideas should not obscure the root causes of unrest and interest in these alternative 
ideologies within regional states. Moreover, it will be shown that the majority oflslamists 
recognize the borders and most institutions of contemporary nation-states-and most 
actually ''work within the bounds" of the state in efforts promoting Islamic political thought 
and reform. Thus, rather than a "wave" of fundamentalism surging forth and engulfing 
regimes one-by-one across the Muslim world, danger from Islamists is principally an 
intrastate challenge-with interstate terrorism as a minor exception-arising from various 
localized, yet multifaceted, environmental contexts. Therefore, analysis of-and guarding 
against potential threats to U.S. interests from-political Islam must be addressed in a corre-
spondingly differentiated manner across the Greater Middle East region. 
2 
A. POLITICAL ISLAM: AN IDEOLOGY IN CONTEXT 
In investigating political Islam's true nature, this analysis will contradict typical 
excessively negative perceptions of the phenomenon-apprehensive commentaries heavily 
burdened by historical baggage and rigid, stereotyped idiosyncrasies-which fail to captw;e 
its actual heterogeneous and modem "essences." Though seemingly "logically" derived from 
misinformed analysis of unique cultural differences and core Islamic religious beliefs, much 
of the contemporary discussion fails to maintain objectivity-actually oversimplifying issues 
involved, while implying a "threatening" unity among Muslim countries and disparate 
Islamist movements not evident in reality. Moreover, the effect of"Orientalist" thought pat-
terns and over-emphasis on the requirement for secularization to accompany modernization 
created a view that most Muslim political activists favor a militant strategy that is both anti-
Western and anti-modem. Simplistic attempts to link Islamic "fundamentalism" to Western 
analogies lead to pictures of a monolithic religious entity aimed at "returning" to the seventh 
century A.D. in Arabia and the perfect Islamic society. 
Later in this study, those fundamental aspects of religion and culture relating to poli-
tics shared between the people, states and Islamist movements of the Greater Middle East 
will be examined briefly, in order to aid in comprehension of political Islam as a whole. 
Islam, like any great religion, is full of powerful symbols and historical qualities providing 
a highly fertile basis for propagating ideologies of mass mobilization in opposition to-and 
in support of- government policies. However, a survey of historical attributes must not 
obscure the genuine sources of contemporary religio-political activism throughout the 
Muslim world. In fact, political Islam is a modem phenomenon, one with metaphorical ties 
to Islam's past but origins in the contemporary atmosphere of the developing world. As 
Bruce Lawrence indicates: 
Islamic fundamentalism ... arose in the modem era. Like every other aspect 
of Muslim life, it was shaped by the overwhelming and new character of 
secularization [brought on by Western-inspired modernization], much of 
which permeated only the elite classes of Muslim countries, but permanently 
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shaped all residents of the Muslim/ Arab world through the emergence of 
such new institutions as communications, health care, education, and, above 
all, nationalism. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 29) 
Thus, a review of key aspects of modernization and development, and the resultant disconti-
nuities of social change in transitional states-as provided in Chapter II-forms the basis 
for distinguishing the common characteristics of political Islam. Expanding on this founda-
tion, Chapter III will present important widespread similarities between "causes" and "ef-
fects" generated by modernization and development efforts sparking the rise of various 
Islamist "responses"; in other words, it will show commonalities arising from the deterior-
ation of a range of political, economic and social factors, generating a crisis milieu 
characteristic of the collective Third World that ignites popular religio-political movements 
across the region. 
Paul Salem (1994, p. 2) describes the period under study, roughly the years since 
World War I, as an "age of ideology" in the region-brought on by "the breakdown of 
traditional social and cultural systems." Such a concept will aid in this analysis, as political 
Islam can be shown as an ideology in context, responding to the particular environment 
around it-and also as simply the latest in a successive line of ideologies that have arisen in 
a somewhat rhythmic pattern over that time. Most important, the "competition" between 
ideologies is significant, because it helped to frame the field of political debate-forming 
a unique blend of Western and Islamic elements: 
Nationalism ... was adopted by many Muslim elites as a strategy for coping 
with the otherwise intractable authority of colonial governments, economies, 
and armies. What emerged with nationalism in nearly every country was the 
state as an obedience context, with the kind of Islam advocated by the 
government enforced on the majority as a symbol of political loyalty as well 
as religious orthodoxy. Fundamentalism then began as a dissident movement 
against both foreign power and foreign ideas perpetuated by indigenous 
elites. Yet it took cognizance of the power of both .... precisely because [the 
Fundamentalists] recognized the strength of the enemy, they did not hesitate 
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to use Western writings, Western means of communications, and aspects of 
Western ideologies to achieve their own ends. (Lawrence, 1987, pp. 29-30) 
Since political Islam is but one category among several ideological responses to the cluster 
of common Third World "crisis" conditions, closely surveying both aspects-the history of 
recent political developments and ideologies, as well as the current "crisis" milieu-at 
various levels-of-analysis is important. A key consideration will be to explain how the 
Islamists can generally take advantage of inherent opportunities presented by the prevailing 
atmosphere in order to pursue their own unique political agendas. They have an appealingly 
simple message of "Islam is the answer," promoting an ideology authentic to the culture, 
untarnished by Western origins or perceived failed implementation in the past, and 
responsive to the needs of those elements within transitional societies most influenced by 
the "crisis" environment. 
However, bonds of commonality among both the "symptoms" of discontinuous social 
change, and standard Islamist symbology and "responses," should not be perceived as 
innately stronger than the disparate centrifugal forces and unique historical experiences also 
influencing Islamist movements and their answers to crises in the national environment. In 
fact, paradoxically, the "Islamic world" is quite diverse and political Islam reflects these 
conditions through a variety of unique manifestations and relationships to political 
power-to be examined in Chapter IV. The phenomenon of political Islam encompasses a 
range of different actors and ideologies, and these disparate so-called "fundamentalisms" 
within the Greater Middle East can be directly related to individual interpretations of Islamic 
precepts as well as to particular local historical contexts and conditions. Often the Islamists 
are seen as competitors against both the government and traditional religious leaders, and 
also as competitors against an onslaught of harmful "Western" influences within their 
societies. Variations in ideology and methods among key actors espousing "Islamic" politics 
are detailed within a typology oflslamic "revivalists"--essentially differentiating between 
various actors, viewpoints, and interests involved in the broader Islamic resurgence-to aid 
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in understanding requisite distinctions of the following analysis. Contrasts in terms of 
geography, politics, levels of development and other socio-cultural attributes also combine 
to generate a variety of ideologies and political relationships--creating a polycentric 
character for the overall phenomenon. 
Chapter IV will also provide specific examples of this diversity through a series of 
case studies-from three separate "categories" arranged according to the general relationship 
between political Islam and political power within their state environment-for comparison 
and contrast: 1) Islamists Gain Power: The Unique Case of /ran-reviewing first the 
triumphant struggle of the radical Shi'i ideology ofKhomeini over first the Shah, and over 
numerous competitors in the period of consolidation after the Revolution, followed by the 
history of continued ideological factionalism that has characterized the Islamic Republic up 
to the present; 2) Political Islam "At War": The Case of Egypt-a case study ofthe current 
bitter conflict between the Mubarak government and Egyptian Islamists-a situation often 
feared as the next potential "Iran"; and 3) Coopted Political Islam: The Case Of Pakistan-a 
survey of the activities of Pakistani Islamists and their interact with a range of governments 
over the history of that country-which has the unique status of being the first and only state 
"founded" on Islam. Finally, the chapter concludes with analysis of a critical issue involving 
the broader phenomenon, when points relating to the mythical notion of a monolithic Pan-
Islam movement will be developed. These final remarks will attempt to place the currently 
exaggerated threat of a transnational "Green Menace" in proper perspective. 
Finally, based upon information provided, some general conclusions on the nature 
of the phenomenon and the most-likely threats to be expected from political Islam in the 
future are furnished in Chapter V. Given the polycentric character and primarily "local" 
orientation of the Islamist movements, it is problematic to give a specific answer to region-
wide questions of power or threats from Islamism-it must be viewed in a more localized 
context that takes into account factors from its broader environment, and not vice versa. A 
series of"multifaceted dialectical relationships" (Dekmejian, 1995, p. 19) that are intrinsic 
to the phenomenon will be developed from the study's information; by focusing analysis on 
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these correlations and then applying them individual states/situations, a more valuable 
perspective of the phenomenon, including its "transnational" aspects, will be gained. At this 
local/state level, the surge of an Islamic "wave" across borders is an unlikely possibility; the 
principal threats are perceived as internal violence and unrest within regional 
countries-and, unfortunately, ever-present acts of terrorism. Of the two, the intrastate di-
mension is the most significant long-term problem-it will be aimed against authoritarian 
and traditional regimes that have failed to properly balance various aspects of their attempts 
to modernize society. The likelihood of violence is especially high where regimes suffer 
from ineffective efforts to offset the concurrent political and social upheavals which 
typically ensue. As an opposition ideology, individuals often see political Islam as their sole 
remaining means available to respond to the national "crisis" milieu, which has hampered 
their ability to cope and thus far thwarted the reaction of most transitional states. However, 
since a response is contingent upon the local context, the particular environment and 
individual actors involved will differentiate the manner in which Islamic ideology is utilized. 
With this understanding -and a realization of the profound changes to the security 
environment in the aftermath of the Cold War-some implications for United States policy 
and interests are provided to conclude this analysis. 
B. A TAXONOMY OF 'ISLAMICITY' 
In most discussions of fundamentalist Islam, the lack of a clear distinction between 
religion and politics provides the justification for attacks on Islam's rigid and anti-scientific 
orthodoxy, and traditional influences, that supposedly make it unsuitable as the basis for a 
"modem" political system (which by definition would exclude religion as a primary com-
ponent-see Chapter II). Within Muslim countries, Islam has historically been closely 
linked-much like Christianity was until quite recently-to government and politics, thus 
providing an aura of timelessness to contemporary calls for religious rule. However, far 
from being a limited or strictly rigid ideological foundation, Islam and its related symbology 
have paradoxically been a tool oflegitimization-both over time and throughout the Muslim 
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world-for a broad spectrum of governments, as well as a powerful vehicle of dissent for 
their various opponents. This unique situation, where diversity originates from a source of 
apparent unity, will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter IV. 
Nevertheless, when trying to outline a generally accepted relationship between Islam 
and politics, and distinguish between the disparate elements encompassed by the 
phenomenon of political Islam and the broader Islamic revival, there is overwhelming 
evidence that, as Nazih Ayubi maintains, "there is no single formula that is recommended 
by all scholars and believers." Given this incongruous situation, it is helpful to review "the 





In terms of the scope of political activity. A sizeable group believes in the 
complete and holistic nature of revealed Islam so that ... it encompasses the 
three famous 'Ds' (din, religion; dunya, life and dawla, State) .... others, 
however, including some religious scholars, ... believe that modern politics and 
economics are more of a civil domain for the ordinary citizen to ponder and 
improvise upon, in which [their] belief ... [is] very close to what in Western 
terminology would be called separation between Church and State. 
In terms of degree of political control and participation. There are some 
who believe that Islamic government is not about participation, and that the 
Muslim ruler is not obliged to take into consideration the advice and opinion 
given to him by others .... There are [others] believe ... that the Islamic princi-
ple of shura is exactly equivalent to the term 'democracy' in its modern 
connotations. 
In terms of type of socioeconomic system and scope of State intervention in 
the economy. Here there are those who, in emphasizing Islam's condoning of 
private ownership, end up by justifying the status quo, the class system ... and 
a capitalist-type economy .... There are also those [with] a leftist perspective 
... who maintain that 'true Islam is ... progressive and revolutionary, and has 
always fought against oppression.' (Ayubi, 1991, pp. 60-65, emphasis added) 
Of note, polarized "opinions" identified in each area are actually positions within a broad 
spectrum of interpretations and political practices evident throughout the Muslim world. 
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Ayubi also recognizes another key aspect of the debate-the modem identity of Islamist 
groups-in stating "It should be emphasized [that] ... the concept ofthe 'Islamic' state as 
such is very new, and can be regarded as an alternative to the concept of the defunct 
caliphate [the successors of the Prophet Muhammad] .... (Ayubi, 1991, p. 64) This 
condition serves to underscore an important consideration of the nature of ideologies, namely 
that conditions of the time and place are a critical consideration when making comparisons 
or distinctions. The circumstances under which individuals or groups develop or support 
specific beliefs or interpretations of Islamic theology must be examined closely in any 
analysis oflslamists and related activity. 
In dealing with these various "!slams" occurring within the all-encompassing Islamic 
revival, Ayubi groups Muslims in terms of categories of "Islamicity" for ease of discussion; 
such a means of facilitation will assist in this analysis as well. First, he introduces a simple 
category of Muslim, a person simply born to Muslim parents. Next, there is a mutadayyin 
Muslim, an observant believer who fulfills his religious duties and upholds the "credo." 
"Islamic reformers" or "Islamic modernists" are those writers and scholars who, though 
varying in personal religiosity and specific opinions, believe that the breadth and flexibility 
of Islamic ideology will allow an accommodation with the changing environment and 
progression of time. They advocate a reconciliation of traditional Islamic doctrine with 
scientific rationalism. Next, there are much smaller "intellectual or social groups," such as 
the salajis who maintain a scripturalist or traditionalist outlook-with the "good example 
ofthe Prophet Muhammad and his companions and ofthe early caliphs and jurists" as their 
ideal. While many of the ulama, or religious scholars, could be grouped in this conservative 
category, Ayubi primarily distinguishes this as a non-clerical segment for the purposes of 
discussing political Islam. 
Then, he presents the "fundamentalists" and "neo-fundamentalists," the Islamic 
versions of universal religiously-oriented movements focused on a "return to the early 
sources"; Muslims of this group are "generally less sympathetic" to jurisprudence and main-
tain a comprehensive, holistic vision oflslam (along the lines of"the three 'Ds" mentioned 
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above) which necessitates collective action of the community to reach fruition. The neo-
fundamentalists are typically splinter groups of this nature, but with a more radical or 
militant bent to their outlook; they will likely be more selective in their promotion of 
"authoritative sources" and will focus on "immediate" actions--often "outside the bounds" 
of the state-to achieve their goals. These last two categories usually are the subject of, 
Western writings or commentaries on "Islamic fundamentalism." Since these groups will 
typically fit into the category of being less-than-hospitable to Western notions of democracy, 
individual and minority rights, and tolerance of political dissent, they are most often 
regarded as a general threat to Western interests throughout the region. In a more inclusive 
category, he includes the last three groups (salajis, fundamentalists and neo-fundamentalists) 
into an "Islamists" category, namely those that go beyond simple belief and practice, and 
make a "conscious, determined choice of an Islamic doctrine" as a means of meeting 
problems of modernization and secularization within their respective countries (i.e., 
promoting political Islam as a solution). (Ayubi, 1991, pp. 67 -68) 
C. A QUESTION OF SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE 
In order to present a comprehensive illustration and analysis of a phenomenon like 
political Islam that is transnational in its range-with correspondingly far-reaching potential 
threats to U.S. interests across the Greater Middle East region-while in tum highlighting 
the important paradoxes of its localized and individually unique origins, several levels of 
analysis of the sociopolitical environment must be incorporated. These levels include the 
Third World in general, the "Muslim" World, the Greater Middle East, the Arab states, and 
finally specific representative countries within in the broader region. While the majority of 
this analysis and its conclusions concern the Greater Middle East-and are based upon 
general historical developments and conditions prevailing throughout that area-it will 
occasionally focus on subregions (i.e., the Arab world, the Gulf states, etc.) or certain 
countries in order to provide more specific examples-particularly in the discussion of 
contrasts within the phenomenon and the case study comparisons of Chapter IV. 
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Of note, the term "Greater Middle East" is used to identify the geographic region 
encompassing North Africa, the Levant, the Persian (Arab) Gulf, Central Asia, and South 
Asia (Binnendijk and Clawson, 1995, p. 67). This "broadened" geographic region has 
received greater attention from political analysts in the aftermath ofthe Cold War and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, due to enhanced social, economic and especially cultural links 
between states in this area. While incorporating states previously included in various other 
regional groupings-and at the same time excluding many additional countries with Muslim 
majorities or sizeable subgroups in areas such as India and South-East Asia (Indonesia in 
fact has the largest Muslim population in the world)-it is a geographic area that will likely 
exhibit increasing similarities and varying degrees of "cohesiveness" in the future. Thus, 
the Greater Middle East can be viewed as a more inclusive whole and will serve as an effec-
tive reference point for discussions of common issues within the general phenomenon. 
Again, however, it must be stressed that specific historical and localized aspects of political 
Islam are the chief determinants of the Islamist response in any given situation or locality. 
Finally, some closing thoughts on the "choice" of a broad scope for this study are 
pertinent at this time. While the various levels of analysis noted above will obviously be 
distinguished as appropriate in this study, the necessity for their use and the concern for their 
clarity-as with the terminology presented below-are merely evidence of an acknowledged 
difficulty in accurately analyzing "the big picture" of such a highly diverse and enigmatic 
phenomenon. Still, a comprehensive survey of political Islam can provide a tremendous 
amount of information and insight-while hopefully avoiding the potential of stereotyping 
of the phenomenon as a whole based upon limited examples from one or two countries or 
situations. This attempt to develop such a extensive study was undertaken as both a 
challenge and a much needed effort to increase general understanding-in support of U.S. 
policy making and to safeguard vital interests throughout the region. This effort is justified 
by the importance of the subject matter, as political Islam is one ofthe most significant (and 
misunderstood) outgrowths of the unsettled political, social, economic, and cultural 
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environment of the Greater Middle East, and it is likely to remain a factor in regional politics 
for many years to come. 
D. PROBLEMS OF TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS 
The phenomenon of political Islam-or more popularly mis-labeled Islamic funda-
mentalism-involves a variety of aspects and a broad range of activities typically described 
in imprecise terminology, with such ambiguity hindering attempts at evaluation. Since 
potential problems can arise as a result, clarification of a number of related terms is 
necessary, providing definitions for basic elements and supporting nomenclature for 
analysis. 
1. Fundamentalism or Revivalism? ... it is Political Islam 
Unlike the news media, few Islamic scholars ardently promote the term fundamen-
talism, with its specific historical linkage to American Protestantism, as a description for the 
phenomenon encompassing numerous complex religiously-oriented sociopolitical 
movements that have increased their activities throughout the Islamic world. It has often 
been stated that the label ''fundamentalist" is a misnomer, as any true Muslim believes the 
Quran to be the actual word of God-and thus all Muslims must be fundamentalists in the 
sense that they adhere to the dictates of the faith it provides. More important, the pejorative 
nature of the term leads to image of religious activists who can be "regarded as static, 
retrogressive, and extremist. As a result, fundamentalism often has been regarded popularly 
as referring to those who are literalists and wish to return to and replicate the past. [It also] 
is often equated with political activism, extremism, fanaticism, terrorism, and anti-
Americanism." (Esposito, 1992, p. 7) In an attempt to avoid these stereotypes and 
misperceptions, a variety of labels-such as Islamic revivalism, the 'Islamic Resurgence,' 
political Islam, and militant or radical Islam- have been used instead when addressing this 
phenomenon. As will be shown, no one term totally avoids ambiguity, particularly when 
discussing various subgroups, which happen to include fundamentalist activists. However, 
some clarity can be provided on the nature and relevant aspects of the general phenomenon 
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in question, to further distinguish it from related considerations in the Greater Middle East 
environment. 
lbroughout the vast reaches of the Muslim world, there are numerous indications of 
a general "revivaf' of the Islamic faith, a "reawakening of interest in Islamic symbols, ideas, 
and ideals .... [and a] reemergence ofislam as a sociopolitical force in the world" (Husain, 
1995, p. 4). In Muslim personal life, this reawakening can be seen in increased attendance 
at mosques, greater regard for rituals such as prayer, fasting and other religious observances, 
the increased religious content of publications and media programming, and more 
pronounced attention to Islamic values and norms of dress and social interaction. While this 
type of"revival" is certainly within the general context of the phenomenon under analysis, 
political Islam is encompassed by (and then must be distinguished from) more public aspects 
of the revival. These features include the proliferation of institutions and organizations 
labeled as "Islamic," such as banks, social welfare and educational organizations, legal codes 
and government systems, and a variety of political opposition groups. In a more politically-
oriented manner than most, Mir Zohair Husain develops the concept in this manner: 
Manifestations of the Islamic revival include (a) a groundswell or 
resurgence-involving a broad spectrum of the Muslim society--of public 
sentiment for and interest in an Islamic system . . . referred to as both an 
Islamic resurgence and as "Populist Islam"; (b) grass roots or populist 
Islamic movements (also referred to as "Populist Islam"), involving selected 
segments of Muslim society-for example, members of the working class or 
those of the student community-who want to establish an Islamic system; 
and © government-sponsored Islamic programs that reassert religion as a 
primary ideological force (referred to variously as "Governmental Islam" or 
"Official Islam"). In the latter programs the leadership in power may be 
resorting to Islam for any number of reasons, including sincere religious 
beliefs, appeasement of an influential domestic religious group, enhancement 
of governmental legitimacy, assistance in the integration of a fragmented 
society, and acquisition of funds from rich Muslim countries. (Husain, 1995, 
p.4) 
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While public features of Islamic 'revivalism' are closer to the issues of concern, this term 
still lacks clarity and focus on the appropriate subject. While also favoring the expression, 
John Esposito, Director of the Center for Christian-Muslim Understanding at Georgetown, 
denotes the "deceptive" nature of the word, due to the implication "that Islam had somehow 
disappeared or been absent from the Muslim world. It is more correct to view Islamic 
revivalism as having led to a higher profile oflslam in Muslim politics and society." (Espo-
sito, 1992, p. 11) Again the broader environment is the focus here, when more speci-
ficity-aimed at the crux of a religio-political phenomenon-is the desired emphasis of this 
study. 
In seeking an alternative, Ali E. Hillal Dessouki uses the term Islamic 'resur-
gence'-with an even more appropriate political connotation in his definition. In developing 
the concept, he alludes to: 
... increasing political activism in the name of Islam by governments and 
opposition groups alike .... Islamic groups have assumed a more assertive 
posture and projected themselves in many Arab and Islamic countries as 
contenders for public allegiance and political loyalty. . . . Thus, Islamic 
resurgence refers to the increasing prominence and politicization of Islamic 
ideologies and symbols in Muslim societies and in the public life of Muslim 
individuals. (Dessouki, 1982, p. 4) 
While his definition is more suitable than others, the term 'resurgence' itselflacks the pre-
cise meaning required to simplify and streamline discussion-without his focus on politics 
and ideology, the term could pertain to other, less-significant aspects of the phenomenon. 
Since the general framework of an Islamist "new order" is comprehensive-as dis-
cussed in Chapters III and IV-it pertains not only to common social, cultural and moral 
aspects of a return to fundamentals of the faith, but specifically applies determining religious 
doctrines and principles to the political realm as well. Since terms such as "Islamic funda-
mentalism" or "Islamic revivalism" are less-than-specific, this analysis will use the expres-
sion political Islam-or Islam ism as it is also called-to focus on the specific phenomenon 
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m question, m order to avoid some of the misconceptions and shortcomings which 
accompany the former commonly misused terms. Political Islam has a basic goal of imple-
menting Islamic law and establishing an Islamic state, which in tum facilitates development 
of a just Islamic society and safeguards its political, cultural and religious integrity with\n 
the international order. 
Thus, Islamism can be distinguished from the more general pattern of revivalism-
which in this analysis refers more to a renewed emphasis on Islam as a religion within 
Muslim personal and public life (i.e., sociomoral reform}-by the inherently political 
features of Islamist ideologies, and their basic goals of implementing Islamic law and 
establishing an Islamic state. While obviously related to the broader, concurrent Islamic 
revival that has aroused the Muslim world over the last several decades, this distinction is 
crucial to understanding Islamism, because it must be viewed separately to concentrate on 
the crucial "subset" of problems and activities involved in order to derive appropriate 
implications. (Marty and Appleby, 1991, pp. xii-xv) Moreover, in terms of the primary 
focus of this thesis, political Islam-at the level of a global "phenomenon"-will still be 
shown to comprise a variety of related aspects and a range of activities involving both 
governments and oppositional movements striving to create an alternative order based upon 
Islamic precepts, laws and doctrine. While there are fundamental theological principles 
involved in each case, individual differences among Islamist groups are an even more 
important reason to avoid the monolithic aura of"fundamentalism" or to separate the broader 
activities of "revivalism," and refocus on the term political Islam to capture the more 
essential political considerations involved. 
2. Political Islam: Ideology Versus Theology 
It is this inherently political nature of the phenomenon that leads to a further required 
distinction, namely that political Islam must be seen as a grouping of political ideologies, 
and not strictly as theology, to aid in comprehension of its character, origins and strength. 
While the areas of politics and religious belief are obviously pervasive-and would have at 
least some interaction and mutual influence in any society-the focus in this analysis will 
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be on those deliberate efforts to fuse the two and to establish a political system based upon 
religion. In converting religious belief into political activism, Islamists can be seen as: 
... activists with scriptural shibboleths. They espouse an ideology but not a 
theology, and perhaps one of their enduring values is to force others who use 
a variety of terms in trying to account for the Muslim world to recognize the 
chasm that separates theology-a handmaid of philosophy that searches for 
a cohesive integration of all aspects of life-and ideology-a handmaid of 
power that looks for ways to authenticate those who have been rendered 
powerless by forces which they can only dimly understand .... [they] are 
exponents of ideology; they are not theologians. (Lawrence, 1987, pp. 31-32) 
This distinction not only reaffirms use of the term political Islam, but also sparks the require-
ment for further examination of the notion of ideology to ensure clarity and determine 
critical elements within the concept. 
Because this concept of ideology can be misunderstood and often considered impre-
cise, two related definitions will provide greater insight into the term's use in this analysis: 
Paul Salem denotes ideology as "a system of highly integrated ideas, principles, and aims 
that are related to sociopolitical action." Focusing even more on the crucial political aspects 
of the concept, Max Skidmore furnishes a similar definition: "Political ideology is a form 
of thought that presents a pattern of complex political ideas simply and in a manner that 
inspires action to achieve certain goals." In simultaneously breaking down these definitions 
and exploring some of the functions of the concept, an ideology can be described as 
"systematic" in that it provides a rational and cohesive "pattern" or framework for 
-understanding such factors as the relationship between individuals and society, religion and 
government, etc., by defining roles and identities for individuals, and answering their basic 
questions. Its "highly integrated" -nature reduces a "complex sociopolitical reality" through 
explanation in "a few central beliefs or theories"; by necessity, developing an ideology 
entails oversimplification, which provides Islamists and other Third World ideologues a 
major source of strength amidst the complex "crisis" environment (discussed in Chapter III) 
that exists in developing countries. Most important, the final portions of both definitions 
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stress political considerations, holding that an ideology goes beyond a simple paradigm of 
beliefs and precepts to provide an inspirational strategy for sociopolitical action that seeks 
to effect change in the current environment. However, this should not be seen as an 
indication of ideologies as simply vehicles of opposition-though they are powerful 
ones-as governments and individuals in positions of power can also use ideologies to 
generate support for the status quo or existing institutions. (Salem, 1994, p. 3; Skidmore, 
1993, pp. 7-8) 
3. The Concept of Ideology: Distinctions and Dynamics 
In expanding upon this last point, Skidmore focuses upon a key point of distinction 
among ideologies-namely that as a political device, they s~ek "one of two things: to 
preserve what exists or to change it." From this he defines two broad corresponding catego-
ries- "conservative" or "status quo" ideologies which seek to preserve existing institutions 
and programs, and "ideologies of change." He further subdivides this second group by type 
of change involved, namely "reformist" (those seeking change "essentially within the 
structure of existing institutions," often in a more gradual and partial manner) and 
"revolutionary" ideologies (those seeking to overturn these institutions, often with a more 
violent, 'ali-or-nothing' bent). (Skidmore, 1993, pp. 7-8) Most important, ideologies exist 
in one of these particular categories based only upon the relative conditions within which 
they occur, a factor that provides a key strength to the concept; for example: 
... [C]onsider the political ideology to which a nation-state adheres, the 
"official" ideology, as opposed to others ... also likely to be present. It will 
always support the institutions of the state, however much it may require 
rationalization and strained interpretations to do so. It therefore would be 
conservative. The ideology of a dissenting group would justify change, but 
if that group were to come to power and develop new institutions, its 
ideology-even if completely unchanged-would become conservative and 
justify the status quo. (Skidmore, 1993, p. 8) 
Skidmore emphasizes this inherent flexibility as the critical factor behind studying 
ideologies, by stating: 
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This ability of an ideology to shift its character depending upon the circum-
stances, without changing internally, suggests the most important reason for 
studying the [particular] phenomenon. If an ideology can inspire people to 
action, and if that action can be directed differently according to circum-
stances, it follows that those who control the terms of the discussion regard-
ing the ideology can use it to control and manipulate the people. (Skidmore, 
1993, p. 10; emphasis added) 
These distinctions, and contextual influences, are very important considerations when 
discussing the phenomenon of political Islam. As will be shown, the wide variety of 
political activists who promote an "Islamic" brand of politics makes it necessary to have a 
firm grasp on their particular perspective of the socio-political environment and what 
position they may currently occupy along the "conservative-revolutionary" ideological 
spectrum-thus indicating the political basis for whatever programs they may promote. 
This leads to other important general considerations related to ideologies, including 
the dynamics involved in the rise and decline of ideologies over time-such as in the "Age 
of Ideology" in the Greater Middle East. Key common variables, according to Salem, 
include socioeconomic class, minorities, generations, and crises. The impact of socio-
economic class on the growth of ideological political thought extends beyond the Marxist 
theory of class material interests to include intellectual and psychological biases of specific 
classes: 
... [A] class will generally adopt and promote an ideology that expresses its 
material interests .... The ideology of a class, however, is also partially a 
politically neutral reflection of [its] educational, cultural, and social 
background .... Ideologies become especially active and important at times 
of class change when a dominated class is toppling a dominating class or 
when a dominating class is desperately resisting such a challenge. . . . 
Ideology also serves, however, as a politically neutral means of explaining 
and understanding reality for classes that are newly formed or ... moving 
into new and unfamiliar social environments. Finally, the dialectical 
opposition between classes applies also to the content of their ideologies .. 
. . [H]ence, the ideological outlook of any class is largely determined 
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negatively by the ideology of the class it is struggling against. (Salem, 1994, 
pp. 21-22) 
Based upon this consideration, and the crucial role of previous ideologies in the formation 
of new replacements, an analysis of the "life cycles" of ideologies within the Greater Middle 
East is helpful to understand the background of political Islam. 
Salem also points to the key role of minorities in this development process. As will 
be shown, religious minorities (including non-Sunni Muslims) had significant impact on the 
ideologies which preceded political Islam. Arab nationalism or "state-centered" 
nationalisms "offered [these minorities] a chance of escaping from their position as a 
minority," by providing an ideological umbrella allowing them to "identify themselves with 
the majority," according to Albert Hourani (1983, pp. 276-277). More important, these 
groups-particularly Christians and Jews-were more receptive to European political ideas 
and principles, and actively promoted ideologies which incorporated such input. (Salem, 
1994,pp.23) 
Generational change also has direct relevance to ideology, a factor especially appli-
cable to the youth in transitional societies of the Third World. While Salem's focus is 
specifically on Arab society, his comments are germane to this study's larger focus. He 
finds that young members of society are especially open to a new means of confronting the 
established order: 
[Y]oung individuals are almost always in some attitude of rebellious;{;ss 
toward the dominant order of their parents and society. Entering the adult 
social and political system on the lowest rung in terms of economic and 
social power, they are naturally threatened by and hostile to the dominant 
order .... Not surprisingly, then, one finds youth very centrally placed in 
almost all the ideological movements of the modem Arab world. They 
support bold challenges to the status quo and are open to ideological 
formulations of the world and their place in it. ... they are highly suggestible 
·but have little original ideological preference . . . . Above all, they are 
opposed to the status quo and support almost any serious challenge from 
below ... (Salem, 1994, p. 24) 
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As will be shown, the resulting frustrations of social change are particularly hard on younger 
members of transitional societies. They are exposed to myriad changes and experience a 
greater degree of the frustration that permeates society as they search for a proper role in it. 
Interestingly enough, once accepting the new ideology at this young age, the new generation 
is "likely to hold roughly to that worldview through its remaining years," and eschew novel 
ideologies promoted by new generations or opposing ideologues. The clear implication from 
this understanding is that the current adherents to an Islamist strategy of change are likely 
to remain a critical feature of the region's ideological future. (Salem, 1994, pp. 24-28) 
However, the most important concern-in terms of the potential threat from political 
Islam-of this element of tension between young society members and the established order 
is that the success of an ideology's acceptance within this group is often determined more 
by what it is against than what it is for. (Salem, 1994, p. 26) As an ideology of opposition, 
political Islam has tremendous potential to attract and mobilize the youth against the 
dominant order. However, in seeking an alternative to the status quo, the formation of new 
ideologies: 
... need not be pendular or cyclical in the sense that generations will go back 
and forth between two antithetical world views. Indeed, . . . the process is 
more liable to be dialectical with each generation rejecting the· status quo for 
a new formulation that draws many elements from the past and present 
experiences .... ideological history will not exactly repeat itself but instead 
trace a zig-zag pattern. (Salem, 1994, p. 25) 
Shils also indicates the notion of a dialectical correlation between a preceding ideology and 
the success of a replacement: 
Mere rejection of the existing society and the prevailing outlook of the elites 
of that society is not sufficient. For an ideology to exist, there must also be 
an attendant vision of a positive alternative to the existing pattern of society 
and its culture and an intellectual capacity to articulate that vision as part of 
the cosmic order. (Shils, 1968, p. 69) 
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Islam's common culture and easily recognized symbols provide supportive ties within an 
ideology that confronts problems of the day in a new, opposing vision for the future. More 
important, Islamists reinterpret these symbols and ideas in new and unique ways, while 
incorporating popular aspects of modem influences and principles as part of their 
comprehensive social framework/strategy. 
Finally, Salem points to the major influence of political crises on ideological move-
ments and the related impact on their beliefs. The occurrence of great events, which shake 
the foundations of the established order and its dominant ideology-such as the disaster of 
the 1967 Arab defeat by Israel-generally have a profound effect of engendering new 
ideological responses to changed conditions: 
[T]he ability of a dominant class to project its ideology on other classes as a 
source of political legitimacy is very vulnerable to crises. Crises undercut 
the authority of an ideology in at least two ways. On the political level, any 
serious defeat brings into question the performance of the ruling class and the 
suitability of its ideology. Convinced that the present political arrangement 
is partially to blame ... people begin to look for alternative arrangements of 
power and alternative ideologies to accompany it. On the psychological 
level, the historical association of any ideology with a painful defeat saps that 
ideology of its ability to evoke sentiments of optimism, power and 
confidence [and] becomes itself a symbol of weakness and defeat. (Salem, 
1994,p.29) 
This searching by the masses for a new ideology to follow, coupled with the previously 
noted likelihood of the elite to continue supporting at least the central tenants of their 
existing ideological standard, further emphasizes the confrontational atmosphere surrounding 
ideological change. If the current elites will not provide a legitimate vision of required 
change, then ideologues will soon challenge the status quo deemed as perpetuating a failed 
social order. 
Based upon this general overview of the concept, linkage between Islamist groups 
is understood to extend beyond similarities of the general environment and fundamental 
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Islamic religious beliefs to certain dynamics related to the notion of ideology itself. 
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that the primacy of local socioeconomic and political 
conditions restrict the breadth of ideological harmony within the overall phenomenon 
implied by these commonalities. In concluding remarks from a study of the history of 
ideology, in which he sought to clarifY the concept by examining its application in a variety 
of cases, Terry Eagleton observes the inherent flexibility and individuality in the concept, 
and cautions against those who would propose a monolithic vision of any ideology, such as 
political Islam: 
Dominant ideologies, and occasionally oppositional ones, often employ such 
devices as unification, spurious identification, naturalization, deception, self-
deception, universalization and rationalization. But they do not do so 
universally; indeed it is doubtful that one can ascribe to ideology any invari-
able characteristics at all. We are dealing less with some essence of ideology 
than with an overlapping network of 'family resemblances' .... We need, 
then, to look skeptically upon various essentialist cases about ideology ... 
. [Such] perspectives contain a kernel of truth; but taken in isolation they 
show up as partial and flawed. (Eagleton, 1991, p. 222) 
Examples of variation in Islamism's power and influence across the spectrum of 
relationships between Islam and political power-and changes introduced by the transition 
when activists gain power (such as in Iran)--will show how critical it is to understand the 
nature of political Islam as a grouping of disparate political ideologies, and not as simply a 
single static, "scripturalist" outgrowth oflslamic Theology. 
Thus, the initial attempt of this section to separate the particular Islamist "line-of-
thought" from the multifaceted context of the broader Islamic revival, indicates a difficult-
but essential-first step needed to successfully comprehend political Islam. While there are 
some aspects common to the general phenomenon throughout the Greater Middle East region 
-as discussed in Chapter III-the requisite differentiation needed to exhibit the diversity 
that exists within political Islam will follow, as part of case study surveys in Chapter IV. 
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In summary, distinguishing among elements within the pervasive Islamic 'revival,' 
and recognizing the diversity of ideological considerations among the Islamists themselves, 
are basic requirements to properly perceive the phenomenon, as well as provide a sound 
basis for beginning further analysis. Hopefully, by differentiating between those individuals 
and movements who view Islam as theology and those who adhere to various politically-
motivated ideological viewpoints-then further distinguishing between the methods used 
by various groups and individuals to reach their stated goals-some of the misconceptions 
of political Islam can be overcome and the common misuse of a term like Islamic 
fundamentalism avoided. With this understanding, the discussion of political Islam will 
move to a review of those similarities of environment and ideology that exist at various 
levels of analysis. 
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II. MODERNIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE THIRD WORLD 
The basic premise behind this thesis is based upon the fact that the ubiquitous, 
grueling processes entailed in modernization and development are common to most develop-
ing countries of the Third World. In that light, the "crisis" environment concurrently gener-
ated by discontinuities existing throughout these transitional societies forms the fundamental 
source of the proliferation of ideological political thought-such as political Islam-and 
related activities throughout the broader Third World. Essentially, this "crisis" environment 
encompasses many interactive aspects from across the sociopolitical spectrum and, thus, they 
can understand Islamism as an ideological response to the cumulative deterioration of social, 
political, economic and cultural conditions within various Muslim countries. As will be 
illustrated in the next chapter, political Islam is a response that makes use of-but is not 
driven by-the ideas, symbology and history of the Islamic faith to promote an alternative 
to perceived failing development efforts of mostly secular national governments. 
To set the stage for elaborating similarities found in this "crisis" environment and the 
linkage between political Islamic ideologies and similar phenomena throughout the 
developing world, the complex effects of modernization and development-and the destruc-
tive impact of colonialism-on these societies will be briefly examined first in this chapter. 
Then, a brief survey of the discontinuities-the detrimental "side effects"-typically 
generated by the cumulative impact of such processes within transitional countries will be 
presented, within the framework of a "cause and effect" -type relationship. Since the "crisis" 
atmosphere is multifaceted, this analysis will attempt to briefly review the process in a 
comprehensive manner- accounting for various factors of influence, including those related 
to political economy and sociology, in addition to cultural elements such as religion and 
values-while acknowledging the constantly interactive nature of the various components. 
In addition, because the processes involved in modernization and development have both 
structural/organizational and behavioral/attitudinal components, both aspects will be 
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examined simultaneously when "defining" elements within these actions and when 
illustrating manifestations of political, economic, social and cultural change creating the 
"crisis" conditions. Finally, while the general discussion is focused on typical situations in 
all developing countries, specific examples are provided at other levels of analysis-such 
as the Greater Middle East-as appropriate. 
To begin with some basic considerations providing background for analysis, one of 
the most important factors that all Third World countries-not just those of the Greater Mid-
dle East-share in common is being faced with the lengthy, wrenching and even painful 
process of modernization. James Bill and Robert Springborg (1994, p. 3) define moderniza-
tion as an evolutionary "process by which men and women increasingly gain control over 
their environment." As noted in the introduction, the currently pervasive phenomenon of 
political Islam is actually a modem outgrowth. Islamism and similar Third World ideologies 
share somewhat standard origins in the historical contexts fostered by modernization and the 
interrelated concept of development, which Monte Palmer (1989, p. 6) defines as: "the 
evolution of societies from 'traditional' forms of political, social, and economic organization 
centered on the family and the tribe into 'modem' forms centering on the state."Unlike their 
counterparts in the West, most Greater Middle East states have been faced with a situation 
of almost "forced" modernization due to their relatively late start in the process (roughly 
since the tum of the century and for some after World War I) and the pervasive influence of 
the First World they have experienced since then. Despite attempts at extensive 
development, regional states remain well short of many of their goals, in some cases creating 
an environment of"crisis." 
A. TRADITION VERSUS MODERNITY: THE CONFLICT WITHIN 
TRANSITIONAL SOCIETY 
To properly review the principal aspects of modernization and development and their 
impact on society, it helps to start by comparing and contrasting the general "beginning" and 
the intended "end" for these complex processes-the transition of traditional societies to 
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modem ones. Traditional societies differ from more modem ones in many ways, but some 
more important areas of contrast include: social structure, economies, political systems, 
cultural systems, behavioral outlooks, ethics and values. While progress within developing 
countries across these areas is uneven at best, most Third World states exhibit some 
attributes of both traditional and modem societies in each dimension; such "amalgams" can 
be labeled transitional societies. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 31, 79) 
To distinguish between "traditional" and "modem" societies in both structural/ 
organizational and attitudinal/behavioral fields, the primary contrast is in basic social 
structure: 
The social structure of traditional societies is based on the extended family 
[which] ... bears primary responsibility for nurturing traditional individuals 
into adulthood, for shaping their basic values .... The social structure of 
modem societies, by contrast, is a highly differentiated network of speciali-
zed socioeconomic and political units, which reach their apex in the state. 
The state, not the extended family bears ultimate responsibility for meeting 
the needs ofthe individual. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 31-43). 
The economic and political systems have a similar divergence, with traditional societies po-
ssessing "poorly differentiated, agrarian, family-based barter economies" operating essential-
ly at subsistence level and "rudimentary" political institutions "dominated by family-based 
tribal chieftains who justify their authority ascriptively on the basis of lineage, religion or 
tradition." They also feature low levels of mass political participation. Modem societies, 
conversely: 
... are characterized by highly differentiated industrial economies, which 
both use and generate innovative technology and create a surplus of goods 
and services sufficient to provide most members of society with a standard 
ofliving well in excess of mere subsistence .... political systems of modem 
societies are characterized by complex, highly differentiated organizational 
structures dominated by elites selected predominantly on the basis of 
achievement or merit. . . . All political functions . . . are performed by 
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specialized units ... [and] mass political participation is intense. (Palmer, 
1989, p. 43) 
In addition, general behavioral outlooks and value systems are important determinants of 
political trends, and suggest some major differences in the two positions: 
Human behavior tends to reflect the individual's social and cultural milieu . 
. . . Traditional individuals, reflecting the values of traditional cultures, are 
said to be passive, fatalistic, conforming, and non-innovative. Modem indi-
viduals, by contrast, tend to have a far stronger sense of human volition: to 
be more aggressive, more innovative, and more imbued with ... "achieve-
ment motivation." ... Similarly, traditional individuals, reflecting the perva-
sive role of the extended family ... are said to be particularistic and paro-
chial. Kinship obligations take primacy .... Modem individuals, by con-
trast, are said to be universalistic. Kinship obligations are regularly 
superseded by occupational, political, and social obligations. Merit and the 
maximization of personal advantage outweigh kinship ties ... [and] the state 
rather than the family is the terminal focus of individual loyalty. (Palmer, 
1989, pp. 43-44) 
Social and developmental theorists generally assume that both the attitudinal/behavioral 
patterns of traditional individuals and the structural/organizational aspects of their societies 
inhibit various types of development, and may actually deny support to a modernizing leader 
attempting to improve their standards of living. 
Thus, the route to modernization is exceedingly difficult, and must go beyond a focus 
on importing technology and modem institutions to incorporate a comprehensive reorganiza-
tion of traditional society. Essentially, the process can be seen as a two-staged effort of 
disintegration and reintegration. Disintegration entails "the reduced utility and effectiveness 
of traditional authority, beliefs, and behavior patterns," while reintegration is "the develop-
ment of new institutions, beliefs, and behavior patterns that are radically different than the 
old." As such, the concept of integration, essentially the "smoothness of fit" between 
specific components arid the aggregate entity, can be applied as a measurement of 
developmental success across the various dimensions involved. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 45-47) 
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In Third World countries, however, the process of disintegration is much more successful 
and thorough, while struggling governments rarely solve the enigma of reintegration on 
anything close to the same pace. Providing further differentiation, Palmer (1989, p. 7) 
makes a distinction between development and change, with the former being a purposeful 
type of change that is goal-oriented (namely, to "modernize" across the range of political, 
economic, social and cultural spheres), while the latter is simply any variation of an existing 
state or condition (often in a negative manner). Thus, since not all development efforts can 
be called successful, this "dialectical clash between the challenging forces of modernity and 
the persistent strength of tradition" (Bill and Springborg, 1994, p. 1) frequently creates 
undesirable changes and great disparities across social, politi<;al, economic, cultural and 
psychological spheres. 
The result is the predicament of poorly integrated, transitional societies mired some-
where between the old and the new, fragmented socially-among various divisions of tribe, 
ethnic or regional group, and religion-with no true sense of national political community. 
The lack of integration leads to a lack of regime legitimacy-or "the belief among citizens 
... that the state's political institutions are important, that they must be cherished and pre-
served from harm"-and institutionalized political institutions, thus denying modernizing 
elites a crucial basis of strength. Because of continued strong traditional influence, identifi-
cation with and support for the state lags well behind lingering support for tribal, ethnic or 
religious organizations. Also, a critical factor is that frequently, regimes are unable to meet 
the rising demands of their subjects in various critical areas. Within transitional countries, 
the prevailing atmosphere of"crisis" creates corresponding growing numbers of transitional 
individuals, filled with anxiety, who question old beliefs and values-while failing to under-
stand or support radically-different behaviors and the rationales behind government-
sponsored development drives. Given a "taste" ofthe more pleasant aspects of moderniza-
tion, transitional individuals tend to have much higher expectations when compared to tradi-
tional society, but lack the requisite skills and appreciation of modem practices to meet 
them. The resulting frustration creates a "spawning ground" of alienated, angry and naive 
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individuals who readily respond to ideological declarations and charismatic leadership. 
(Palmer, 1989, pp. 46-49) 
B. GOVERNMENT-LED DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE 
Transitional governments, also hampered by these "crisis" conditions, attempt to 
meet the demands of their transitional subjects and to make progress in the difficult process 
of reintegration to stave-off mass opposition. Bill and Springborg succinctly describe the 
complicated situation faced by regimes: 
Modernization is an unsettling, disruptive, painful process. The comforts of 
traditional habits are lost as these habits are uprooted. In modernizing soci-
eties, new processes and institutions seem always to be trapped in a state of 
becoming . . . as a result, the expected uncertainties of the past have given 
way to the more frightful and unknown insecurities of the present. In the 
Middle East, where most of the societies have seriously begun to modernize, 
any slowing or reversal of the process causes great stress. Yet the uneven 
supply of national resources, the shortage of technical skills, and the 
weakness of political leadership are all severe impediments . . . . 
Modernization is a process in which expectations necessarily race beyond 
their satisfaction. However, satisfaction must never lag too far behind. In 
most Middle Eastern societies, the gap between sharpened aspirations and 
their attainment threatens to become a chasm. The consequent frustrations 
directly promote social upheaval and political unrest. (Bill and Springborg, 
1994,p.5) 
Faced with the dual challenges of difficult modernization goals and growing demands from 
the populace, government development efforts take on a critical role in this turbulent milieu. 
Any analysis of development must start from the basic pretense that, while the pro-
cess entails political, economic, social and cultural dimensions, the people of the state or 
society are the ultimate target of government development efforts. Thus, social change is 
the inevitable result of this effort, and-regardless of the initial intent-such change does 
not always translate directly into modernized societies. The uneven and often "negative" 
progress that results creates the atmosphere where ideologies arise and thrive. There are a 
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variety of additional factors that affect these development endeavors, and the subsequent 
direction and pace of social change. As such, a comprehensive survey of these influences 
aids later discussion of the resultant "crisis" environment created by modernization. Of note, 
while this chapter attempts to point out similarities among states in that environment, the 
various attributes discussed below will certainly vary across the range of countries in the 
Greater Middle East-a heterogeneity that not only establishes the basis for Chapter IV's 
focus on qualities of certain states and the general polycentric character of political Islam, 
but also must be keep in mind throughout the review of commonalities. 
1. Determinants of Development 
First, since decision making and development plans are the products of ruling elites 
and their values, the stance of these elites toward the entire development effort (across vari-
ous spheres of politics, economics, social issues, culture, etc.) is a critical consideration. 
Second, a crucial aspect involved is their respective viewpoint and ideological stance on the 
balance between rapid economic growth and the corresponding diverse social changes that 
result. The discontinuous processes involved in modernization and development require 
flexibility, vision, and courage from elites seeking the requisite symmetry for the current 
situation: 
[M]odernization ... is [a] dynamic that can either retard or promote political 
development. Dramatic economic and technological growth increases the 
needs [of] population .... such advancement [also] strengthens the capacity 
of the political elite to exert influence and control. In order to muster-the 
strength necessary to exploit scarce resources and to initiate effective 
planning programs, Middle Eastern elites have often relied upon authoritarian 
political methods. When they do this, they risk sliding into repressive and 
oppressive modes of behavior that fatally weaken their capacities for political 
development. ... On the other hand, if the elites govern loosely and decen-
tralization reigns supreme, they may also forfeit their developmental 
capacities as society breaks down into conflicting ethnic, regional, and class-
based cliques .... The process is a delicate balance of capacity and demands. 
Increasing demands require an enhanced capacity to meet them. 
Development involves a constant push and pull between the two sides. (Bill 
and Springborg, 1994, p. 12) 
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The elites are faced with the dilemmas of this situation on a daily basis, as demands upon 
their governments continue to grow from rapidly rising populations. Regime-types and their 
associated outlooks can range from "national socialist" systems-such as seen in Egypt, 
Syria, Iraq and Algeria-where emphasis is placed upon an ideological blending of national-
ism and traditional religious and social values in an attempt to foster economic progress, to 
the traditional regimes-like Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies-that emphasize con-
trolled growth ofthe economy and an attempt to minimize disruption of the religious and 
tribal basis for their authority that would likely result from rapid social change. "Knowledge 
of an elite's core values provides an important guide to predicting how vigorously that elite 
is likely to pursue rapid economic growth as well as the types of modernization programs 
it will select. ... Knowledge of elite values also helps predict the severity of the means they 
are likely to use in their efforts to mobilize the masses in the pursuit of their goals." (Palmer, 
1989, pp. 20-23) While the focus ofthis analysis is not to identify why certain elite choices 
are made or to debate social determinism, this section merely points out key roles played by 
elites (and their ideologies) in the overall modernization effort. These roles are much less 
restricted than in the First World, due to the limitations of formal political institutions in 
most Third World countries, and bring the whims of rulers more centrally into the policy 
making process. 
A. second key factor concerning governments and elites-related to this idea of 
limited constraints on government-is the legacy, especially evident in the countries of the 
Greater Middle East, of the great size and scope of state intervention into nearly all aspects 
of society. Alan Richards and John Waterbury (1990, Ch. 7), in examining this situation 
note that, whatever the legitimacy granted any particular state or its specific policies of the 
moment, there is apparent widespread acceptance of interventionist policies by governments 
as legitimate and necessary to harness the state's resources to develop society-a stark 
contrast to Western notions of the proper role of the state: 
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[I]t is conceded in the abstract that the state and its leaders have a right and 
an obligation to set a course for society and to use public resources to pursue 
that course. Two principles ... of Western liberal tradition are given short 
shrift. One is that state authorities, to the extent possible, should confine 
themselves to themselves to the maintenance of law and order, [limited] 
regulation of economic life, provision of basic social-welfare benefits, and 
defense of the borders. The Middle Eastern state has taken on functions 
vastly more complex than these, and its citizenry has endorsed the effort. 
Second, the emphasis is on the ends of state intervention, and checks on 
balances are not seen as preventing abuse of power but rather as impeding the 
state's course toward its goals. Therefore, to some extent, there has been an 
acceptance of a high concentration of power--economic, administrative, and 
military. (Richards and Waterbury, 1990, pp. 184-185) 
While noting that historical and cultural factors may play a part, they believe that the 
fundamental basis for this situation is the "politics of decolonialization and development," 
the two key subjects within this chapter. 
The critical factor involved in elite/government activities is the ability to efficiently 
collect and manage available resources to meet development requirements. One key factor 
is this effort is mobilization, which Palmer (1989, pp. 25-26) defines as "an elite's capacity 
to motivate its subjects, and to organize and direct them once they have become motivated" 
(emphasis in original). In their attempts at government-led development, ruling elites po-
ssess varying degrees of three basic types of assets (or resources) which provide them the 
capacity for mobilization: economic assets, coercive assets and symbolic or identitive assets. 
These are defined as follows: 
Coercive assets refer to the ability of an elite to force compliance with its 
wishes through the application of force. Economic assets refer to the ability 
of to manipulate mass behavior through the granting or withholding of ma-
terial rewards. Symbolic assets refer to the ability to persuade the masses to 
support specific programs on a voluntary basis because they believe that it 
is the right and proper thing to do and because they believe that the ruling 
elite has their best interests at heart. (Palmer, 1989, p. 26; emphasis in 
original) 
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While typically relying on combinations of these types of assets, it is a basic fact that many 
transitional regimes, with obvious vested interest in preserving the established order, are 
faced with a need to mobilize the masses while lacking essential legitimacy required for 
symbolic persuasion, or the resources and institutions to provide appropriate material 
rewards. 
Thus, they are forced to rely more on coercive force in their attempts to maintain 
control and carry out development plans. A spiraling cycle tends to develop as coercion 
typically broadens the alienation and frustration of the masses, creating the need for even 
stronger coercive measures. As Palmer (1989, p. 31) states, "the ultimate test of the organi-
zational and motivational capacity of the political system is its ability to involve the masses 
in its modernization projects." In order to develop the requisite level of voluntary support 
for elite programs among the masses-and the corresponding belief and faith in government 
leaders and institutions-regimes lacking an overabundance of material resources (to "buy" 
support) must normally pursue a more balanced development effort accounting for required 
growth in all dimensions involved, especially the area of political participation. "[H]owever, 
the ability to transform fundamentally the basic power configurations has been the rarest 
form of political change" (Bill and Springborg, 1994, p. 19). Instead, regimes pursue the 
dangerous gamble of repression. For example: 
The forces of modernization, by providing political elites with more 
sophisticated techniques of control, can enhance their capacity to me."'€?t 
demands and to provide security. They also, however, can permit elitesto 
stifle demands through repression. Calls for participation, equal opportunity, 
and justice can be smothered by "security" forces .... Security through 
repression is often a harbinger of violence and upheaval. (Bill and 
Springborg, 1994, pp. 9-1 0) 
Further examination of this crucial aspect of the transitional environment will be undertaken 
below in considering the problems associated with state and nation building. Elite values 
form the basis for their ideologies and, when combined with elite assets, are the single-most 
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important parts of the development equation in transitional societies. Success or failure in 
development is most often a result of this particular component. 
Next, political institutions are also key determinants of regime ability to reach 
modernization goals. These institutions, though often lacking in substance in most 
transitional states, are significant because they provide an indication of the critical "organi-
zational and motivational capacity of the state" to mobilize its human and natural resources 
behind the development effort. The government bureaucracy, political parties, and military 
and security forces are primary components of concern here. The bureaucracy carries out 
the plans and runs the development programs desired by elites. Program success is largely 
determined by the efficiency and energy applied by members of.the bureaucracy-which in 
developing states are "minimally effective at best." Political parties are important because 
they serve as a bridge/communication channel between elites and the "targeted" masses. 
With proper organization and a receptive political environment, parties can help in the 
critical socialization process needed to mobilize support for the regime. Nevertheless, most 
Third World states have poorly developed political organizations due to an improper balance 
between the developmental spheres and an environment that inhibits suitable political 
development: 
Changes occasioned by the forces of modernization usually occur in the 
physical environment and are most dramatically evident in the areas of 
technology and economics. Impressive change here, however, does not 
necessarily signal basic alteration in the sociopolitical system. Traditional 
patterns of power and authority tend to resist fundamental change. Personal 
equality, political participation, and social justice are usually the last issues 
to be confronted. Political elites have vested interests in preserving ongoing 
political patterns. (Bill and Springborg, 1994, p. 9) 
The import of Western institutions has changed the face of the political arena, but little 
substantial change has been noticed in traditional patterns of rule: 
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Political institutionalization has never been absent in the Middle East. 
Masses and elites were bound together by a number of important linkage 
structures, which included elaborate networks of intermediaries .... [This] 
personalized institutionalization resulted in numerous lines of 
communication through society .... Grievances could often be aired and 
demands could be heard. The political elite, however, enjoyed the 
prerogative of action and redress. The petitioners lacked the institutional 
organization that could guarantee the satisfaction of their demands. The 
coming of political parties and parliaments has seldom changed this form of 
participation. Parties have often existed as loose collections of personal 
cliques that have penetrated little beyond the upper crust of society .... they 
have served largely as the instruments of powerful individuals and small 
elites. (Bill and Springborg, 1994, pp. 20-21) 
Finally, military and security forces enter the development equation primarily as the insti-
tutions charged with providing sufficient security and political order to permit development. 
As noted, these forces are often used to enforce mass compliance and quell unrest, especially 
among regimes lacking legitimacy and without strong development of political institutions. 
(Palmer, 1989, pp. 27-28) 
Regime development efforts-in this case primarily of the economy-also hinge on 
available resources, both material and human, which vary widely across developing 
countries. States with abundant natural resources and mineral wealth can avoid some obsta-
cles to growth faced by their disadvantaged neighbors when they translate these resources 
into government income. Such countries are referred to as rentier states, because their 
wealth is based more upon economic rents received from export of raw materials rather than 
from national production. Royalties from mineral wealth permit such states to benefit from 
sometimes enormous wealth without developing significant production capabilities. Each 
country generally benefits-based again upon the variable of regime capabilities previously 
noted- from an increased standard of living and government subsidies, a reduced 
requirement for taxes, and the ability to import high technology and hire foreign labor and 
technical experts. Host states will also often avoid major development of the political 
infrastructure, because large incomes allow them to adequately meet the peoples' demands 
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without greatly expanding popular participation. However, since these economies often have 
such narrow bases of support and limited productive capabilities in other areas, these 
regimes have very vulnerable economic assets-and thus the security and stability of the 
overall system come into question. Also, as these states spend their revenues, new demands 
typically arise from members of society that in turn reduces the alternatives for political 
action by regimes. (Richards and Waterbury, 1990, pp. 16-17; see also Beblawi and Luciani, 
1987) 
As for other states-those without the comfort of inordinate wealth to distri-
bute-they must deal with the adversities of seeking rapid economic growth within an often 
hostile world economic system. They can pursue various policies or strategies (or 
combinations), such as import substitution or manufacture-export-led growth, in seeking 
rapid economic development-yet each of these has its own particular drawbacks and 
discontinuities. One important constant that most regional governments have to face is the 
issue of a "food gap" between agricultural production and rising consumption-an 
increasing difficult problem even in countries rich in agricultural lands. Alan Richards and 
John Waterbury (1990, pp. 139-146) provide a "straightforward" analysis of the food-
security problem, hinting at the actual gross mismanagement among the developing states 
of the region: 
Rapid population growth and per capita income expansion due to the oil 
boom of the 1970s increased the demand for food. At the same time, natural 
and social constraints (sometimes exacerbated by state policies) limited the 
domestic supply response .... [D]emand for food in the region will continue 
to increase rapidly. Population growth is unlikely to fall dramatically .... It 
is reasonable to conclude that there will be little reduction in the food gap 
from the demand side. (Richards and Waterbury, 1990, pp. 140-141) 
Lingering problems involving development of the agricultural sector will impede overall 
economic development efforts. The continued stagnation in growth of this crucial sector will 
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exacerbate the problems of rural migration to the cities, unemployment, burdensome food 
subsidies, and potential "food riots." 
Regime planning for economic growth often focuses almost exclusively on the issue 
of industrialization-this sector is often seen as "driving" the rest of the economy. However, 
the methods employed have aggravated the previous problems of the economy: 
Partly because of a desire to have the most modem technology available, and 
partly because of distorted price signals, much of the industry installed in the 
Middle East during the last generation has been capital intensive. Conse-
quently, the amount of investment required to create a job has been very 
high. Due to managerial inefficiencies and foreign exchange bottlenecks, 
these same industrial facilities have been plagued by idle capacity, driving 
up the amount of investment needed to add to output. ... Perhaps worst of 
all, however, these industries have all too often not produced the kinds of 
simple consumer goods that the bulk of the population wants and can afford. 
[Instead, they] tum out relatively expensive, "top of the line" consumer 
durables, like refrigerators ... and automobiles. (Richards and Waterbury, 
1990, p. 17) 
By failing to gain full benefit from their comparative advantage of cheap labor costs and 
shifting capital to other critical development sectors, modernizing elites not only broke a car-
dinal rule of economics, but they added problems and frustrations to a mounting "crisis" 
milieu. Moreover, when seeking foreign investment capital or government aid to finance 
industrialization, regimes must be concerned with "strings" that are attached, as well as the 
standard distress from what is typically a required total restructuring of their economies. 
In addition, these "have not" states are often burdened with much larger populations 
and the associated larger scale of problems they create. This raises related issues concerning 
human resources. The people of transitional societies, while noted as the target of develop-
ment efforts, are also critical actors in bringing government plans to fruition, and they are 
especially critical to those regimes without great mineral wealth to rely on for economic 
security. In seeking to raise the level of technical skills and productive capacity of its 
citizens, large-scale education programs are undertaken. However, these systems are often 
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substandard and lacking in the technical and scientific courses required to compete in the 
modem business and industrial environments. Many technically advanced students travel 
overseas for training and education, and often remain there after their schooling is 
over-creating a "brain drain" effect that hampers the overall development effort. (Palmer, 
1989, pp.30-31) 
In summary, since politics can be seen as guiding the development process, the 
functions of elites and political institutions-as well as the resources available and strategies 
implemented-are central to determining the success of planned economic growth and 
modernization. To be considered "developed," Bill and Springborg (1994, p. 7) hold that 
a political system must be able "to initiate, absorb, and sustain continuous transformation"; 
the primary focus is on the fostering and satisfaction of citizens' "demands for equality of 
opportunity, political participation, and social justice." The structure of the system should 
be sound enough to cope with the tremendous social upheaval and stress that accompany the 
development process, able to meet the needs and expectations of the population, and 
maintain control. Beyond such "political" development, considerations must also be made 
as to meeting other basic requirements; a country's political system must not only control 
its population and resource base but also keep these assets secure from foreign exploitation. 
Finally, an ability to mobilize human and material resources in support of economic and 
social development goals is a necessity for progress. While First World states have been 
successful in developing the requisite political institutions to meet these standards, most 
Third World states have yet to exhibit such capacity. Part of the problem plaguing 
-developing countries is preserving the delicate balance required between centralized control 
of the fragile economic development effort and developing sound political institutions, 
which broaden popular participation and provide an outlet for some social unrest-as well 
as maintain at least some measure of legitimacy for the government and authenticity in its 
values and goals. Vast differences in time scale and mass expectations, coupled with the 
extensive penetration of their societies by foreign influences, today's developing countries 
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have major disadvantages when compared with their predecessors in the West. (Palmer, 
1989, pp. 16-19) 
2. The Impact of Colonialism on Social Change 
As "the single most important factor in the erosion of the world's traditional soci-
eties," (Palmer, 1989, p. 80) European colonialism had a tremendous influence on most 
developing countries in the Greater Middle East, transforming their traditional societies and 
providing some "encouragement" in their start along the arduous path of modernization. The 
most prominent aspect entailed the previously noted penetration of foreign influences, such 
as secularism, into nearly all aspects of the environment. In fact, following World War I, the 
aggressive spread of influences from the European countries-which benefitted from having 
begun their developmental agendas earlier and under different circumstances-was so great 
that soon the countries of Third World could no longer be viewed as conforming to the 
traditional model: the Third world's transitional societies had been "born." 
Not all these influential elements were unfavorable, but most had at least some 
negative aspects which created discontinuities within the developing states. For example, 
colonialism provided the obvious benefits of modem health practices and education systems 
to Third World countries. However, modem medicine soon led to the exponential growth 
of populations-outstripping the abilities of traditional subsistence economies of states to 
provide basic necessities for their citizens. Improved education meant greater exposure to 
a variety of new influences-such as the mass media, foreign languages, ideologies and life-
styles, and even new political models-which further increased interaction with foreign soci-
eties and created an increasing spiral of aspirations and expectations which in even the best 
of circumstances would have been hard to satisfy. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 80-85, 91-92; Richards 
and Waterbury, 1990, pp. 49, 112-136) Colonial rulers also sought to use the bases of 
traditional power to an advantage, focusing support to-and thus control over-traditional 
rulers who now were insecure in their leadership positions. 
Nevertheless, since the principal reason behind European interest in the region was 
economic-major involvement in the region generally began in the wake of the Industrial 
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Revolution and the corresponding search for foreign markets-it was in this sphere that 
massive change and the erosion of traditional principles was most noticeable initially. As 
part of the transition process, colonialism brought changes to the traditional 
economies-with the transformation of barter economies to standardized monetary system~, 
and the shift from subsistence-level to mercantile-based productive power as exporters of 
raw materials. As workers began to receive regular wages, they gained mobility previously 
unheard of in the region and the potential to significantly better their status by accumulating 
property and wealth. Dramatic disparities in earnings rates lead to the growth of economic 
classes in societies that were previously essentially uniform. Since penetration of these 
regions was aimed at gaining markets as well as access to primary products, members of 
these transitional societies received a growing supply of European goods and services. The 
growing distinctions between the "haves" and "have nots" in these states were highlighted 
by their relative access to these new "luxuries." From a structural perspective, however, it 
was the effect of the mercantile system that had the most far-reaching-and 
lingering-impact on these societies. Essentially, the economic sector was divided into: 
[T]hree distinct segments: (1) a commercial urban sector perhaps augmented 
with some light industry such as spinning or weaving and transportation, (2) 
a highly organized and developed extractive economy centered upon the 
country's primary exports, and (3) an unproductive agrarian economy that 
continued to operate along traditional subsistence lines and that was only 
marginally influenced by the monetary economies of the commercial and 
extractive sectors. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 88-89) 
These divisions within the economy acted to "sectorize" societies, creating a diversity of 
relative impacts of the various forces of social change, with individuals in the more 
commercially-oriented sectors being influenced to a much greater degree than their rural 
counterparts. More important, emphasis on maximizing gains from single-commodity 
production hindered broader economic growth-stifling what were at least somewhat 
diversified economies at the previous lower levels. As Mohammed Ayoob notes: 
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Colonial rule derailed the evolutionary process of economic development . 
. . by introducing major discontinuities in the economic sphere in order to ex-
tract maximum benefit from the resources of [colonial] societies for the 
metropolitan economies and to tum them into captive markets for metro-
politan manufactured goods. Colonial rule [also] disrupted or destroyed 
flourishing agricultural economies by switching them from food to cash 
crops meant for export. It also decimated traditional handicraft industries . 
. . . termed the deindustrialization of colonial economies. Colonial policies 
also decimated the class of large-scale native traders and financiers that had 
dominated the monetized sector of the more sophisticated pre-colonial 
economies .... (Ayoob, 1995, p.35) 
Colonialism also impeded the normal growth of the "modem" social classes, such as the 
commercially-oriented bourgeoisie, which eventually further undermined mass support for 
the state's development efforts. 
However, these foreign influences did create a new type of minority class within 
these transitional societies-the educated, white collared civil servants of the expanding state 
institutions. The interaction of what was soon to be a Western-oriented elite with the Euro-
pean administrators-even beyond the economic effects of"sectorization" discussed previ-
ously-soon formed a small class of natives who had taken advantage ofthe link between 
Western education and upward mobility. These elites were best positioned to take over 
control of the states once the colonizers decided to leave, and had a tremendous bearing on 
the subsequent development efforts pursued by states. Exposure (and receptivity) to Western 
scientific methods and ideologies, coupled with closer work with European elites, had a 
- tremendous influence on individuals who held key positions for the future development 
drives after independence. (Ayoob, 1995, pp. 36-37; Richards and Waterbury, 1990, p. 49) 
Nevertheless, the most profound influence of this westernized elite was as role 
models for the younger generations-with their interaction with the European had brought 
them wealth and status, and their newly adopted lifestyles, they were living proof of the 
benefits of "modernization." In fact, even these relatively prosperous individuals still felt 
the frustration of being inferior to the Europeans, who monopolized the major positions in 
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business and government. The pain of continued disappointment was soon channeled into 
the ideological challenge to colonialism-the captivating, revolutionary force of Third world 
nationalism. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 93-95) 
Yet another influence of colonialism, related to the "centralizing" aspects of the 
mercantile system and rapid population increases, was the massive growth in urbanization. 
Major cities became the focus of colonial administration and commercial activities, creating 
a conjunctive flow of the populace toward the urban areas, driven by coinciding "push"- and 
"pull" -type forces. Rural individuals were often "pushed" to go to the cities because the still 
backward countryside could no longer provide the necessary support for burgeoning masses. 
Moreover, the urban centers exerted a "pull" on the traditional subsistence-oriented agrarian 
sector, by offering substantially greater opportunities for individual financial improvement. 
Colonial commercial activities were often labor intensive extraction operations, bringing 
greater and greater requirements for workers as the commercial sectors grew. The Dutch 
Disease-altering the terms of trade in favor of the higher paying urban jobs-and 
increasing rural education converged to add further impetus to the flow of rural migrants. 
(Richards and Waterbury, 1990, pp. 265-269; Palmer, 1989, pp. 85-86) 
The new migrants were greeted with the choking, squalid conditions of the urban 
slums-and the realization that good paying jobs were scarce and housing usually 
substandard at best. However, the contrast in conditions compared with their rural origins 
was even starker when compared with the corresponding displays of wealth by the European 
businessmen and administrators in the upscale areas of the cities. In addition, the urban 
areas saw the focus of various "agents" of change, such as the mass media, education 
systems, indigenous political movements, and labor unions, which were not a part of the 
rural experience. Thus, urbanization had a number of negative influences, including the 
open exhibition of disparities in wealth and corresponding frustrations of the "have-nots," 
and a concentration of uprooted, lower-class citizenry exposed to a wide range of foreign 
influences of change. The resultant increase in forms of urban violence created even more 
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problems for faltering regimes (Richards and Waterbury, 1990, pp. 272-278; Palmer, 1989, 
pp. 86-88) 
3. Ideologies of Nationalism and the Drive for Independence 
Mounting frustration for people of the developing countries-at the inapplicability 
of traditional values and behavior in their new environment, at being unable to attain the 
higher status exclusively maintained by the Europeans, at being incapable of comprehending 
the universal changes around them and coping appropriately-was the primary result of the 
colonial experience. From a "technical" viewpoint, these foreign influences of social change 
were powerful agents of disintegration of traditional influences on societies they came into 
contact with, yet the subsequent requirements for reintegration were usually left unmet. 
Nationalism, promoted by elites seeking to wrest control of their countries from colonial 
powers, was presented as the answer to the increasing number of problems facing the 
transitional societies. The strident demands of nationalists for improvements in education 
and increased control over the affairs of state were often met with repression by colonial 
administrators, touching off a cycle that typically led to increased politicization of the 
masses. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 92-95) 
Realizing the fragile basis of mass support for the still tenuous idea of an independent 
"state" or "nation," as well as the strong influence of tradition on the broader elements of 
society, the leaders of nationalist movements appealed to traditional religious and ethnic 
symbols when defining and championing key aspects of these novel ideas. With the allure 
of an "authentic" basis for change--couched in terms of ethnic or religious "liberation" 
-nationalist ideologues were able to broaden their following among the more traditionally-
oriented members of society. This typically apolitical group, concerned more with removing 
foreign social and cultural influences than "minor" issues such as economic development 
and political independence, soon joined in the denouncement of imperialism and 
Westernization. As a result, the environments of these states were characterized by 
significant instability-a dilemma which would linger well after the goal of independence 
had been achieved. In most cases, the turmoil created by nationalism was simply another 
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element in the complex conditions leading to social disintegration and--despite the promise 
of a better future-simply helped perpetuate the "crisis" environment. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 
94-95) 
C. THE TRIALS OF NATION BUILDING IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES 
1. State Making versus Nation Building 
Given generally unstable transitional societies and continued (often enhanced) influ-
ence of forces of change, the "ideologically-charged" atmosphere of independence led to fur-
ther discontinuous social change in the developing world. Third World countries had yet to 
reach levels of development in various spheres to be considered truly modernized. 
Surveying their general status, Palmer describes the impact of colonialism as "half-nation 
building," adding that "as former colonial territories gained independence ... their leaders 
inherited the framework for nation building but very little of its substance" (Palmer, 1989, 
pp. 98-99; emphasis in original). However, an important distinction must be made between 
the concepts of "nation building" and "state making." In analyzing the multifaceted Third 
World "security predicament," Ayoob (1995, pp. 21-28) holds that the complex process of 
"state making" is actually the foremost concern of developing countries, and that weakness 
in this area is the primary point of contrast from First World states. In distinguishing 
between "state making" and "nation building," Ayoob indicates that the former consists 
primarily of: 
... expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain 
under political authority, ... maintenance of order in the territory ... and 
over the population, ... [and] extraction of resources ... essential to support 
not only the war making and policing activities [of] the state but also the 
maintenance of apparatuses of state necessary to carry on routine 
administration, deepen the state's penetration of society, and serve symbolic 
purposes. (Ayoob, 1995, pp. 22-23) 
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Tbis concept of"state making" is in contrast with the related-yet distinctly different-idea 
of"nation building." In examining this topic, Ayoob--using definitions and analysis from 
Charles Tilly and Ernest Gellner-makes the further distinction between national states and 
nation states; according to Tilly, the former are "relatively centralized, differentiated, and 
autonomous organizations successfully claiming priority in the use of force within large, 
contiguous, and clearly bounded territories." Nation states, by contrast, are states "whose 
peoples share a strong linguistic, religious, and symbolic identity." Gellner defines 
nationalism, a key element of distinguishing the nation state, as " primarily a principle which 
holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent." Now, the reason for these 
distinctions is that the "state making" process leads toward the goal of the national state 
which, in tum, precedes the nation state: 
National states that have performed successfully over a long period of time 
and have ... knit their people together in terms of historical memories, legal 
codes, language, religion, and similar factors may evolve into nation-states 
or at least provide the necessary conditions ... but they are not synonymous 
with nation-states .... [H]istorically, national states predate the emergence of 
nation-states; they are the products of the state-making enterprise rather than 
nationalism or nation building. This is the reality to which Gellner referred 
when he pointed out that "nationalism emerges only in milieux in which the 
existence of the state is already very much taken for granted .... " (Ayoob, 
1995, p. 24) 
Thus, the distinction can be made between the rhetoric of nationalism which pei:l¥~ates the 
transitional states' environments and the actual processes that regimes are focused 
upon-the accumulation of state power over territory as a fundamental component of state 
making. In this view, the Western focus on the need for developing popular consensus in 
support ofbuilding nation states misses the point that these societies have reached the point 
of development needed to sufficiently support the elusive end-goal of the nation state. 
Currently, the struggle in transitional societies is to reach intermediate goals focused around 
the national state and improved security. (Ayoob, 1995, pp. 24-26) 
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In assessing the circumstances which lie at the root of Third World "crisis" 
conditions and its general "feeling of acute vulnerability vis-a-vis the international 
establishment composed ofthe advanced, industrialized states of the global North," Ayoob 
points to two factors as crucial considerations: "[F]irst, the stage of state making at which 
Third World states currently find themselves and, second, the timing of their entry into the 
international system ... [of] sovereign states" (Ayoob, 1995, p. 15). Since these third world 
countries are at early stages of the process, the difficulties of state making would normally 
be tremendous anyway; however, now these states are forced to deal with a vast array of 
additional challenges to their fragile situation from both internal and external forces. 
To aid in overcoming these dilemmas, new national elite~ did gain some "assets" de-
veloped under their colonial masters, with the provision of national boundai-ies and central-
ized control over most regions, along with improved transportation and economic infrastruc-
tures to aid integration. Much like other aspects of colonialism, however, such "assets" 
included drawbacks, too. Great disparities between the states' urban and rural sectors had 
been allowed to develop in most areas, with an increasing percentage of society lost in the 
transitional middle ground. The fragile minority of native elites had knowledge of the 
benefits from the western practices and ideals of their European predecessors, yet they were 
burdened by the complex realities of development and the necessity to transform what 
essentially remained a traditional majority of society. The imposition of western-style legal 
systems and (limited) political institutions, coupled with the nationalist leaders' desire to 
reduce potential challenges from traditional sources of power, hampered efficient 
administration and mobilization of the masses. When voluntary support was lacking, the 
continuation of regime reliance on strong security forces inevitably resulted-yet now it was 
indigenous elites giving the orders of repression. More important, most of the infrastructures 
which could aid in nation-building had been developed specifically to support the political 
and economic interests of the European powers-boundaries were drawn in foreign capitals 
with little thought for complexities on the ground, and often fragmented longstanding tribal 
or ethnic homelands. While the colonial rulers did seek to provide requisite security to 
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ensure economic development could be achieved, pacification efforts were often incomplete 
and ethnic or religious divisions were often shrewdly used to political advantage-a strategy 
of"divide and conquer" that only added to the instability following the departure of colonial 
regimes. (Ayoob, 1995, pp. 34-35; Palmer, 1989, pp. 89, 98-99) 
In addition, the inherited economic structure was horribly insufficient to meet the re-
quirements of the times. Development of the agrarian sectors of these economies had been 
insignificant under the Europeans, and their continued subsistence-levels of production were 
woefully inadequate for the burgeoning masses of most states. A lack of industrial diversi-
fication brought on by colonial concentration on the export of a few primary products often 
precluded new regimes from altering standard practices of dependance they sought to offset. 
Reliance on this limited economic base-often tied into the same pre-independence pattern, 
without the "benefits" of colonial administrative regulation and enhanced commercial 
relationships-exposed their frail economies to the ravages of the increasingly global 
economy with little means of protection. Attempts to diversify their economies and increase 
industrialization have typically met with limited success, especially in the non-oil producing 
states of the Greater Middle East, but at least one outcome is an expanding middle class that 
has increased the debate within societies over improved political development. (Richards and 
Waterbury, 1990, pp. 49-50; Palmer, 1989, pp. 89-91, 98-99) In summary, the bonds of 
economic dependance remained strong, and the independent regimes were faced with the 
complicated predicament of needing to increase development in a range of areas with few 
assets to aid them in their efforts. Again, the purpose here is not to debate the accountability 
for 1bird World dependance, but simply to form the basis for examining the current "crisis" 
environment such conditions have created. These current conditions have also seen the rise 
of a new type of change, the extremely disruptive phenomenon of political violence. 
2. The Problem of Political Violence 
As previously noted, elites and their regimes employ various assets available to them 
to conduct their development efforts, and the accumulation of power through state making 
is a pivotal process in the overall scheme. In addition, the requirement for sound 
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reintegration, the fundamental "balance" of the development equation that remained to be 
solved, also confronts them. What is most important for this analysis is that in these more 
primitive stages state making, the use of coercive policies is more likely-and according to 
regimes-more necessary to permit requisite state accumulation of power. This necessity 
is because of the increase in political violence, including demonstrations, riots, 
assassinations, terrorist activities, and revolutions, has become a prevalent feature of the 
transitional society, and is yet another indication of the fundamental problems which are 
inherent to them: 
A society [can be] defined as a division of roles and rewards sanctified by 
religious, ideological, or related belief systems. Violence is the overt 
indication that the existing division of roles and rewards has ceased to be 
viable for some segment of that society. A society sustains itself by 
providing for the security and sustenance of its members. To the extent that 
acts of violence prevent a society from performing these and related 
functions, they attack the very foundation of a society's existence. (Palmer, 
1989,p. 105) 
As an obviously deleterious form of change, regimes must respond to this problem; they 
have choices to make on how to respond, such as with suppression or accommodation, but 
each has its disadvantages. For regimes with limited assets besides coercive power, the 
choice is often not really a choice at all: the needs of establishing and maintaining security 
in order to conduct the other various efforts of the state-and to provide a secure 
environment for its populace-make a quick response with the most available assets most 
likely. 
Repression can have a number of effects, as militant groups typically intensify their 
organizational· efforts and develop a more radical ideology in confrontation with security 
elements. "Suppression frequently has the unintended effect of transforming poorly 
organized and diffuse opposition groups into disciplined, intensely ideological revolutionary 
movements." (Palmer, 1989, p. 105) More important, among the masses, the often 
protracted violence of a regime repression effort to counter militants leads to politicization 
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of previously apolitical and tractable members of society. This buildup of oppositional 
momentum, which is often focused against the elites, as well as the regime, further 
exacerbates the "crisis" environment: 
At best, the intense politicization of the masses in the Third World focuses 
[their] attention upon the government as the ultimate solution to their 
problems. [However, this is itself] a particularly severe problem, for ... few 
developing areas possess the administrative capacity to meet high levels of 
mass demands. At its worst, the intense politicization of the masses increases 
their willingness to use violence as a means of achieving their goals .... 
Protracted violence, by politicizing the population and by fragmenting it into 
hostile camps, also paves the way for the introduction and spread of radical 
political ideologies and organizations. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 109-110) 
Thus, regimes seeking to foster development within transitional societies are faced with the 
difficult problem of confronting political violence with assets that may only incite further 
cycles ofviolence throughout society. Unfortunately, the conditions of"political overload" 
that these regimes experience, coupled with the fundamental problems which beset their 
societies, makes these "no win" confrontations increasingly likely in the future. 
D. THE DISCONTINUITIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE 
Keeping within the framework of a "cause" and "effect" -type representation for the 
typical circumstances generating the Third World's collective "crisis" environment, the 
pivotal concern now is the results of the trauma-filled processes reviewed previously. The 
focus must be on the repercussions and discontinuities created, which in tum will form the 
underpinning for the next chapter's focus on the specific regional history of related issues 
and events followed by the common attributes of the atmosphere of"crisis." An important 
consideration is how unique the situation that exists now is, especially when comparing the 
development processes in their earlier time and setting in the West: 
The contemporary era ... is fundamentally different any earlier time because 
scientific advances and technological revolutions have wrought 
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unprecedented change. This change spreads rapidly because of the 
increasingly interdependent nature of the world. Modernization ... races 
onward at a breakneck pace. (Bill and Springborg, 1994, p. 8) 
The unfortunate result is that the states of the developing world are at a great disadvantage 
when attempting to overcome the obstacles to modernization: 
The earliest national states were the products of a long period of 
uncoordinated, although often simultaneous, political acts undertaken ... 
[throughout] Western Europe. This development also happened to coincide 
and interact with important social and economic factors, such as changes in 
the mode of production, and the consequent emergence of powerful new 
social forces and economic and political interest groups. The Third World 
is attempting to replicate this largely unpremeditated and uncoordinated 
evolutionary process but on a ridiculously short timetable and with a 
predetermined set of goals. The existence of a model to emulate, and the 
pressures generated by international and domestic elites' demands that 
postcolonial states translate their juridical statehood into effective statehood 
within the shortest possible time, make the task of state makers in the Third 
World so difficult as to border on the impossible. (Ayoob, 1995, p. 32) 
This grim prospect returns the emphasis to time and the nature of social change. Because 
of a combination of factors, developing states are presented with a situation in which the 
rapid pace of events has left them in a state of-using Ayoob's term-"political overload." 
The critical element is the nature of the forces of change-as opposed to develop-
ment-within modem transitional societies which, though essentially the same as previous 
eras, now proceed at the aforementioned "breakneck pace." To reiterate: 
Change means that established social, economic, and political patterns are 
being altered. [On the other hand,] Development means that such changes are 
directed toward greater productivity or other planned targets such as greater 
social or political integration. (Palmer, 1989, p. 130) 
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Palmer adds that, while the stimulus for change may often vary across these states, the 
process of social change "tends to be cumulative, reciprocal, and discontinuous." 
Specifically, he asserts: 
Change tends to be cumulative in the sense that the frustrations and conflicts 
unleashed by the myriad sources of social change in the Third World 
accumulate until they reach a point at which they overwhelm the capacity of 
traditional political leaders to rule effectively .... The reciprocal nature of 
change refers to the fact that the circle of change is perpetuated and expanded 
by the tendency of the diverse forces of social change to reinforce or to feed 
upon one another .... [and] The process of change has also been 
discontinuous. Rather than a smooth, uniform progression away from 
traditional social structures, culture and behavior, the breakdown of 
traditional society has been uneven and sporadic. (Palmer, 1989, p. 128) 
Each of these concepts will aid in analysis, but the notion of discontinuities is extremely 
important to understanding the "effects" of modernization and development. Discontinuities 
within transitional societies occur when some sectors of society or institutions undergo 
change at a different pace than others. Besides structural/organizational aspects, there is a 
psychological dimension to this concept, since variations in the rate of change for behaviors 
and attitudes occur within and between societies. Specifically, Palmer surveys five 
categories of discontinuities-demographic, group, structural-cultural, occupational and 
personality-which can provide the conclusion to this chapter. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 128-129) 
Demographic discontinuities center primarily around the problem of w:e:Wlization 
and the extreme differences in rates of change between the urban centers and rural areas of 
the developing world. The cities see the focus of most of the activities and influences which 
engender changes in society, such as government, political and commercial operations, a 
confluence of mass media and higher levels of education among the populace, the majority 
of foreigners and foreign influence, as well as the dilemmas of urbanization and 
unemployment previously noted. "While the evidence that urbanization facilitates change 
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is overwhelming, the link between urbanization and economic development is not at all 
clear." (Palmer, 1989, pp. 129-130) 
Palmer (1989, pp.130-134) also notes how Groups or classes and members of certain 
occupations within society display discontinuities related to social change. The variety qf 
backgrounds and social influences lead to a heterogeneity in individual receptivity to 
changes in the environment. For example, minorities or status-deprived groups will have 
a different perspective of the status quo than an elite majority. Certain professions, often 
related to income levels, the contact with foreign influences or those previously noted traits 
of urban versus rural environments, also vary in rates of change. Disparities in wealth 
correspond to differing levels (and issues) of frustration and flexibility toward shifts in the 
social environment. Levels of education are also a major factor of consideration. Members 
of the new middle classes have been shown as "modernizing" much more quickly than less-
educated members of the lower class. 
When discussing structural-cultural-and the related personality-discontinuities, 
the emphasis centers on the fact that, while most of the changes previously discussed are 
more structural in nature, the individual response to such changes will vary: 
From a psychological perspective, it is clear that structural and 
environmental changes can and often do modify attitudes and behavior. One 
problem in the analysis of social change in developing areas, however, is that 
the changes produced by environmental stimuli do not follow a smooth and 
easily predictable pattern .... Individuals also often respond to some 
structural changes ... but not to others. Under most circumstances there is 
a time lag between changes in an individual's structural environment and 
corresponding changes in his or her adaptive response. This lag may be 
years or it may be measured in generations. [William F.] Ogburn calls this 
time period between [structural] changes ... and corresponding changes in 
human attitudes and behavior cultural lag. (Palmer, 1989, p. 134) 
These cultural influences create conditions in which factors such as alterations in levels of 
education, while noticeably central to individual-level receptivity to change in some groups 
of society, will still only have a limited impact in overcoming specific indigenous cultural 
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barriers to modernization. Variations in levels of productivity and group behaviors across 
a range of cultures from the developing countries are examples of these discontinuities. 
Focusing in greater depth on personality discontinuities, Palmer (1989, pp. 136-139) 
develops four types of"attitudes and behavior patterns[:] ... demand behavior, productivity 
behavior, security behavior, and self-regulatory behavior." Demand behavior can be defined 
as the levels of demand and the expectations members of society place on political systems. 
Education levels will transform the traditional mind set into one with greater expectations 
in the present life rather than being satisfied with seeking "reward in the hereafter." 
Conversely, ''production-related behaviors such as innovation and entrepreneurship remain 
low and are not easily instilled" in the developing countries. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 136-137; 
emphasis added) This is the key input to Ayoob's condition of state "political overload": 
A little education can also be a dangerous thing, for it often teaches 
individuals to become consumers long before it teaches them to become 
producers; it teaches them to place demands upon the government long 
before it imbues them with the responsibilities of citizenship .... It would be 
fair to suggest that many developing areas are building a supervisory class 
before they are building a working class of skilled and unskilled labor. Thus, 
while the forces of change rapidly create new expectations, they seldom 
engender a corresponding desire to produce more to meet those expectations. 
(Palmer, 1989, pp. 136-137) 
In terms of security behavior, security values-the continued dependence on traditional ties 
(family, ethnic background, religion) for providing an individual "sense of security" and as 
_a means of influence-typically remain high within transitional societies. Such influences 
are obviously harmful to development efforts, as reliance on family and parochial ties for 
preferential treatment significantly adds to the impact of the demand behavior previously 
noted. In a related concept, the slow development of self-regulatory or citizenship behaviors 
among transitional individuals hinders the functions of governments and reduces their 
mobilization capacity; such individuals hold little respect for government institutions or 
property, and casual "ripping off' the regime is prevalent. (Palmer, 1989, pp. 137-138) 
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In summary, the cumulative, reciprocal, and discontinuous nature of social changes 
in these transitional societies has set the stage for a "crisis" environment of epidemic 
proportions. Developing state governments are faced with sometimes insurmountable 
problems, due to various limitations on their assets and related capacity for mobilization. 
The rapid rise in expectations from the populace, coupled with the usually low levels of 
economic/ material assets at the regimes' command and typically limited levels of 
legitimacy, force a reliance on hollow rhetoric and increased repression as routine 
government policy. The lingering strength of traditional ties is antithetical to the advance 
of modernization, hampering development efforts across each dimension of activity. The 
burdens of state making and goals of nation building often become incompatible given the 
restrictions on time and the external influences which beleaguer modernizing elites. 
Capacity for mobilization is hindered by an insufficient ability to socialize citizenry; the 
drive for economic development--often seen as the "answer to all problems"-siphons 
funding from critical institutions such as schools and social services, as well as from funding 
for health care and general infrastructure improvements, while providing few "solutions" for 
mounting problems. The critical "second half of the equation," the reintegration or 
resocialization of society, is incomplete and unsuccessful in most states of the Greater 
Middle East. Faced with myriad traumas and the uncertainties of transitional society, 
individuals as well as governments across the region seek new ideologies to aid in coping 
with the dilemmas of daily life-and Islam is often a critical element. With the fervent, yet 
simple, slogan of "Islam is the answer," the Islamists are increasingly enchanting to 
individuals entrapped in this environment of"crisis." 
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III. POLITICAL ISLAM: A COMMON THIRD WORLD RESPONSE TO CRISIS 
Whether revolutionary or reformist, conservative or an ideology of change, the em-
ployment oflslamic ideology in political contexts provides the potential for great power and 
influence within the developing world's Muslim societies. Through the reinterpretation of 
religious symbols and ideas, Islam has been a primary pillar of support for a broad spectrum 
of modem governments, from totalitarian states to ones espousing greater political pluralism 
and democracy-a fact illustrated in various Chapter IV case studies. Before focusing on 
specifics and the diversity of political Islam, however, it is helpful to first explore general 
areas of commonality that can be found both within the phenomenon, and between political 
Islam and other ideologies within both the Greater Middle East and in broader Third World 
environments. The basis for such broad ideological similarities is the common "crisis" 
milieu-generated by the discontinuous processes accompanying modernization-and the 
concurrent individual-level psychological quandary found within these transitional societies. 
Since ideologies have been shown to develop in relation to the historical context of 
their sociopolitical environment, specific background information will be assembled for 
political Islam. First, a survey of the political history of the Greater Middle East in the 
modern era -the period since World War I in which the aggregate conditions and events 
created what Salem describes as an "age of ideology" in the region-is provided. While 
relating general trends and key events, which have affected the common regional 
·:~:::~;· 
environment, parallels to political Islam can be drawn from the rise and fall of sorne primary 
ideologies that have influenced regional countries over that time. The brief historical 
perspective on the modern political environment sets the stage for a synopsis of primary 
components of the resultant "crisis" atmosphere that is the norm throughout the 
contemporary Greater Middle East. Since political Islam is the "latest" ideology to confront 
this threatening milieu-and the primary focus of this analysis-further review of the 
common background provided by the symbols and ideals of the religion, and the historic 
relationship between Islam and politics is then presented. Finally, to close the circle of 
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"Third World" commonality, a comparison between political Islam and another religio-
political movement of the developing world, liberation theology, will conclude this chapter. 
A general outline of the Islamist movements, and the "fundamentals" of their unique 
response to conditions of transitional society, is followed by a basic review of liberation 
theology, and then key aspects of the two will be correlated to show the strong similarities 
between these religio-political phenomena. 
A. MODERN POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST 
History has repeatedly shown that the rise of activist Islamic religious movements 
seeking to reconstruct the established order is generally a predictable result of corresponding 
deep social crises-a cause-and-effect relationship that is relevant to the situation in the 
Muslim world today (see Voll, 1983; Esposito, 1992, pp. 49-50). Thus, an examination of 
each of the dimensions-political, social, cultural, economic and psycho-spiritual--of the 
"incubational" milieu created by social change and giving rise to Islamist ideologies 
(Dekmejian, 1995, Ch. III) is a necessary starting point to properly analyze Islamism as a 
whole. Such a survey is undertaken in the next section, but a brief look at the political 
history of the Greater Middle East region is needed first-to develop a basis for specific 
discussion. Though specific conditions vary across the Greater Middle East region and from 
country to country-as do Islamist responses-the common factors seen in political Islam 
throughout the region can be drawn directly from the general historical context from which 
societies have evolved-especially aspects related to the processes of modernization and 
development. 
1. The Modern Era as an "Age ofldeology" in the Greater Middle East 
The rise of ideologies has been a commonplace occurrence throughout the world 
whenever countries are subjected to the strains of modernization and unbalanced 
development as described in Chapter II. Edward Shils explains some reasons behind this 
activity: 
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Ideologies arise in conditions of crisis and in sectors of society to whom the 
hitherto prevailing outlook has become unacceptable .... [They develop in 
response to] strongly felt needs . . . for an explanation of important 
experience, for the firm guidance of conduct, and for a fundamental 
vindication or legitimation ofthe value and dignity of the persons who feel 
these needs. (Shils, 1968, p. 69) 
The effect of modernization and the discontinuities of social change are no different for the 
Greater Middle East than any other part of the developing world. Extreme socio-cultural 
strain stemming from "the breakdown of traditional social and cultural systems," created 
what Salem (1994, pp. 2, 4-5) calls an "age of ideology" within the Arab world (and corres-
pondingly in the broader Greater Middle East), a period of activity which-despite an ob-
served decline (in his opinion) in central importance of ideologies-still continues today. 
In a similar statement of the regional prominence of ideological political thought during the 
modem era-that also acknowledges inherent instability and a "transitory" nature of regional 
ideologies which supports this fluidity-Bill and Springborg state that: 
Middle Eastern ideologies tend toward instability and fragmentation. They 
are unstable in that they are prone to rapid change and fragmented because 
they do not inspire the wholehearted commitment of all those for whom the 
message is intended. Many countries in the region have ethnic, linguistic 
and/or religious minorities that subscribe only partially, if at all, to the ide-
ologies sanctioned by their respective states .... [P]olitical behavior and 
beliefs are strongly conditioned by immediate demographic and political 
circumstances and are, therefor, subject to change according to those 
circumstances. This plasticity at the communal level is mirrored by the 
multiplicity and flexibility of personal identities. (Bill and Springborg, 1994, 
pp. 31-32) 
While their statements seem to fit better in the next chapter stressing the diversity of political 
Islam, the evidence provided of the somewhat ephemeral nature of regional ideologies does 
support the notion of inherent receptivity to new introductions into political discourse. They 
also note that the emphasis has been on rhetorical "style" over concrete "substance" within 
politics in the region: 
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Middle Eastern political leaders typically pepper their speeches with ideo-
logical terms, national and religious imagery, and attacks on domestic 
opponents and foreign enemies .... Middle Eastern governments seek to 
legitimate themselves less through references to financial statements than 
through manipulating nationalist, religious, and other symbols. In the Middle 
East the primary purposes of ideology . . . are not to define concrete 
objectives or identify strategies .... Instead, ideologies are intended "to 
reassure both articulator and audience, to engender solidarity, and to resolve 
problems of personal or group identity." They are, in the words of Clement 
Henry Moore, expressive rather than practical. (Bill and Springborg, 1994, 
pp. 30-31) 
Thus, the ideologies of those in power have often not been supported by hard results and pre-
sent an inviting target for a charismatic ideologue who might oppose them. Similarly, the 
contemporary phenomenon of political Islam can be seen as the latest ideological response 
to a "societal crisis of multidimensional proportions." (Dekmejian, 1995, p. 23) and the 
failure of preceding ideologies to create solutions to various problems. Thus, the common 
"conditions of crises" that foster the growth of political Islam must be viewed at various 
levels of analysis to achieve an appropriate and effective basis for both understanding, and 
subsequent comparison and contrast. The first examination will consider the historical 
aspects ofthese circumstances and also a variety of preceding ideologies. 
2. Predecessors to the Islamist Response to Challenges from the West 
An important influence of the contemporary Islamic 'revival' actually began prior 
to the critical period of colonialism, occurring during the time of rising Western power and 
European expansion and "penetration" in the late 19th century-this was a series of Islamic 
reform movements known collectively as "Islamic modernism." The Islamic modernists 
sought to "reformulate" their Islamic heritage in response to the challenges of modernity and 
the related declining strength and pride of the Islamic community. Through emphasis upon 
the compatibility of Islam with aspects of Western development such as reason, science and 
technology, these reformers promoted a process of selective acculturation aimed at 
developing an Islamically-based rationale for national independence, and social, legal and 
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educational reform. Because Islamic modernism was confined mostly to the intellectual 
elites, however, it had limited influence on the masses as "it failed to produce a systematic 
reinterpretation of Islam and to develop effective organizations to preserve and propagate 
its message more broadly in Muslim society" (Esposito, 1985, p. 299). Nevertheless, Islamic 
modernism did impact the Muslim community's development and its overall worldview, by 
reawakening Muslims to the past strength and glory of their faith, and demonstrating the 
compatibility between modem sociopolitical reform and Islam. Moreover, these reformers 
recognized the difference between acquiescing to Western imperialism and selective 
acceptance ofWestem ideas and technology. They promoted the need for Muslim autonomy 
and unity-while denouncing the ill-effects of colonialism and dependency. While the 
results of some of their efforts did impact the mind set of contemporary Islamists, the more 
important impact was on new movements founded throughout the region in the early 20th 
century-based upon themes of anti-colonial independence and modem nationalism. 
(Esposito, 1992, pp. 55-63; Husain, 1995, pp. 95-113) 
These nationalist movements, which became noticeably more active in the period 
between the two World Wars, can be seen not only as a reaction to Western imperialism but 
as a natural product of Westernized reforms which began in the last years of the Ottoman 
Empire. A ware of the growing threat of European expansionism, the Ottoman rulers had 
also recognized and admired the strength and vitality of the West. To bolster the flagging 
strength of the Muslim world, they sought to imitate the West's military, economic and 
political modernization programs by developing Western-oriented education programs and 
bureaucratic institutions. Modem European learning and technology would form the basis 
for reform, reinvigorating Muslim society and enabling a forceful reaction to the external 
threat from the West. As such, reform was not based upon direct pressure from internal 
societal forces or derived from Islamic political and religio-cultural identity and history; it 
was based on Western models, and imposed from above by Muslim rulers. While Islamic 
rationales were employed to legitimize these processes, the laws, ideology and institutions 
of the state gradually began to reflect Western secularism-a transformation that altered the 
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traditional Islamic basis and legitimacy of Muslim society by limiting religion and Islamic 
law to personal life. At least two important outcomes of these developments should be 
noted: First, the development of Western-oriented legal and educational systems caused 
tremendous growth in Western influences. Within Muslim society-a new Westernized 
minority of intellectual elites emerged (even before major Western penetration via 
colonialism) which contrasted with the traditionally-educated, Islamically-oriented majority; 
and second, the Muslim rulers' primary desire for modernization was to strengthen and 
consolidate their power and economic systems, and not to increase political participation of 
their peoples-popular attempts at substantive political reform were crushed and the masses 
were excluded from participation in the planning and implem~ntation of developmental 
programs. (Esposito, 1992, pp. 51, 53-54; Richards and Waterbury, 1990, p. 47) 
3. Colonialism in the Greater Middle East 
In the aftermath of World War I, the previous challenge to the Muslim world from 
the West was dramatically altered. A system of mandates set up under the 1920 Treaty of 
Sevres left the French and British dominating the Middle East, including a majority of the 
former Ottoman empire outside present-day Turkey and Iran. The British had already 
established a firm position in Egypt, while the French actively colonized portions ofNorth 
Africa. In general, European colonialism not only transformed indigenous social, economic, 
political and educational institutions but redrew boundaries and designated new leaders 
throughout the Muslim world. Moreover, the implicit belief that Christianity's inherent 
superiority was responsible for Europe's strength and expansion was reflected in the policies 
and statements of the new colonial governing officials. Seeking to "enlighten the natives," 
European rulers initiated campaigns to educate Muslims in the history, sciences and 
languages of the West- and the virtues of Christian faith. Meanwhile, the conditions of 
"crisis" began to develop in societies of the Greater Middle East: 
Muslim views of the West and responses to its power and ideas varied from 
rejection and confrontation to admiration and imitation. However, the 
prevailing mood was one of conflict and competition. For many, colonialism 
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conjured up memories of the Crusades; the European challenge and 
aggression was but another phase of militant Christianity's war with Islam. 
(Esposito, 1992, p. 51) 
Further stress was added in the early postwar years when Kemal Ataturk, the victorious new 
leader ofTurkey, who after ousting the foreign armies from Turkish soil moved to establish 
a secular state through various reforms and the crucial step of abolishing the Muslim 
Caliphate-seen as an archaic remnant of the Ottoman past for the new "right-sized" state. 
Taken together, the various events obviously had a tremendous psychological impact on the 
Muslim community, reversing the basic pattern of Muslim self-rule that had lasted since the 
Prophet's time, and engendering a profound sense of uncertainty and a questioning of Islamic 
history and belief-in short, the Muslim world was faced with an acute identity crisis. 
(Esposito, 1992, pp. 47-49, 52) 
4. Independence and the "Success" of Nationalism 
In the years prior to World War II, the interrelated concerns of national identity 
(nationalism) and independence became prominent features of the Muslim world's 
sociopolitical milieu. The direct threat from European colonialism, coupled with the modem 
Western political institutions and values introduced through educational reform and 
modernization, created conditions for the rise of nationalist and independence movements 
throughout the Muslim world. While Islam acted as an important source of ideological 
symbols and common identity-due in part to the Islamic modernists' efforts to link Western 
political and basic Islamic concepts-modem nationalism was founded on a more secular 
orientation based on ethnic ties, tradition, territory, common language and history. Ethnic 
and religious minorities played key roles in this effort to limit the strict "Islamic" influences 
on these emerging ideologies. The triumph of nationalism (or more appropriately the 
exhaustion of the Europeans) allowed the Westernized elites to gain control of the 
administrative, security and economic systems of the colonial powers, but their new 
countries were beset with tremendous social problems. Furthermore, by pursuing Western 
development schemes, nationalist elites permanently altered the socio-political environment 
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of the Muslim world-in what eventually proved to be an unsuccessful attempt to promote 
legitimizing ideologies of progressive reform and development. (Esposito, 1992, pp. 62-63) 
5. Failures of Western-Style Development in the Greater Middle East 
Thus, in the early aftermath of independence, "conflict" with the West changed to 
a more competitive struggle centering on aspects of development. New regimes, mostly 
installed by the West and supported by westernized elites, began a process of "grand 
emulation" of their former colonial rulers; "modernization was imposed from above .... 
Individuals, countries, cities, and institutions judged themselves, and were judged, to be 
modem by the degree to which they were Westernized ... " (Esposito, 1992, pp. 67-68). 
Nevertheless, most attempts at development were less than successful and this period of 
Western-inspired liberal nationalism eventually led to widespread discontent. This unrest 
was the result of at least two distinct factors: first, Western models of development "were 
adopted, not adapted" to the distinct environment of the Muslim world-creating the 
problems similar to the broader Third world; and second, despite general "lip-service" to 
religious principles, Islam receded from the political arena and could no longer play its 
former key role as an authentic and legitimizing ideology of mass mobilization. (V oll, 1983, 
pp. 42-43) Given such weaknesses, these modernization efforts were without the essential 
legitimacy and authenticity required for success. Most important, since the platforms from 
which the nationalists sought to develop legitimate governments and modernize their 
societies were centered on a concept-secularization-which was only "accepted" by the 
political elites and intelligentsia, the new regimes lacked an effective support bJ~e among 
the populace; this deficiency crippled their attempts at nation-building and socioeconomic 
development. 
6. The Rise of Nasser and Arab Nationalism 
As liberal nationalism faded, more radical ideologies rose to take its place; Arab 
nationalism or Arab socialism came to dominate the politics of most of the Arab countries. 
As old regimes were overthrown, new governments installed programs which emphasized 
Arab unity and promised the establishment of a new social order aimed at improving the 
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conditions of their societies. In trying to distance themselves from the two major 
development models-Marxism and Western capitalism-and seek a more authentic middle 
ground, James Bill states that: 
[C]ertain Middle Eastern leaders have sought to develop hybrid models of 
political rule. These have involved elements of capitalism and Marxism 
adapted to local conditions and traditions: thus the creation of such 
ideologies as Ba'thism, an Arab socialism tinged with secondary elements of 
capitalism, Nasserism, another form of Egyptian socialism combined with 
pockets of capitalism; or Pahlavism, a form of Iranian capitalism with limited 
sectors organized according to socialist principles. (Bill, 1989, p. 128) 
A key leader during this time was Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918-1970); his initial 
platform of Egyptian nationalism, proclaimed after the July 1952 coup, was based upon a 
rejection Western colonial influence and previous policies of liberal nationalism and 
capitalist economics. As Nasser's reputation grew after his defiant stand against British, 
French and Israeli forces during the 1956 Suez crisis, he expanded his ideological platform 
to stress Pan-Arab unity and the region's common Arab-Islamic heritage. Arab socialism 
was promoted as the means to respond to the needs of the Arab masses-a third alternative 
to capitalism and communism, which would equitably distribute wealth and provide required 
social services. Despite ideological rivalries and challenges for Arab leadership from the 
Hashemite rulers of pre-revolutionary Iraq and Jordan, the Baathists in Syria and post-
revolutionary Iraq, and the Saudis, Nasser was unsurpassed in his abilities to gain mass 
mobilization through charismatic leadership and anti-Western rhetoric. Moreover, he rose 
to a position of prominence throughout the broader Third World, strengthened by his cre-
ation of the Alliance ofNon-aligned Nations with Indonesia's Sukamo and India's Nehru, 
and soon became a leading symbol of anti-imperialism. Nasser also championed the cause 
of the Palestinians, and focused the general anti-imperialist struggle of the Arabs on 
liberating occupied lands from the "European-American colony" oflsrael. (Esposito, 1992, 
pp. 72-73) 
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While Nasser's Arab nationalist ideology recognized the interrelationship of Arab 
and Islamic history, the core beliefs were centered on a secular, transnational Arab identity. 
Eventually, the Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, withheld their initial 
support for the Free Officers when they realized that Islamic principles were not to hold a 
preeminent place in Nasser's policies of state socialism, and that he would not seek an 
"Islamic" state. Forced to confront both internal Islamic opposition and pressure from 
traditional regimes such as the House of Saud, Nasser skillfully manipulated religious 
symbols and identified the continuity between Islamic and Arab socialist principles such as 
social justice, equality and anti-imperialism. He coopted the religious establishment in 
Egypt, using religious scholars to legitimate his policies of nationalization and socialism. 
Despite his political skill in countering domestic and international rivals, the strong 
identification with the Palestinian's plight proved to be the most successful and, at the same 
time, the most harmful policy decision for Nasser and his regime. On the positive side, it 
was a source of transnational solidarity which provided a common cause throughout the 
Muslim world. It also furnished a vital external distraction from the lingering internal 
economic and social problems of the 'front-line' states like Egypt and Syria. However, the 
downside came with the disastrous defeat of the combined Arab forces in the 1967 war with 
Israel. 
7. Soul-Searching After the Catastrophic 1967 War 
The word defeat might actually be too mild for the total effect of the crushing rout 
of the combined Arab forces, highlighted by the loss of Jerusalem-Islam's third holiest city. 
It was a catastrophic blow to Nasser and the Pan-Arab cause, leading to declining support 
for secularly-oriented Arab socialist ideologies and a rise in Islamic activism. The Arab 
nationalism/socialism myth was shattered, and the failure of imported ideologies again 
confirmed: 
Pan-Arabism proved incapable of transcending the diverse and often compe-
ting interests of Arab leaders and societies. Socioeconomically, Arab social-
ism ... did not usher in the promised egalitarian Arab order or significantly 
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alter the plight of the masses .... Despite several decades of independence, 
imported ideologies and development schemes seemed to have failed. Old 
issues of identity, national ideology, political legitimacy, socioeconomic re-
form, and Western domination persisted. The failures of governments and 
national ideologies (liberal nationalism and Arab socialism), epitomized by 
the humiliation of 1967, precipitated a deepening sense of disillusionment 
and crisis in many Muslim societies and contributed to the political and 
social resurgence oflslam. (Esposito, 1992, pp. 75-76) 
For the Muslim World, the years that followed the 1967 Arab defeat saw the secular trend 
of the nationalist/socialist governments begin to gradually change. After a period of intro-
spection and questioning of core Islamic beliefs, Muslim elites and the broader masses began 
to acknowledge the power and potential gains from a revitalized Islam within their societies. 
Arabs begrudgingly admired the strength of Israel's political and military establishment, and 
pointed to the Israelis' persistent support of their Jewish faith as a central source of their 
power. A reintroduction of Islamic symbols and related manifestations was lead by Egypt 
under Anwar Sadat, as highlighted by the Islamic overtones and symbology employed in the 
mildly more successful 1973 conflict with Israel. Similar employment of Islam became even 
more pronounced by the 1980s-in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution in Iran-when 
a variety of regimes proclaimed an Islamic ideology to legitimize policies, mobilize mass 
support and strengthen their authority; such governments ranged from the traditionalist 
monarchies in Saudi Arabia and Morocco, to the theocratic nature of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran, to the military-backed regimes in the Sudan and Pakistan, to finally the radical "state 
of the masses" in Libya. Even the professed secular basis of the Turkish state has been 
affected, and the need to acknowledge the pressures of the broader Islamic revival have 
become a regular aspect of government policy. Still, except for Iran, the primary feature of 
this period has been a limited display of true Islamic principles and shariah precepts by 
regimes, and an apparent determination to "ride-out" the stormy periods of development 
without initiating major political reforms-Islamic or otherwise-and simply biding time 
until better times can return. The paucity of forward-thinking elites and long-term programs 
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for comprehensive development in the economic, social, and political areas portends a 
continued potential "threat" from Islam as a key element of oppositional ideology. 
B. THE REGIONAL CRISIS ENVIRONMENT: THE CATALYSTS OF 
ISLAMIC REVIVAL 
The catalysts within this crisis milieu must be seen as both multidimensional and 
interactive (as well as highly specific to a local area as will be discussed in Chapter IV). 
Thus, while several broad categories of "crisis" catalysts and their impacts are discussed 
below, it must be kept in mind that combinations of these factors are typical (in various local 
"varieties") and will act to compound the detrimental effects of such conditions. 
1. Cyclic Failures Ideology in the Greater Middle East 
The first of these "catalysts" is the regular pattern of failures among ideologies across 
the region. As previously discussed, within the concept of ideologies there are a number of 
dynamic factors which lead to a regular succession of ideologies over time, such as 
generational change, crises, etc. An important element in this factor is what Salem calls "the 
'anti' aspect of ideological change," namely that successful ideologies are strongly 
influenced by the ideology which previously dominated society at large. In the "age of 
ideology" under study, the succession of ideologies in the period can easily be understood 
as being fueled by "waves" of opposition to previous failed ideologies: 
In the 1940s and 1950s, revolutionary pan-Arab nationalism arose in oppo-
sition to the rather conservative nationalism of the 1920s and 1930s [which 
had previously opposed colonialism]. .. .In the late 1960s and 1970s, religion 
was offered in opposition to Arab nationalism. (Salem, 1994, p. 27) 
The initial euphoria of the independence period was soon crushed by the hard facts of 
transitional society. Modernizing elites, espousing Western versions ofliberal nationalism, 
soon shifted from leaders of"hoped-for" social change to the major part of the problem. The 
difficulties of overcoming the aftereffects of colonialism overwhelmed them, and continued 
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economic malaise left them with little concrete power behind the symbolic, "rootless" 
notions of "the nation" and "liberty" under a secular system. 
The frantic rise of Arab nationalism, so closely associated with Nasser, surged to 
"great" heights of transnational aspirations, but soon they saw both the icon and his vision 
as discredited by defeat and particularism. Various other attempts at development and 
socialization also failed to establish the critical link between ideology and the common 
cultural background of the masses, further hampering political development and 
exacerbating the "crisis" environment: 
The social and political models adopted in the Muslim Middle east through 
the 19502, 1960s, and 1970s shared one common factor. In greater or lesser 
degree, they sought to emphasize the modernization side of the dialectic. 
Advancement in technology, industrialization, military science, communi-
cations, health, and construction was a major priority. Political change 
occurred typically through . . . military coup. . . . In all these cases the 
casualty was political development, as harsh authoritarian rule became the 
order of the day. Although these military elites did a better job in the politics 
of distribution ... they failed to build institutions that would integrate the 
masses into the political process. (Bill, 1989, pp. 128-129) 
The constant search for answers and a new vision of reality within the disconcerting environ-
ment of the post-1967 Greater Middle East led to a "return" to the faith oflslam--a comfor-
table fit for transitional Muslims lost in an uncompromising, turbulent world. (Husain, 1995, 
pp. 160-162) This dialectical relationship in the rise and fall of ideologies is als9!<poted by 
Fouad Ajami when discussing the "intellectual" aspects of the "crisis" within Arab society, 
when he notes the pivotal trends leading up to the rise oflslamic fundamentalism including 
"disillusionment with pan-Arab doctrines on the part of critical populations in the Arab 
world" and "disillusionment with secularism." (Ajami, 1992, p.l6) There are a number of 
additional factors that arise from associated discontinuities of transitional social change, 
which further influence the current appeal of an Islamic "alternative" to the "crisis" of the 
status quo. They include political and economic factors, military impotence, and a vast array 
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of socio-cultural considerations, all of which culminate in a psychological crisis at the . 
individual level. 
2. Political Factors: Legitimacy Crisis and Mis-Rule 
A basic reason for the rise of political Islam has been the persistent failure of Muslim 
elites to establish legitimate systems of government and progress toward stable, modem 
"nation states." Given the difficulties of the early stages of the "state making" process, most 
governments in the Arab world must still resort to coercion in times of difficulty or unrest 
to ensure public compliance with regulations or policies. This legitimacy crisis can be 
directly related to the inability of secular ideologies employed by the political and 
intellectual elites to gain authenticity and to provide meaningful results from development 
efforts, or to promote social cohesion. Failures by the ruling parties to fulfill promises of 
social and economic advancement, and to meet the increased expectations of the people only 
added to their loss oflegitimacy. (Deeb, 1992, pp. 52-55) The partial emulation of Western 
political models, combining certain aspects of constitutional norms and practices with 
traditional centralized and authoritarian power structures, was further damaged by the failure 
to develop an ideological synthesis which could gain mass support within Muslim states. 
The inability to meet the challenges of "state making" goes deeper than simple 
legitimacy; Husain describes a series of related "crises" developing in response to the 
mixture of a variety of contemporary influences into the political development effort in most 
transitional states. These include a "penetration" crisis, in which the state is unable to 
adequately extend its reach to local levels; a "distribution" crisis, where government inter-
vention to solve economic and social welfare problems brought on by high population 
growth, urbanization, etc., is ineffective; and the "participation" crisis, where the inordinate 
influence from Western political notions of popular participation in government clashes with 
the "state making" level of political development that most of these societies (and more 
important, regimes) find themselves. (Husain, 1995, pp. 166-172) 
Several attempts were made previously to overcome problems of legitimacy and 
other areas involving politics and government through ideological political thought. 
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Ataturk' s development of a secular model, stripped of lingering "externals" from the days 
ofthe Ottoman Empire and pan-Turkism, was closely associated with the charismatic Turk 
war hero and benefitted from strong Turkish nationalism-two factors most other Muslim 
states could not come close to matching. (Dekmejian, 1980, pp. 3-4) Nasser's eclectic fusiqn 
of pre- and post-revolutionary political thought, along with some Islamic principles, created 
a powerful ideology-transformed over time from Egyptian to Arab nationalism-which 
came the closest to success; however, its demonstrated weaknesses after 1967 and the fact 
that it was too closely linked to Nasser's own persona and charismatic leadership made it 
problematic Arab nationalism could survive his death. The great Egyptian leader had a 
major impact on the broader Arab world. By propagating a legitimizing formula which 
increased Arab unity, raised the political consciousness of the masses and infused the 
philosophy of Pan-Arabism upon an entire generation, he was a truly historic figure. 
Nevertheless, the negative impact of the ideology was a bitter pill for the Arab states. The 
high expectations raised by the Nasserite formula went unfulfilled, and the ideology soon 
created an even greater crisis of legitimacy once no proper heir could be found to fulfill his 
central role of charismatic legitimization. (Dekmejian, 1980, pp. 3-5) 
Baathist political ideology stood in contrast to the Nasserite formula by focusing 
strictly upon Arab unity based upon a glorious past, maintaining a strict secularist stance that 
saw Islam as more of a potential threat than a tool for legitimization. Lacking the 
charismatic leadership of a Nasser, the rival Syrian and Iraqi regimes were forced to 
increasingly rely upon the military and security forces to retain authority. Throughout the 
rest of the Arab world, various 'local' legitimization formulas have been employed-some 
with more success than others-covering a range from traditionalist tribal and Islamic bases 
of support for monarchies, to authoritarian republics, or a mix of Islamic and socialist 
principles or even Marxism (as once seen in Afghanistan and South Yemen). While each 
system had--or continues to have-some limited success in the "state making" process, it 
remains to be seen if the required strength and flexibility exist within any of these local 
ideological constructs to meet the cumulative challenges of transitional societies. The 
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inability to create appropriate developmental strategies, coupled with the quantum increases 
in coercive and control capabilities, point to the great potential for further repressive 
measures from weakened, desperate rulers. (Dekmejian, 1980, pp. 5-6) 
3. Economic Factors: Class Conflict and Mal-Distribution of Wealth 
The political factors of this crisis environment have only been exacerbated by the 
failures of regime attempts at achieving greater "social justice" and economic development. 
The gradual change of the "pathways of economic life" seen throughout the modem era has 
created a situation where economic problems continue to mount throughout the Muslim 
world-with various influences such as corruption and elite ineptitude, high population 
growth rates, inflation, and poor strategies for mass mobilization in support of economic 
reform and comprehensive development efforts--existing in nearly every country. 
Disruptive occurrences have been felt in many states from the "side effects" of economic 
reform, as economic systems were revamped from socialist to capitalist-based schemes, and 
inefficient industrialization schemes were imposed. (Salem, 1994, pp. 8-9) Even the oil-rich 
states have been plagued with economic concerns, due to their lack of effective mechanisms 
to achieve a balance between increased income distribution and overall social and economic 
development. The problem of mal-distribution of wealth can exacerbate other underlying 
problems, both within and between countries-no comprehensive strategy has been yet ' 
devised to overcome this lingering problem. Again, Nasser had a major impact, by 
promoting economic policies in conjunction with his Pan-Arab political strategy which were 
labeled Arab Socialism. In a synthesis of "Islamic, Marxist and etatist principles," the 
-formula of Arab Socialism promised great benefits to all Egyptians and adherents in the 
greater Arab world. However, as with most other economic models for the region, its 
promises and corresponding increased expectations went unfulfilled. (Dekmejian, 1980, pp. 
4-7) 
Even beyond the issue of a widening gap between the "haves" and "have-nots," 
frustration has mounted over more basic concerns such as unfulfilled promises of education, 
and increasing overcrowding of the cities. Rising unemployment and unavailable (or 
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unaffordable) housing are other issues which antagonize Muslims. As regimes fail to 
address such concerns over the long-term, the opposition will only gain strength and demand 
greater change from the ruling elites. Moreover, as economic problems grow and the 
conspicuous consumption and corrupt practices of elites continue, diverse groups within 
society will likely be drawn together and support political aims they might not otherwise 
have considered. While such groups will be unlikely to remain unified once changes have 
been made- especially after radical changes such as seen in post-revolutionary Iran-the 
potential strength of their oppositional stance is a significant cause of concern for currently 
beleaguered elites. Urban political violence is likely to be a regula feature of the 
sociopolitical environment for some time. (Ayubi, 1991, p,p. 157-175; Richards and 
Waterbury, 1990, Ch. 10) 
4. Military Impotence: Crises Involving the Lack of Security 
Yet another factor expanding the Islamic world's crisis milieu is the continued burden 
of military defeats. A basic element of the Muslim countries' drive for independence was 
the objective of gaining sufficient military potential to defend their important territorial 
interests from external threats-an aspiration that has not only failed to be met but has been 
a source of outright humiliation for many of these countries. In the struggle for 
independence, Muslim countries-with the exception of the Algerian ouster of the French 
and the mujahedin "victory" over the Soviets in Afghanistan-were notably unsuccessful 
in waging military conflict with their European imperial powers. This futility continued 
after independence was granted, with non-Islamic foes repeatedly vanquishing Muslim 
militaries; key examples include not only the continued Arab failures against the state of 
Israel, but also Pakistan's successive defeats at the hands oflndia's military. While all Arab 
ruling elites suffered repercussions from these "crises to ideologies in power" (an 
approximation of Salem's concept), the greatest impact ofthese defeats-most notably the 
1967 debacle-was felt by various Muslim military regimes, whose already tenuous 
legitimacy was further undermined. (Dekrnejian, 1980, pp. 7 -8) In general, states within the 
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region face "crises" of security involving both internal and external dimensions, a situation 
that is intrinsic to the level of"state making" that exists across the region: 
[T]he regional dimension of conflict is often determined by the process of 
state making undertaken concurrently by contiguous states in the Third 
World. The simultaneous nature of this process, which frequently includes 
the assertion of political and military control over demographic and territorial 
space contested by neighboring states, underlies many of the conflicts among. 
developing countries ... there is a major and obvious link between the state 
making process and the regional balance of power. (Ayoob, 1995, p. 50) 
Lingering concerns over security and the inherent instability of the transitional environment, 
both internal and external, create an atmosphere where militant Islamist groups thrive (i.e., 
Hamas in the Israeli-occupied and Palestinian Authority controlled territories, Hizbullah in 
Lebanon, etc.). (Deeb, 1992, p. 54) The second GulfWar also had a major impact, not only 
by the crushing defeat of the Iraqi military machine-the largest Arab military force at the 
time, but also by highlighting the continued vulnerability of the wealthy Saudi state and its 
smaller Gulf neighbors-which required the protection of the Western powers despite having 
spent billions of dollars on modem weaponry. The continued presence (and build-up) of 
U.S. forces in the region transmits visions of neo-imperialism and further enhances the 
feelings of military impotence. Conversely, the unresponsive attitude of the Western powers 
to the plight of Muslims in the Former Yugoslavia over several years prior to NATO's 
current involvement suggested a double-standard in Western military intervention, and 
amplified feelings of despair among Muslims worldwide. 
5. Socio-Cultural Factors: Identity, Spiritual and Cultural Crises 
Corresponding with the increased strains typical in transitional societies and the 
break with the traditional roots of the past, Muslims throughout the Greater Middle East are 
experiencing a pervasive identity crisis. Attempts to develop an alternative identity system 
based on ethnic-linguistic or nationalist ties have proved mostly ineffectual, as only Islam 
is seen as comprised an all-encompassing framework suitable for Muslim society-including 
74 
religion (din), law (shariah) and state (dawlah) (Dekmejian, 1995, pp. 25-27); further 
information on these aspects oflslamic ideology are covered in the next section. While the 
existence of the state, and all that is entailed in its institutions and boundaries, is grudgingly 
accepted, the "mystical" qualities behind a national identity have yet to emerge. Competing 
nationalist ideologies have continued to stress secular principles and concepts, failing to 
"reach out" to the Muslim masses still feeling the persistent bonds of tradition. The identity 
crisis in transitional societies often heightens attachment to traditional beliefs and values, 
creating a general feeling of ambivalence toward modernity. The solution is a "satisfactory 
reconciliation of tradition and modernity" at the individual and group (for Islamists, the 
ummah) levels, and a new ideology must meet this requirement. (Husain, 1995, pp. 164-166) 
The interaction of various aspects of the "crisis" milieu were only exacerbated by 
overt attempts to limit Islamic influences in past strategies for modernization and socio-
political development. The Muslim identity crisis was only compounded when 'internal' 
attempts at social change were joined by increasing pressures from economic problems 
associated with ill-conceived development plans and pervasive influence of Western culture. 
The situation where native Muslim elites are "out of touch" with the masses highlights the 
multidimensional stratification of society: 
The superficial Westernization of political and economic elites, coupled with 
their non-nativist behavior and conspicuous consumption, sets them apart 
from their less affluent and tradition-bound subjects. This has created a 
politically dangerous culture gap between the rulers and the ruled, whidf:ts 
exacerbating the ideological vacuum caused by the erosion ofPan-Arabism 
and the lack of a substitute ideological framework. (Dekmejian, 1995, p. 30) 
The widespread clash between aggressive Western culture and the "suppressed" indigenous 
value system has created an acute crisis of culture that pervades nearly every aspect of every 
Muslim country, particularly in the "pressure cooker" environment of the major cities: 
During periods of rapid modernization, ... when the familiarity of traditional 
society is broken, a widespread identity crisis can ensue. People are uprooted 
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from their tightly knit rural communities and migrate to the cities, where 
many become victims of unemployment or underemployment, inflation, and 
unhygienic living conditions. Often these individuals arrive in the cities with 
high expectations; instead they find a world of excessive materialism, 
selfishness, and crime. The depersonalization, alienation, and frustration of 
the "urban jungle" disillusion them and threaten their security and identity . 
. . . [T]his identity crisis often draws them closer to the religion into which 
they were socialized as children. [It] acts as an anchor, alleviates their fears 
and gives them a sense of stability, direction, and faith in the future. (Husain, 
1995, p. 165) 
Thus, Islam is naturally invoked to respond to the spiritual crisis felt by Muslims essentially 
"under siege" from a variety of forces of change. One of the most pivotal forces is the 
impulse of secularization which affects the entire spectrum of socio-cultural issues; critical 
aspect involved include the problematic division of "church and state" and the typical 
"assault on tradition" incorporated in the idea. Attempts to isolate religion in the Islamic 
world lead to a direct challenge to the fundamentals of the religion itself, thus further 
destabilizing the identities and beliefs of Muslims in transitional society. 
6. The Cumulative Psychological Crisis at the Individual Level 
The central issue of a Muslim identity crisis, coupled with the variety of other 
"crises" noted, conjoin at the individual level to form a psychological "crisis": 
For many [transitional] individuals, the lack of congruence between inherited 
orientations and the realities of the contemporary environment left them in 
a direct and unrnediated confrontation with society, which engendered deep 
feelings of weakness, fear, and anxiety. Individuals experience social anomie 
as intense personal alienation from the social environment accompanied by 
feelings of helplessness and fear .... On the psychological level, they find 
the symbols and structures of the new society unfamiliar . . . alien and 
meaningless .... They are unable to derive a clear identity and role structure 
for themselves. (Salem, 1994, pp.15-16) 
These alienated and disoriented individuals "are inclined to overcome their loneliness and 
alienation by forming hyper attachments to symbols and mass movements that can provide 
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them an identity, a role, a sense of self-worth, power and companionship." Thus, their 
receptivity to ideologies and ideological groups is quite high, as they use strong symbols and 
ideas to create an environment where transitional individuals can find relief from the strains 
of society and a new collective identity. As part of the collective identity, ideologies also 
provide solutions to the broader moral crisis created, providing solid principles as a basis 
for confronting the "cluttered and confused moral environment" of society at large. (Salem, 
1994, pp. 18-19) The constant bombardment of new and greater amounts of information 
brought on by the modernization process, particularly through exposure to the mass media, 
modem education, and foreign influences, also creates an intellectual crisis. However, 
ideologies provide a solution here as well, as Shils (1968, 69) notes: "(A ]n ideology is the 
product of man's need for imposing intellectual order on the world." The "simplification" 
aspects of the concept outlined in the introduction aid in providing a coherent explanation 
of reality. Finally, Salem discusses the most "threatening" aspect of the cumulative 
psychological crisis, the crisis of aggression: 
All the crises [of the transitional environment] generate in individuals deep 
wells of frustration and bitterness. To keep this resentment from drowning 
individuals and shattering their modest stability and self-esteems, they must 
be presented with suitable targets for aggression on which to unload their 
hostility freely and healthily .... Indeed, all desperate people need enemies. 
Ideologues and ideological movements can play a helpful role here in 
identifYing some person, group, class, nation, civilization, and so forth, as the 
source of evil against which all can vent their aggression. By situating the 
source of failure or defeat outside oneself or one's immediate society, one 
can maintain a reasonably positive self-image even in the worst and most 
desperate circumstances. (Salem, 1994, pp. 20-21) 
Islam has a somewhat "built-in" external "evil'' in its dichotomous notion of the "forces of 
good" in dar al-Islam (or the land of the Islamic community) and dar al-harb (or everywhere 
else). (Salem, 1994, p. 21) Addition key symbols and history will be included in the 
following section. In summary, this combination of common "catalysts" within a variety 
of local contexts created a "crisis" environment in which transitional individuals were left 
77 
to search for an alternative to government-led development, which was seen as creating more 
problems than solutions. So, the rise of political Islam, an authentic ideology that was 
powerful and garnered support across various levels of society in its quest for a new 
sociopolitical order. 
C. ISLAMIC POLITICS: INTERPRETATION OF COMMON SYMBOLOGY 
AND HISTORY 
1. Political Islam: An Ideological Response to the Crisis Environment 
As has been shown, the general origins of the phenomenon of political Islam are 
quite similar to other ideologies of transitional states. Moreover, there are some indications 
that Islam itself may aid in creating an environment "ripe" for the growth of ideological 
political thought. Indeed, Salem provides evidence of an "intensified appetite" for ideology 
across the Muslim world, as each state struggles through the agonizing process of 
development. He holds that: 
[T]he central role of Islam in organizing traditional political and social life 
gave a strong transcendental meaning to worldly affairs. Consequently, in 
the secularization and differentiation that characterize modernization, the 
need for political and social values with transcendental authority was felt 
especially strong in the Arab [and, by extension, the broader Islamic] world. 
This response [to the "crisis" environment] ... contributed to the power and 
centrality of ideological political thought. (Salem, 1994, pp. 4-5) 
Shils points to the more fundamental aspect that Islam itself, like any "intellectualized 
religion," imparts an inclination within its particular "high culture" toward ideological 
beliefs: 
An intellectualized religion provides the precondition for the emergence of 
ideology, since the former contains explicit propositions about the nature of 
the sacred and its cultivation, which is what ideologies are about. The fact 
that an ideology already exists serves both to form an ideological tradition 
and to provide a medium in which ideological dispositions can be 
precipitated by emulation and self-differentiation. (Shils, 1968, p. 69) 
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Thus, an inherent "ideological receptivity" exists within Islam that need only be prompted 
by bleak environmental conditions-such as those experienced by the states of the Greater 
Middle East since the time of World War I and earlier-to spark the growth of ideological 
movements. The genial basis for ideological political thought directly relates to Salem's 
"age of ideology," which is common to the entire Greater Middle East region. 
2. The Relationship Between Islam and Politics: a Historical Perspective 
Another aspect of commonality-and the basis of concerns over "threats" from 
Islamic unity-is fundamental relationship between the religion and the ideology of Islam: 
the common symbols, ideas, practice and history of the Islamic faith that all Muslims 
recognize and believe in. While there is little need to examine most of the aspects of 
religious practices in great detail, a brief survey of the historical relationship between Islam 
and politics will provide the appropriate information related to the specific phenomenon of 
political Islam. 
While the totality of the Islamic belief system certainly pertains to politics, very little 
specific information is provided in the fundamental sources-the Quran and the Sunnah (tra-
ditions) of the Prophet--concerning specific matters of government and the "Islamic" state. 
This vagueness (and thus, ideological flexibility) provides Islamist movements the liberty 
of innovation and the ability to promote their own various interpretations of Islamic 
government. (Ayubi, 1991, ch. 1) As such, Islam's relationship to modem politics is unique; 
its divergence from Western norms leads to many contentious issues, with the ill-defined 
nature of Islamic statecraft and institutions being a central factor of concern. As Esposito 
explains: 
The organic relationship of religion to all areas of life is viewed as 
distinguishing the Islamic community from Christianity as well as from 
Western secularism and communism. Islam is to provide the ideological 
basis for both individual and communal life, for state and society. . . . 
(Lacking) a specific, agreed upon authoritative model for an Islamic state, Is-
lamic activists, organizations, and governments have had to address a number 
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of issues that include the nature of Islamic government, political institutions 
and international relations .... (Works of early 20th-century Islamists on) 
Islamic government and institutions tend to be sketchy, dealing more with 
general principles and ideals rather than specific details. (Esposito, 1991, pp. 
282-83) 
While the diverse nature of the ideologies that originate from this ambiguous foundation will 
be reviewed more in Chapter IV, it is important to survey some key aspects of Islamic 
history to gain insight into the general phenomenon. 
The basis and inspiration for contemporary Islamic fundamentalist movements-the 
historical relationship of religion to politics and society in Islam--can be traced back to the 
very beginnings of the faith in the seventh-century A.D. The time of the Prophet 
Muhammad (who received his first revelation in 610 on the "Night of Divine Power and 
Excellence") and the Rashidun period-the era ofthe first four, "Rightly Guided" Caliphs 
(632-661) who succeeded the Prophet as leaders of the ummah-serves as the model for Is-
lamic ideology and institutions by which both modernist and conservative Islamic activists 
and scholars compare contemporary governments. Esposito defines several reasons why this 
period is seen as normative for Muslim life: 
[T]he age of Muhammad and the Righteous Caliphs ... is viewed as the time 
when God sent down His final and complete revelation for humankind and 
His last prophet, Muhammad. Second, the Islamic community/state was 
created, bonded by a common religious identity and purpose. Third, the 
sources oflslamic law, the Quran, and the inspired leadership of Muhammad, 
which provided the basic guidance for the community, originated at this time. 
Fourth, the importance of Muhammad's exemplary behavior (Sunnah) and 
the early practice of the community was reflected in the creation and 
proliferation of hadith (traditions) literature. These narrative stories reflect 
the extent to which the Prophet, his family, and companions served as models 
for Muslim life. Fifth, it is the period of the early companions, or salaf(an-
cestors or elders), that serves as the reference point for all Islamic revival and 
reform, whether traditionalist or modernist. Finally, the time of the Prophet 
and the early righteous caliphs was not only one of divine guidance but also 
one of validation. During this period, Muslims believed that the revealed 
message and Prophetic claims were realized and divinely validated in the full 
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light of history by the success and power which resulted from the near 
miraculous victories and geographic expansion of Islam. (Esposito, 1991, p. 
11) 
Thus, regardless of the ideologic orientation of Islamic political activists, the early history 
oflslam is an important factor of consideration; this is an example of what Husain labels the 
"historic" nature of Islam. "As a 'historical' religion, orthodox Islam, at least in theory, 
bridges the gulfbetween the sacred and the profane, the religious and the political." This can 
be distinguished from the "organic" nature of the religion, which sees essentially a merger 
of religious and social systems because Islam possesses both divine laws "governing every 
aspect of the Devout Muslim's life" and "a comprehensive code of ethics, morals, 
instructions, and recommendations for individual action and social interaction." (Husain, 
1995, pp. 28-31) Both characteristics suggest at least part of the reason Islam clashes with 
attempts to modernize and develop Muslim societies strictly along Western lines-the 
concept of secularization is difficult to reconcile with the "historic" and "organic" nature of 
Islam. 
Ayubi brings additional factors into consideration, focusing on the need for 
innovation and a greater variety of influences: 
Given the limited nature of political stipulation in the Quran and Hadith .. 
. Muslims have had from the start to borrow and to improvise in the 
developing of their political systems, inspired (I) by the shari'a as 
represented in the Quran and Sunnah; ... (ii) by Arabian tribal traditions and 
(iii) by the political heritage of the lands they conquered, especially Persian 
and Byzantine traditions. The influence of the first source was more 
noticeable during the era of the ... Rashidun, ... the second during the 
Urnmayyad dynasty [which directly followed], and the third during the 
Abbasid and Ottoman dynasties. (Ayubi, 1991, pp. 6-7) 
Because these various influences play of a crucial role in the debate over the relationship 
between Islam and politics, a brief overview of some of the key sources providing for 
innovation in Islamic ideological political thought is warranted. 
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The Quran, the revelation of God's will for all creation, was provided in the seventh 
century to Islam's founder/prophet Muhammad-it is the literal living word of God. Obedi-
ence and submission (islam) to God's will, while actively striving (jihad) to lead a virtuous 
life and realize God's will, are Muslim duties. Man has been provided all creation as a 
divine trust (Quran- 33 :72; 31 :20-29) and is designated God's representative or viceregent 
on earth (5:55; 6:166), with a divinely mandated mission to establish and spread God's rule 
(an Islamic order). The principal vehicle for realizing this divine mandate is the Muslim 
community (ummah), and thus religious affiliation replaced tribal ties as the bond oflslamic 
society. The sine qua non of the "Islamic" state is the implementation oflslamic law (the 
shariah), which provides the ummah with a rigorous socio-moral code and also safeguards 
it from external threats. Islam is also distinguished from Christianity by the unity and 
totality of its view of the universal order and God's centrality as the source and foundation 
of all life. While specifically referring to Islamic monotheism, the doctrine of "God's 
absolute unity (taw hid), sovereignty and [the] totality of God's will for humankind" serves 
as political Islam's ideological foundation and implicitly provides the focus of identity for 
believers. (Esposito, 1991, p. 282) The teachings of reformist Shi'i scholar and political 
activist Ali Shariati emphasize this focus: "all human activities and relationships, whether 
political, economic, literary, or artistic, ought to be firmly founded on tawhid. It provides 
one, single direction and it guarantees a unified spirit for its adherents." (Sachedina, 1983, 
pp. 199-200) 
In 622, when Muhammad and the early converts were forced to emigrate (hijra) to 
Yathrib (Medina), the ummah was established and Muhammad served as both religious 
leader and political head of state. He functioned not only as prophet and lawgiver, but also 
as commander of the army and chief judge, drawing authority from Quranic mandate: "Obey 
God and the Prophet" (3 :32). In addition, the Prophet's exemplary conduct and outstanding 
character served as the model by which Muslims were to pattern their lives: "You have a 
good model in God's Prophet" (3:32). The Sunnah, or example and sayings ofthe Prophet, 
became one ofthe key sources ofthe shariah, ranking just after the Quran. Muhammad died 
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in 632 and, as most Muslims believe, failed to designate his successor or establish a 
mechanism to allow the selection of a replacement-much less describe any specific system 
of government comparable to modern designs. 
In the tense period after the Prophet's death, his leading companions quickly came 
together and, following the tribal custom of consultation, selected Abu Bakr-Muhammad's 
close friend and advisor-as their new leader. Taking the title of successor or caliph of the 
Prophet of God, Abu Bakr served as political and military leader of the Muslims, and also 
held religious prestige symbolized by his leading of the Friday congregational prayer and 
his name being mentioned in the prayer. The second Caliph, Umar, sought to further clarify 
the selection of his successor and appointed an "election committee" on his deathbed to 
select his successor. Following consultation, Uthman Ibn Affan was elected and given the 
traditional (Arab) sign of allegiance (the clasping of hands which symbolized the sealing of 
a pact or contract). This solidified a pattern of selection of the caliph from the Prophet's 
tribe, the Quraysh, following consultation, election and an oath of allegiance (bay 'ah). 
(Esposito, 1991, pp.7-8) Still, Uthman's family had been adamant foes of Muhammad and 
the early Muslim community-tribal factionalism and threats of rebellion soon reappeared, 
eventually leading to Uthman's assassination. Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the Prophet, 
succeeded Uthman, but fared little better as a number of rebellions and separatist movements 
occurred or were formed during his brief rule, which concluded the Rashidun period. Of 
note, the subsequent murder of Ali, coupled with the martyrdom of his sons, Hassan and 
Hussien, are critical events in the history of Islam during this period, specifically because 
they fostered the separatist movement of the Shi'i (partisans of Ali) who believe in the right 
of hereditary rule of the family of the Prophet. The ensuing sectarian strife between the 
majority Sunni faith and that ofShi'ism has continued up to the present and has had a major 
impact on the Islamic world-yet another example of diversity within the Muslim faith. 
Despite the great advances made by the Islamic world in the succeeding years, the 
Rashidun era is regarded as the "Golden Age" of Islam-it was the period that introduced 
the "model" for administration and organization of the Muslim community. The example 
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and practice of Muhammad became the pattern for governance of the Islamic state, with the 
caliph directly controlling political, judicial, fiscal and military authority. During this 
period, the process for administration of conquered territories was also developed, with the 
establishment of provinces, governors, military garrison towns, systems of revenue 
collection and distribution, and regulations regarding non-Muslims within the Islamic state. 
It is important to note, however, that while the symbol oflslam's "Golden Age" is widely 
revered, its specific meaning or interpretation varies and has been used to support a broad 
array of positions of Islamic activists and their governments, as discussed in next chapter. 
(Esposito, 1991, 1 0-11) 
From the time of Ali's death until the end of the Ottoman rule after World War I, the 
Islamic world was ruled by a succession of hereditary-based monarchies which maintained 
the legitimacy of their rule by proclaiming fidelity to Islam and basing government on the 
shariah, rather than on descent from the Prophet or traditional tribal and Islamic principles 
of allegiance. It was under the "shadow of the [monarchial] state" that most of the 
"theorizing about politics ... and Islamic political literature" was developed. Furthermore, 
it "seems to have emerged when the political realities it addressed were on the decline." 
(Ayubi, 1991, p.2) This situation, obviously in conflict with the state of early Islam, creates 
the problematic circumstances now found in Islamic political thought and the conflict of 
ideologies: 
[A ]n elegant and elaborate body of jurisprudence, and a formal theory of the 
caliphate . . . through monopoly and repetition . . . [became] altogether 
entrenched in the 'Arab Mind'. With the passage of time, subsequent 
generations have found it extremely difficult to distinguish between what was 
meant as description and what was meant as prescription . . . . 
[J]urisprudence has now been extracted from its historical and political 
context, and endowed with essentialist, everlasting qualities. Furthermore, 
the elegant body of jurisprudence has been elevated almost to the level of the 
shariah itself ... The point is thus overlooked that this jurisprudence was in 
the first place a human improvisation meant to address certain political and 
social issues in a certain historical, geographical and social context. What is 
also often overlooked is that the main body of the official jurisprudence 
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fulfilled a certain political function by imparting religious legitimacy to the 
government ofthe day, which ... was not generally living up to the Islamic 
ideal. (Ayubi, 1991, p.2) 
This last point, of the legitimizing function of the traditional jurists, has a major affect on the 
Islamist ideologies of today: 
The traditional jurists had forged a link between politics and religion by 
giving a religious legitimacy to political power. The political Islamists 
maintain that religion and politics cannot be separated, but because they are 
now in the position of resisting the existing State, not of legitimizing it, they 
are seeking the politicization of a particular vision of religion that they have 
in mind. To achieve this purpose, the contemporary Jslamists are often 
inclined to be more innovative and less textual in their approach. {Ayubi, 
1991, p.3) 
Thus, far from representing a strict return to the sources or theories as defined by a pure 
fundamentalist definition, political Islam can be seen as a modem invention that actually 
disregards certain aspects of tradition. It improvises on the historical linkage of politics and 
religion, transforming the relationship and placing religion as superior to politics-the oppo-
site of the traditional connection. Also, just as the traditional jurists did in the past, the 
contemporary Islamists improvise from the various sources to meet the requirements of 
today, typically reflecting a focus on local political, economic and social conditions. 
3. Cycles of Islamic Renewal and Reform 
Yet another aspect of the Islamic faith that provides the Islamists with historical pre-
cedence for their efforts is the persistent tradition of religious revitalization over the years, 
as reflected in the key concepts of tajdid (renewal) and islah (reform). The history oflslam 
shows a recognizable pattern of renewal-reform, with a unique cycle of revitalization 
typically occurring during "periods of intense spiritual, social and political crisis" for the 
Islamic community (Dekmejian, 1995, p. 8), or at the start of a new Islamic century-the 
Islamic year 1400 began in 1979. Individuals or organizations seek to reconcile a perceived 
disparity between the Muslim world's current environment and the Islamic ideal by calling 
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for a return to the fundamentals of the faith. This broad tradition provides a foundation for 
the belief that movements of revitalization are an appropriate and necessary catalyst for "the 
regeneration ofthe authentic Islamic spirit," thus providing significant justification for some 
of the broader aspects of contemporary sociopolitical activism. (Vall, 1983, p. 33) Whil~ 
the current "cycle" of resurgence is linked to this tradition, it differs from previous eras 
however, and must be seen in its own modern context. The phenomenon is a grouping of 
political ideologies seeking to solve problems of Muslim society within the contemporary 
socio-political milieu. Most important, previous reform efforts were usually focused upon 
confronting strictly internal problems while the modern situation reflects a response to a 
greater external challenge from the West-specifically, from the drastic effects that 
colonialism and modernization have had upon the Arab and broader Muslim world over the 
past century. 
D. COMMONALITIES WITHIN ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS 
To focus on the specific beliefs and agendas that are somewhat common to the 
Islamists-using A yubi' s (1991, pp. 67 -68) definition incorporating fundamentalist and neo-
fundamentalist groups, and also traditional Islamic scholars who are politically 
active-across the range of regional countries, a brief examination of relevant aspects of the 
fundamentalists' response to their contemporary crisis environment is furnished. (For general 
background on this section of commonalities-beyond specific sources noted-see also 
Abrahamian, 1993, pp. 1-38; Ayubi, 1991, pp. 214-238 Butterworth, 1992; Deeb, 1992, pp. 
53-55; Esposito, 1992, pp.77-167; Hunter, 1986; Wuthnow, 1991; and Zakaria, 1988) Of 
note, Muslim fundamentalists, etc., can be distinguished from other groups within the 
broader Islamic revival and political environments of the Muslim world--expanding on 
Ayubi's efforts-in a typology of'revivalists' in the next chapter, in emphasizing the very 
diverse aspects of the phenomenon. Outside of its Quranic scriptures, Islam is far from 
monolithic; even the scriptures themselves offer plenty of room for a variety of inter-
pretations and implementations, developed under circumstances reflecting the unique 
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character and individuality of various states and regions. Evidence is seen in the diverse na-
ture of governments and their opponents in the Muslim World, as well as the general socio-
political environments between countries. As such, this survey will provide a very general 
review of the commonalities among Islamists-and further in depth coverage of specifics 
will follow later. For now, Fran((ois Burgat and William Dowell, while cautioning attempts 
to bound the phenomenon, provide a good starting point from which to begin an overview: 
The innumerable modalities of behavior and of social and political attitude 
linked to religion in Islamic countries justify a certain prudence on the part 
of anyone attempting to make an inventory. Once the differences in origin 
and the hierarchy of relationships have been shown and the diversity of 
different national situations taken into account, nothing prevents arriving at 
a conclusion that the attempts which have been underway for a half century 
to bridge the gap that separates society from the State by reintroducing Islam, 
have in fact taken on forms that are increasingly coherent and more and more 
homogeneous. It is thus possible to make a first attempt at a systematic 
outline, and to propose therefore to define Islamism as the recourse to the 
vocabulary of Islam, used in the post-colonial period to express within the 
state, or more often against it, an alternative political program that uses the 
heritage of the West as a foil, but allows nevertheless the reappropriation of 
its principal references. Despite the diversity of their institutional 
expression, despite their different political situations (clandestine or legal, 
opposing or as in the case of Iran acting within the state), despite the 
diversity of their means of action (proselytizing in the mosques, social or 
political activism or even violence, etc.) And that of their social base, the 
Islamist movements as a whole can well be attached to the same historical 
matrix. (Burgat and Dowell, 1993 p. 41) 
The common "historical matrix" that the Muslim societies have experienced-that of the 
Third World, colonialism, underdevelopment, etc.-and the "crisis" conditions with which 
their members are forced in confront form the essential basis for the environmental common-
alities that exist between Islamist movements. Now a more focused review of political plat-
forms they endorse becomes important, as well as the religious features of their ideologies. 
As previously noted, Islam, much like other religions, provides a basic doctrine 
which specifies man's relationship and obligations to God. Still, the literal Arabic transla-
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tion of Islam-to surrender, or submit to-points to a deeper meaning: everyone and every-
thing must submit to God. Many Islamists promote the notion of Islam as a din ("way of 
life"), emphasizing a total commitment and subordination of all aspects of a Muslim's life 
to the will of God; the doctrine of taw hid provides the common basis of this comprehensive 
worldview. Moreover, Islam surpasses the basic level of most other religions and catechisms 
by denying a philosophical separation of "church" and state. This overarching relationship 
stands in stark contrast to modem Christianity and the Western political environment; the 
resultant description in the West oflslam as a "political religion" creates fears of a rising tide 
of fundamentalism confronting Western values and institutions. As the focal point ofthis 
section, however, the concern over Islamic fundamentalism centers around its emergence as 
a major new political force over the last two decades. A few general assumptions 
concerning the Islamism phenomenon within the broader Islamic revival are provided as a 
basis for further examination: 
1. It is, first and foremost, a cluster of ideologically-inspired movements using a 
variety of interpretations of scriptural symbols and religious precepts to support 
political activities motivated by the same local societal problems of concern to 
secularists within the state environment. 
2. It is a force capable of trans-national appeal-though it provides little unity of 
action among groups-and can be seen in societies with a wide variety of social, 
political and economic environments. 
3. It is a powerful, thriving element within both Sunni and Shi'i schools, and is 
seen as more openly politically motivated than larger groupings of"revivalists" 
and adherents to "folk" Islam/Sufi orders currently flourishing in the Muslim 
world. 
4. It is a highly diffuse force with different manifestations according to the time 
and place; it is not a centrally-controlled, monolithic or even a formally orga-
nized force, and typically mirrors the stance of the regime vis-a-vis its activities. 
5. It is mainly a populist phenomenon, as opposed to an official (government-
sponsored) movement, mirroring Third World activism against political elites 
in other regions; its religiously-inspired basis comes as much from regime 
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repression of other modes of political discourse as it does from a quest for 
authenticity in its attempt to provide a new framework for reality/strategy for 
action. (Amuzegar, 1993, pp. 127-135; Bill, 1989, p. 130, Hunter, 1988A, pp. 
ix-xv) 
The two most important factors are the populist nature of political Islam-Ervand 
Abrahamian goes so far as to name Khomeini's fundamentalist ideology "populism" and the 
intrastate nature of most of its activities. This is a movement of grass-roots anger-from 
feelings of deprivation and alienation derived from the deteriorating environment-which 
confronts or opposes the official religious, as well as traditional governing, elites. By 
promoting a social thesis which stresses social equality and champions the have-nots, the 
Islamists can mobilize a constituency wherever there are dispossessed or oppressed Muslims. 
Another factor which is critical is their strong objection to any form of external influence or 
intervention in Muslim societies. The Western imperialist legacy, combined with a 
perceived economic neo-imperialism which has captured their countries' drives for indepen-
dence and local autonomy in an increasingly international economic system, creates fuel for 
their activist efforts. The Western image has been further tainted by frequent regional 
intervention, typically in support of repressive regimes or in order to maintain "regional 
stability"-a term typically seen as maintaining a status quo favoring the interests of 
Western-oriented elites over those of the masses. (Amuzegar, 1993, pp.127-135; Bill, 1989, 
pp. 127-132) Despite underlying Sunni-Shi'i animosity, Khomeini's slogan from the Iranian 
Revolution of''Neither East nor West," coming from common underlying circumstances, has 
symbolized the outlook of a broader spectrum of regional fundamentalist movements: 
The common threads that tie these movements together are their stand against 
the established ruling class, which they consider oppressive, corrupt, 
faithless, and aligned with the United States and Israel; their grievances 
against what they consider to be the imposition by the West and the United 
States of a neo-colonialist and neo-imperialist culture hostile to their native 
traditions; and last, their sympathy with the plight of oppressed and 
disenfranchised Muslims in places like Palestine, Bosnia, and Kashmir. 
(Amuzegar, 1993, p. 131) 
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Given the pervasive nature of the "crisis" environment, the multifaceted "attack" on cultural/ 
traditional elements ofMuslim societies, and the continued failure of ruling elites to solve 
mounting problems or to permit an increased political "voice" for the masses, Islam can be 
seen as less a cause of the current violent rage throughout the Muslim World but instead as 
an opposition "mobilization platform." (Nuemann, 1993) Resisting the onslaught of "Wester-
nization," Islam also survives as the only available avenue for political expression of their 
grievances, due to state dominance and its repression of other forms of political activism: 
The Islamists gain popular appeal by endeavoring to accomplish the very 
program nationalist regimes had devised but were unable to achieve-be it 
because of the regimes' widespread corruption, their squandering of oil 
revenues, their reliance on the West, their more recent submission to 
International Monetary Fund strictures, or their persistent lack of interest in 
tradition. (Salame, 1993, p. 23) 
This statement ties directly to the notion explored earlier of successful ideologies 
incorporating aspects of their predecessor to provide some continuity of thought while 
advancing a new approach to problems. 
As for the primarily intrastate nature of political Islam, Sami Zubaida surveys a wide 
range of aspects relating to the modem "nation-state" in Middle Eastern societies and 
determines that, while not as a stable an environment as the West, the region still exhibits 
crucial attributes which indicate legitimate support for the state system: '·';::'-"· 
[A] modem political field develops in all the countries in question in relation 
to the nation state but not tied to it; ... the discourses, political models and 
forms of organization of this field assume a nation and a national state, even 
when they are opposed to it in favor of some wider entity; ... this field is the 
product of cultural and technical processes of modernity; and . . . most 
Islamic movements and ideologies are part of this field. (Zubaida, 1993, p. 
140-141) 
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Zubaida holds that assertions that pan-Arabic or pan-Islamic ideologies are widely supported 
stem from lingering cultural stereotypes and "Orientalist" thought patterns. By focusing on 
a non-existent essentialism within political Islam and the typically arousing rhetoric of Arab 
ideologues, such analysis fails to account for the actions of the majority ofislamist groups 
which-while seeking to change the state "in their image"-still support its existence and 
"measured" accumulation of power. As development/modernization continues across the 
region: 
[T]he 'imagined community' of the territorial state extends ever further into 
the deepest rural and desert areas, where the people are ever more conscious 
of their dependence upon the territorial polity. This dpes not necessarily 
imply solidarity or loyalty to the state, but a heightened consciousness of the 
national dimension of their livelihood and their relations to politics, which 
is crucial in both loyalty and opposition .... [C]onditions [within the region] 
have produced mutual interests in the territorial state, and ... it is at least the 
working concept for all the actors on the economic and political stages. The 
challenges to the territorial state, pan-Arab and pan-Islamic, have come 
primarily from elaborate modem ideologies worked out by intellectuals, but 
who have in practice pursued their politics within the territorial state. 
(Zubaida, 1993, p. 170) 
In analyzing the most significant "outgrowth"ofpolitical Islam in terms of the nation state 
environment-namely the establishment of an Islamic Republic in the former Kingdom of 
Iran-Zubaida notes that all indications are that "the Islamic elements of the republic fit very 
well with the nation-state model," even some ofKhomeini's "less than Islamic" additions 
to the "Islamic" state (as discussed in the case study of Iran in the next chapter). The 
revolutionary thrust, powerful as it was, focused strictly upon the overthrow of the Shah and 
took no actions (at least overtly, outside of rhetoric) against its neighbors (Zubaida, 1993, 
p. 170); it was the invasion by Iraqi forces that began the long conflict between those two 
states after the Islamic republic had been formed. 
As for those groups working outside the "system," studies indicate the more militant 
variants of this phenomenon are but a small percentage of the fundamentalist "sub-set" (neo-
91 
fundamentalists) of the overarching political Islamic "umbrella" of ideologies (more 
information is provided in the next chapter) that receive little support throughout society. 
While alienated transitional individuals may feel angered at the state, etc., many do not see 
violence as a means of positive change for society; examples of popular disgust at violen} 
acts include routine occasions where Egyptians have chased down bomb throwers running 
from the scenes of attack and turn them into authorities. (Dunn, 1993, p. 76) These secretive 
groups are ideologically quite similar to earlier revivalist movements in the history oflslam, 
except that these groups often no longer feel constrained to work "within the system" that 
has failed to provide them the progress in social, political and economic spheres that they 
seek. In terms of their secretive, cell-organized nature-and their potential theat to disrupt 
social peace-these groups can be compared quite well to Western terrorist organizations 
such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Badr-Meinhoff gang in Germany, which also 
conducted terror campaigns with limited popular support. Some have been prevented from 
potential participation by repressive regimes, and/or "radicalized" by repressive policies. 
In summary, such terrorist activity, much like related more peaceful political Islamic action, 
is less linked to "Islam" as it is to the "crisis" environment and the opportunistic efforts of 
militant ideologues to gain a few supporters to wage destructive campaigns of violence 
against the state. (Dunn, 1993, pp. 76-77) 
Despite this overall diversity in means of action, all Islamists tend to exhibit a 
number of general characteristics which tie together the similar deteriorating conditions they 
face with their common proposed response: 
1. They believe Islam is an all-encompassing ideology-with the Prophet Muham-
mad, the Quran, and Sunnah as essential elements-that provides an effective, 
yet 'comfortable' response to the wide spectrum of contemporary challenges. 
2. They emphasize social justice and equality, with vague prescriptions for specific 
problems-"Islam is the answer" is a standard response; as regimes continue to 
fail in their efforts to solve daily problems, the power of the Islamist line grows. 
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3. They oppose repressive and corrupt governments, and organize an integrated 
social, economic, and political infrastructure to encourage expansion of their 
base of support-taking full advantage of the global impact of the drive for 
democratization/popular participation to call for change in their societies. 
4. They denounce the intervention of external actors into their societies' internal 
activities, promoting an authentic, yet eclectic, "Islamic solution" to problems 
of society-many of which are perceived to stem from previous external 
involvement, either directly or indirectly. 
5. Their members exhibit total dedication to their principles and are usually willing 
to make the ultimate sacrifice for them. While not all groups are messianic in 
outlook or militant in tactics, the absolutist, otherworldly bent common to their 
creed tends to reinforce their mutual fervent commitment. 
6. They believe that an Islamic "system" is the only ideological system which can 
truly succeed in the Muslim world, permitting their goals to be achieved and 
returning Islam to its rightful place of prominence on the world scene. (Bill, 
1989, pp. 131; Dekmejian, 1995, pp. 41-44) 
Under this general framework, it can be concluded that the Islamists provide "answers" to 
each of the various "crises" previously outlined. Islam, as an ideology instituted into society 
through the shariah, provides principles and prescriptions that have been applied to most 
aspects of Muslim social life. In terms of legitimacy and the related inability of ruling elites 
to organize viable political systems, Islam provides a traditional system of legitimation 
which enables the Islamists to reject Western ideologies and institutions for more "authentic" 
constructs to direct political activity and foster social cohesion. As Islam remains the sole 
ideology that has not been tried and found lacking, it retains an additional appeal within 
Muslim transitional societies, for both regimes and the opposition: 
[F]undamentalist activity is the only means by which dissidents of any sort 
can express themselves in most Muslim countries. Modernist and communist 
ideologies have been hampered by the contaminative association with past 
colonialist power or present neo-colonialist endeavors .... Islam ... is the 
one area the colonialist powers could not or would not usurp .... To the 
extent that state ideologies of nationalist orientation have replaced the 
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colonial powers they succeeded, their exponents have secularized Islam, but 
not displaced it. The legitimation of nationalist leaders continues to rest in 
part on their efforts to depict the kind of rule they offer as constant with the 
true dictates oflslam. (Lawrence, 1987, pp. 32-33) 
There are three points to discuss here; first, the Islamists hold much greater power in their 
ideology of opposition to regimes, than do those elites who attempt to strike back at the 
Islamists with their brand of "government" Islam-often supported by traditionalist ulama 
(more on this in the typology of'revivalists'); second, the statement oflslamic ideology "not 
being applied yet" obviously infers "in the modem era" as the period of concern; and finally, 
this "untried" method also comes with the partial exception of Iran-yet another reason the 
revolution and subsequent activities of the Islamic republic are so pivotal: their demon-
stration effect (Iran will be one of the case studies in the next chapter). Thus, the (Sunni) 
fundamentalists can easily say "Islam is the solution" and have greater support for their 
claim. 
As for economic problems, social justice and equality are key tenets of the Islamic 
faith-"Gross disparities of wealth and privilege fly in the face of traditional Islamic maxims 
of communal sharing of basic resources." (Dekmejian, 1980, p. 8) As class polarization 
increase and the region's massive poverty increase, Islam provides the basis for a potent 
ideological protest-promoting 'socialist' Islamic prescriptions which have basic religious 
sanction. As for the concern over military impotence, the military tradition of Islam and its 
rapid rise to world prominence within its first century of existence are so obviously a 'part' 
of the religion that they have helped add to its stereotypes and misperceptions over the years. 
The Islamists tum this negative effect into a positive opportunity, emphasizing concepts such 
as jihad (holy war, in this context), ghazi (victorious warrior) and shahid (martyred warrior 
in the name oflslam) to evoke great sentiment among the faithful. (Dekmejian, 1980, pp. 8-
9) Ruling elites can also come to see Islam as a powerful motivational tool, seeking to 
redirect the rage of the people and propel it against external enemies. The notion of Muslims 
defending dar al-lslam (the land oflslam) is a central idea of the Islamic faith. 
94 
As for Islam and socio-cultural crises, the religion is so closely linked to the people's 
basic existence that it will always provide a firm psychological foundation amid a troubled 
environment. Islam offers unity, legitimacy and self-esteem for Muslims in the throes of an 
identity crisis, and provides an 'answer' to the problem of general alienation. The Western 
view that religion will (must) recede into the private life of society for modernization to 
occur will likely need modification, with Islam seen as an exception to the rule-for if 
development plans and modernization are to go forward throughout the Muslim world, Islam 
will almost certainly have to play a key role at least providing cultural authenticity to such 
efforts. 
Who are the individuals most likely to respond to the Islamists' da 'wah (or call to 
Islam)? The constituencies generated by the "crisis" environment and state action/inaction 
will vary according to a number of factors, including Salem's "dynamics of ideology" such 
as socioeconomic class, age/generation, etc., as well as from country to country. 
Nevertheless, there are certain similarities among members of these groups: 
They are not the disenfranchised, the rural rabble that some social scientists 
have supposed them to be. They are upwardly mobile, urban transplants 
from rural settings, with a keen sense of social/cultural/religious disjuncture. 
It is through a charismatic leader that they are mobilized (Lawrence, 1987, 
p. 32) 
As previously noted, the youth of transitional society are particularly "ripe" for ideological 
capture. The increasing frustration of youth who have raised expectations due to high 
school, college and university educations and an inability to realize their goals due to the 
problems of the (usually urban) environment combines with the psychological insecurities 
and lack of identity common to youth worldwide to form a potent mixture of alienation and 
rage. It is no coincidence that students with training in scientific and technical fields-so 
promising and full of potential upward mobility-are prone to join Islamist groups when 
they realize the lack of opportunity that awaits them in the job market. Dekmejian notes 
three reasons for this relationship, in which scientific and technical studies 
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confirm/strengthen their religious beliefs: 1) their "desire to catch up with the West" and 
overcome their industrial and military underdevelopment; 2) their "quest to master fields of 
learning ... thought minimally to involve the transference of Western values to Islamic 
society"; and 3) "the attractiveness of the certainty inherent in the sciences as opposed to the 
analytical and speculative nature of the humanities and social sciences." (Dekmejian, 1995, 
pp. 46-47; Ibrahim, 1980; Dunn, 1993) 
Other key attributes-many related to the general transitional environment--of the 
members of the Islamist movements include the likelihood that they are part of the newly 
urbanized society, with all its associated social, economic, and cultural shocks; often they 
are members of the traditional sectors of middle class/petite bourgeoisie whose religious 
devotion is increasingly turned into fundamentalist activities out of fear for the state of Islam 
in a world besieged by the powerful Western culture and political/economic influence. The 
lack of mobility provided by dismal economic conditions in regional countries only adds to 
their feelings of relative deprivation. Finally, their are the lower classes, which can be 
divided into three groups-peasants ifallahin), tribesmen (badu), and the urban poor-but 
are often grouped together as al-mustad'ajin (the oppressed). While members of this group 
are less likely to be involved in Islamist activities in the early stages of group development, 
should conditions worsen and civil unrest increase, these groups--especially the urban 
poor----could join the conflict, providing mass support and "cannon fodder" for the potential 
revolutionary seizure of power. (Dekmejian, 1995, pp. 47-49) 
In closing, it must be emphasized that identifying the potential for an Islamist 
response to the pervasive atmosphere of crisis does not necessarily indicate that such 
movements can develop appropriate solutions to the myriad of problems they face. The 
example of Iran and its troubles since the revolution provide an obvious message to 
observant Muslim that the platform of "Islam is the solution" is not as easy as it sounds. 
Nevertheless, the appeal of Islam among the masses has been based much more upon the 
political (ideological) message rather than its spirituality and other-worldliness (theology); 
Islam can be presented as a powerful anti-establishment political alternative to mobilize 
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protest against poverty and deprivation. Until Islamists are given a chance to replace the 
eclectic Western-inspired ideologies of current ruling elites with their Islamic alternative, 
and actually demonstrate how their policies will address (or fail to address) the various 
problems plaguing their countries, they retain the advantage of an untried option that will 
likely retain a secure spiritual and psychological niche in transitional society. Finally, while 
the more militant ideologies of the neo-fundamentalists have yet to gain broad popular 
support, they remain an active force with an influence far beyond their "secondary" status. 
Recognition of the moderate nature of the majority oflslamists is crucial, and at least some 
tangible "concessions" to those elements who seek to work within the system must be 
made-or the risk of radicalizing a broader portion of society could result. Government 
actions, in this instance, can do more harm than good if measures fail to combine 
suppression of militant actions with positive reforms and dialogue with moderate elements. 
E. POLITICAL ISLAM AS A "THIRD WORLD" IDEOLOGY 
1. Common Third World Origins 
A basic premise of this thesis remains that political Islam has common roots across 
the Greater Middle East-despite the greater importance of individual historical, social, etc. 
backgrounds of states-in the impact of development and colonialism that distinguishes the 
Third World from the First. While each state has individual experiences, sometimes even 
without "official" colonization, the similar experience of "late" development and state-
building in the modem era creates a degree of commonality between the ideologies which 
arise-both those with religious tiers and without-in response to "crisis" conditions of their 
environment: 
In forcing the matter, one could go so far as to disassociate Islamism from 
religion, and see nothing more in this religious vocabulary, which is intended 
to express an alternative political program, than the ideological logistics of 
political independence, the cultural prolongation of the ruptures born of 
decolonization .... [I]ndeed, it is true to say that Muslims are not the only 
one to tum toward the heavens to find a response which a secular state 
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refuses to provide for them. . . . The phenomenon might be regarded as 
universal .... It is "the revenge of God." (Burgat and Dowell, 1993, p.68) 
It is within the dynamic of the North-South dispute that political Islam must take its place 
as simply another in a series of ideologies seeking to provide support to members of societies 
overburdened by the course of events which created their relative backward conditions. In 
seeking a way to cope and combat the forces within that environment that seem out of their 
control, these Third World groups are forced to respond on terms decided by the First 
World-in an essentially religiously-charged environment spurred on by the spirit of the 
colonial age-which have had a lingering effect over generations: 
More than the return of God, the most perceptible dynamic at the end of the 
century is probably the return to the forefront of His once-forgotten sons of 
the South. But if the South is not only Muslim, the North in its 
overwhelming majority is certainly "Judea-Christian." It is the vocabulary 
of its Judea-Christian culture which has served to express the marginalization 
from which the "Third World," notably the Muslim, is trying to emerge 
today .... If mosques have had as much success as they have over the last 
few decades, it is much less because they speak of God than it is because the 
vocabulary they use to do so comes from the only place that resisted the 
cultural pressure from the North. In this case, the apparent "return to the 
religious" is far less concerned with the resurgence of the sacred in a secular 
universe than with the rehabilitation of local cultural references, political 
ones among others. (Burgat and Dowell, 1993, pp.69-70) 
Politically-active individuals in Third World states, regardless of particular developments 
which distinguish their states from their similarly underdeveloped neighbors in the South, 
all experience the effects of being in an inferior status compared to the First World. The 
need to respond continues-just as it did under colonial rule--due to the prolonged situation 
of second-rate prominence on the world stage: 
In the South, the colonial episode and its diverse sequels constitute the hard 
core of the conscience of each individual, even for those who have not lived 
it. ... To fail to recognize it or to appear astonished by the fact that most of 
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the Islamist generation has not personally experienced colonization is equal 
to drawing the conclusion that a society's collective imagination changes 
completely with each generation .... In the South as in the North, the 
resurgence of religion in the systems of representation indeed reflects the 
difficulties of life in societies that have fallen prey to the questioning of 
values and categories that have dominated the century. (Burgat and Dowell, 
1993, pp.69-70) 
Such discussion further confirms previous analysis linking the "crisis" environment common 
to the Third World with the response of political Islam, among other ideologies of"the 
South." Comparison with another example of a "religiously-inspired" response to such 
conditions is an appropriate way to close this chapter. 
2. A Comparable Religious Ideology: Liberation Theology 
While modernization theorists and neo-Marxist scholars have the view of religion-
especially Christianity-as being apolitical or non-political in the modern era, evidence 
exists that many religions are witnessing the growth of religio-political thought and related 
activities. An example for comparison to political Islam, further emphasizing the "Third 
World" roots of the phenomenon, is liberation theology-an outgrowth of the Catholic 
religious communities of Latin America and elsewhere that is a response to the typical 
quandaries of the societal environment in developing countries (as discussed relating to 
political Islam). Jeff Haynes describes some key features: 
Central to the concept ofliberation theology is the notion of dependence and 
underdevelopment, the use of class struggle perspective to explain social 
conflict and justify political action, and the exercise of a political role to 
achieve religious as well as secular goals. (Haynes, 1994, p.98) 
These movements were seen as a socially progressive phenomenon aimed at overcoming the 
stagnant, indifferent hierarchy of the Church to engender a spirit of 'people power' to 
mobilize the masses. In so doing, liberation theologians endeavor to confront the problems 
of the day and the status quo, making positive changes in the "crisis" environment at the 
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local level through welfare and reform activities. Haynes notes the atmosphere in which 
liberation theology developed: 
In Latin America, Christianity has been the province of the Catholic Church 
for 500 years. Rather like Islam in the Middle East and North Africa, 
Catholicism is (or has been until recently) more than just a religion; it is the 
dominant culture, with deep roots throughout the hemisphere. . . . What 
happened to change things was that the traditional (Catholic) order began to 
collapse under the combined pressures of modernization, Americanization, 
and urbanization ... (Haynes, 1994, p. 96) 
Liberation theology grew out of a situation where the formal institutions of the Church had 
grown "out of touch": with the plight of the faithful among the lower levels of society. The 
phenomenon evolved as a response to two factors: 
The first was the declining ability of the Catholic Church spiritually to satisfy 
burgeoning populations enmeshed ever deeper in stultifying poverty and 
political inconsequence. The second was the degeneration of politics to a 
squalid struggle for power between the military and the political elites, on the 
one hand, and the guerilla groups and trade unions, on the other. In this 
deadly battle many people were the targets of political violence from both 
sides. (Haynes, 1994, p. 96) 
The conditions of crisis were further inflamed by a general deterioration of the overall 
economic situation in the region, limiting or halting growth rates which had previously 
soared in the years since WWII, and thereby creating the ruinous increasing gap between 
increased expectations and decreasing opportunities. Within this "crisis" environment, a 
key element which led to the fostering of a "politicized religion" was the Second Vatican 
Council (1962-65) from which a series of reforms were initiated aimed at revitalizing the 
Latin-American Catholic community. Seeking to increase the number of clergy and focus 
more on improved pastoral action, the Church sought foreign priests to bolster the dwindling 
numbers of the native counterparts throughout Central and South America and minister 
among the poor communities. (Sigmund, 1990, pp. 14-21) Many of these new arrivals had 
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deeply held, "politicized" beliefs concerning "dependency, socialist or militant Christian 
ideas." As a result the 'worker-priest experiment' began, leading to the direct involvement 
of the Church in the development struggles of states in the region: 
The theology of liberation grew out of the militant priests' direct 
involvement with the working poor ... A ware that the Church seemed to be 
losing contact with the masses, particularly in the cities, bishops in many 
dioceses supported a plan for parish priests to take employment in factories 
and workshops in order to get closer to working people, understand their 
needs more intimately, and develop [an appropriate] ministry .... For most 
worker priests, direct involvement was a profoundly unsettling experience in 
consciousness raising. Many realized the Church was alienated from the 
poor, and saw it as primarily an agent of pacification and co-optation since 
it made little effort to change social conditions or draw attention to the 
structural causes underlying poverty. (Haynes, 1994, p. 1 00) 
As a central part of the new ideology which grew from this "crisis" milieu, the radical clergy 
drew concepts from an eclectic sampling of Marxist social thought and reinterpreted 
Christian beliefs and traditions to form the frame work/strategy that became liberation 
theology. A "third way" was sought between the two dominant ideologies of the West and 
East, and to these priests there was no dilemma in advocating Marxist-type reforms for 
society-because the starting point was from a need to "humanize" the masses (release them 
from poverty and degradation) before Christian values and beliefs could be emphasized. 
Thus, the process of "liberation" incorporated ideas of socio-political "conscientization" as 
well as spiritualization. Two keep means of implementing their plans came in the form of 
the Church hierarchy's program of literacy training, such as the Brazilian Basic Education 
Movement, and the grassroots-level Eccleisial Base Communities (CEB), which were small 
groupings of 20 to 30 led by laymen centered around Bible study and communal action. 
While radicalized elements within the priesthood provided the impetus for the CEBs in their 
early emphasis on popular community action and self-help, these "peoples forums" soon 
rapidly expanded in numbers. Redefining the Catholic Church's role in terms of social 
101 
activities in many Latin American countries-a key contribution to their societies was the 
socialization and sense of citizenship provided to transitional individuals. (Haynes, 1994, 
pp. 101-106; Sigmund, 1990, pp. 23-27) 
3. Political Islam and Liberation Theology Compared 
Thus, some strong comparisons can be made between political Islam and liberation 
theology as two "Third World" religio-political ideologies responding to a collective "crisis" 
within their respective transitional societies. Political Islam and liberation theology are first 
and foremost, popular-level, often mass-based phenomena, composed of diverse groups of 
activists, that "radicalize" (or politicize) religion to counteract a lethargic, traditional 
religious establishment and its support for the status quo religio-political environment. 
Liberation theology also seeks to reexamine its heritage, and like the Islamists, liberation 
theologians have many problems with the notion of secularism and its effect on society. 
We all know that the Christian West resolved the issue of secularism in the 
formula, "Render unto Caesar that which belongs to Caesar, and unto God 
that which belongs to God." Nevertheless, there remains a lively tension and 
a certain degree of ambivalence among all major Christian sects ... about the 
notion of secularism. . . . The conflict within the Roman Catholic Church 
between the traditional hierarchy and priests in Latin America practicing 
what they call liberation theology is perhaps the most dramatic current 
expression of this tension in the Christian context. Liberation theology 
resembles Islam more than any other variety of Christianity because of the 
extraordinary range of its views on a plethora of issues which cannot 
narrowly be defined as religious. (Mitchell, 1987, P. 78) 
They can take advantage of the opportunities presented by "religious sanctuary" in an 
otherwise sterile political environment, circumventing regime efforts to stifle political 
opposition, and also benefitting from links with similar movements in other areas, states, etc. 
Both start with a fundamental concern for the poor and dispossessed members of 
society-. in particular the urban members under heavy strain from social change-and urge 
them to take action to improve their conditions. While the Marxist slant (Western ideology) 
of liberation theology differs from Islamism, the anti-Westernization rhetoric and concern 
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over maintaining cultural purity, along with their mutual focus at the religious "community"-
level, further suggest the cross-ideological similarities of the two. In essence, they have both 
redefined their political environments, as both regimes and orthodox religious leaders are 
forced to shift their public stances on religion and politics closer to the "extremes" of these 
movements. Emphasis on laymen being actively involved in grass roots-level social and 
spiritual functions within the transitional environment is also a common feature. Finally, 
there is also a link in terms of revolutionary activity, with the Iranian Revolution comparing 
with the activities in Haiti, the Phillippines, and Central America of liberation theologians 
leading mass opposition efforts (Haynes, 1994, p. 1 07). 
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IV. POLITICAL ISLAM'S DIVERSITY AND ITS INFLUENCE ON POWER 
While the survey of common aspects provided a good starting point for 
comprehension ofthe general phenomenon of political Islam, the main proposition ofthis 
study is that some of its most important aspects, paradoxically, involve its localized features 
and origins. Lawrence notes the local influences on the phenomenon and then points to the 
"unity" of its original sources: 
[I]nstead of a regional, national or transnational [phenomenon, political 
Islam exists in] a myriad oflocal situations, each bracketed by a set of vari-
ables that determine the issues and actors of the moment. ... [Paradoxically, 
the Islamists] are [also] interlocked through a shared perception that Islam, 
with a capital I and in the singular case, matters more than the several 
alternative ideologies that compete with it, and more than the several state 
structures that attempt to define, and so control, it. (Lawrence, 1987, p. 34) 
Yet, the discussion of Islam with a capital "I" overstates the effect of this potential basis of 
solidarity among movements when taking a view beyond the bounds of the local areas, and 
diminishes the key influence of his "local variables." The key to the diversity of political 
Islam-indeed, to almost any religious ideology-is the potential to meet requirements of 
the local environment due to the extreme flexibility of interpretation of the symbols and 
ideas that compose the religion itself. 
Building from the previous basis provided, this chapter will furnish an examination 
ofthe breadth ofislamist movements, and also related actors in the environment of politics 
and religious ideologies in the Greater Middle East. These conditions create an atmosphere 
where a wider range of actors influence religio-politics, as will be shown within a brief 
typology of Islamic "revivalists"-a description of a variety of ideal-type actors and their 
viewpoints on the conjunction of religion and politics from positions of power and 
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opposition. While the previous chapter provided some basic characteristics common to 
Islamists and provided insight into the membership of these groups, this chapter will explore 
the far greater aspects of divergence in terms of their creeds and programs for Islamic-
inspired political action-some of the distinctive traits that distinguish these groups and their 
more prominent ideologues within the broader phenomenon. These differences, along with 
group perceptions of the "crisis" situation in their country and certain structural factors in 
regional states-which vary based upon diversity in levels of development, affect of 
colonialism, geographic/natural resource considerations, and unique socio-cultural and 
political-economic attributes-play a role in the development of a variety of ideologies and 
political relationships throughout the region, creating a polycelJfric character for political 
Islam overall: 
Islamic militancy in each country has come as a response to that country's 
underlying conditions. In their ideological approach to statecraft and 
economic management, the disparate Islamic movements give contradictory 
and confusing signals. Some are in favor of free enterprise and global 
economic integrations; others find capitalism, free markets, and 
multinationals exploitative and unjust. Furthermore, while most groups favor 
the adoption of Islamic teachings and jurisprudence as the law of the land, 
few openly advocate the establishment of a theocracy similar to Iran's, and 
the exclusion of secular parties. (Amuzegar, 1993, p.130) 
Beyond this simple evidence of diversity, further information will be provided to outline 
some general variations in "types" of ideologies promoted, and issues involving an 
"evolutionary pattern" that is characteristic of these movements. Then, a general look at 
regime types across the region and their various responses to political Islam-a factor with 
an obvious impact on the activities of the groups involved. 
Next, in attempting to illustrate some diverse aspects related to this phenomenon, a 
set of case studies will follow, organized according to the general relationship between 
Islamic ideologies and groups that espouse them and the government in power within the 
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state. The first case study, labeled Islam Gains Power, surveys the "birth" and "growth" of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this case study, evidence will show that far from a mono-
lithic essence, Islam-even among the Mullahs within the government-is open to a variety 
of interpretations and political positions. Reviewing the events leading up to and during the 
Revolution, and the subsequent consolidation of power by more radical elements within the 
regime, this examination demonstrates how factionalism in Iran has been a key factor since 
the earliest stages of drive toward an Islamic Republic-and still plays a major role in 
decision making today. In addition, those aspects of the revolution which make it atypical 
within the Muslim world will be explored. Next, a case study ofEgypt will look at Political 
Islam at War, in the regional state that has had the longest experience with political Islam 
in the modem era, and currently undergoing a tense conflict between the regime and militant 
Islamist groups. A briefhistorical overview of the changing relationship between Islamist 
groups and the regimes will provide the backdrop for discussion of individual groups and 
their ideologies. Then, an assessment of the potential impact such groups will have on Egypt 
in the future will conclude this section. Finally, the last case study concerns Pakistan, a state 
created by the conflicting religious and ideological views of Muslims and Hindus prior to 
independence in British-held India. In Coopted Political Islam, analysis of the historical 
interaction between the various Islamist groups, political elites and the military provides 
insight into yet another manifestation of politico-Islamic interaction. Here, the Islamists 
have continued to "play by the rules" of the essentially secular "Islamic Republic"while 
being unable to gain power via the ballot box. Despite the prominent position of "Islam" 
as a legitimating overall focus for the state and its activities, the Islamists have not overcome 
local elements and traditional factors which play a greater role in determining political 
outcomes in Pakistan. 
Such diversity not only refutes the notion of a single "Islam" as related to politics or 
other facets of daily life in Muslim states, but deflates the primary notion supporting the idea 
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behind the theories of Huntington and Lewis (noted in the introduction) that caution is 
warranted due to a rising tide of Islam across the region-creating the potential for a "Green 
Menace" to clash with its historical Christian and Jewish adversaries in the West. The 
chapter concludes with a review of evidence relating to the specific transnational aspects of 
the phenomenon which indicate linkage/unity of action among the variety of Islamist groups. 
Beyond Iranian "kin-ship" -style support of Shi 'i groups around the region and inflammatory 
rhetoric aimed against Western powers and traditional regimes across the Gulf, little 
evidence exists of a renewed ideological threat to be contained a la communism across the 
Greater Middle East. Islam is first and foremost a "lived experience" for its adherents and, 
as such, its various "relationships" with each Muslim are focused on the daily life and the 
daily environment-and not merely a byproduct of the theological tenets of the Quran (i.e., 
Lawrence's capital "!"Islam). As noted, the confluence of the range of specific "crisis 
catalysts" form the driving force behind individual interpretations of religious precepts 
leading to the development of an Islamic ideology to confront problems of social change. 
Most important, politics within Muslim states have historically varied greatly in practice 
from the theoretical "Islamic" state discussed previously. However, this extreme diversity 
and fragmented nature of political Islam-since it is due to the great adaptability to local 
situations-combined with the unity of "faith" in providing identities for transitional 
individuals and also the state's removal of other vehicles of political 
participation/protest--ensures that as a phenomenon, political Islam will be a factor in the 
region for many years to come: 
Because Islamic fundamentalism exists, and will continue to exist, as the 
only pressure valve in a turbulent, cruel, uncertain world, fundamentalist 
Muslims will find other successes-some minor, some major, all 
temporary-beyond Iran ... (Lawrence, 1987, p. 34) 
108 
With that thought, the analysis of political Islam continues, with an emphasis on diversity 
across the Greater Middle East region. 
A. ISLAM AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL FLEXIBILITY 
The Islamic legacy has proven quite adaptable historically and-much like the Judea-
Christian tradition-has been open to multiple interpretations. The religion of Islam, with 
its variety of powerful symbols and ideas, is an integral part of the culture of Muslim 
societies and can be "mined" for various influential elements to support the ideologies of 
political leaders or their opponents. Often, the limits of its capability and capacity for 
mobilization relate less to the ideology itself, and more to the ingenuity and skills of the 
leaders, and also how they develop and apply their particular interpretations of Islam: a 
variety of factors influence the environments of countries throughout the Greater Middle 
East region-the similarities of which were discussed previously-and generate an 
atmosphere conducive to the growth of ideological political thought. The very nature of the 
Islamic faith, however, when coupled with the range of its spread, presents both a vast and 
fertile community to base the establishment oflslamist movements upon, as well as obstacles 
to strong pan-Islamic tendencies based upon its individualized interpretations. Accordingly, 
the ambiguity within Islam concerning politics (and other issues) actually serves as a basis 
for diversity in beliefs and practice, contrary to the hostile character and invariably 
authoritarian structure of Islamic politics presented by "Orientalist" scholars and some 
Islamists. Such variance provides the Islamists and others great leeway to interpret an 
eclectic sampling of the authoritative sources and promote their own unique "Islamic" 
ideology. James Piscatori discusses these conditions, pointing out the key role of individual 
interpretation concerning any aspects oflslam: 
The only definite things one can say about the term 'Islam' are that it is 
protean and imprecise. Every Muslim can agree that the profession of faith 
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... is an article of faith and not susceptible to differing interpretations; but 
as regards the meaning of many other principles and ideas, and whether they 
are beyond question and change, there is little agreement. The believer says, 
'Look to the Quran,' but, like all fundamental documents, it is what the 
reader makes of it. Ask, 'Does it support polygamy or monogamy, socialism 
or capitalism, equality of women or inequality, birth control, parliamentary 
democracy?,' and the answers hinge on what one hopes to find. (Piscatori, 
1986,p.3) 
While such scriptural interpretation is enigmatic in any religion, Piscatori asserts that Islam 
is particularly so for a number of reasons: The Quran encourages interpretation with its own 
statements that certain verses are "obscure" or "ambiguous,"and that only God knows their 
true meaning (3:7); Systematic revisions (2:106, 13:37, 16:101, 22:52) became the basis for 
the theory of"abrogation" which not only allowed revision of revelations to the Prophet due 
to changing circumstances, but implied that the laws derived from such revelations were also 
subject to change. The pragmatic nature of the Sunnah, or example of the Prophet, not only 
supplements the Quran, but also justifies the wide variance of its interpretations-indeed, 
this flexibility is the very essence oflslam. As there is no mediator between God and man, 
Islamic legal scholars developed the concept of ibaha-which asserts that outside the 
Quran's specific divine commands, an individual has freedom of action and becomes the 
"arbiter ofhis own faith." Finally, Islamic jurists have used an alleged saying of the Prophet, 
'Difference of opinion among my community is a sign of the bounty of God,' to support the 
diversity within Islam that flows from the exercise of ijtihad (independent judgement) and 
the interpretations of the various major Islamic legal schools. In short, Piscatori asserts that, 
given all these factors, one comes to the "inescapable conclusion: that it is nearly impossible 
to say with authority at any one moment what Islam is and what it is not." (Piscatori, 1986, 
pp. 3-5, 9) 
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B. A TYPOLOGY OF ISLAMIC 'REVIVALISTS' 
Based upon Ayubi's ''taxonomy" provided in the introduction, and the additional data 
previously pre~ted on the phenomenon, there is a basis for further examination of the 
•· diversity of political Islam. To aid in this elaboration, Husain develops a somewhat 
similar-yet expanded-typology, which when viewed in combination with Ayubi's 
framework, will permit a greater understanding of both the "players" and "playing-field" as 
related to Islamism as a regional phenomenon. Given the character of the subject-both of 
these Islamic scholars acknowledge the imprecise nature of their classifications-there are 
some points of both "overlap" and disagreement between the two; an attempt will be made 
to reduce these points of dispute, and clarify the intended use of respective terms for this 
study. Any such typology is necessarily imperfect, as not only will comparisons across 
cultures and sociopolitical milieus be deficient, but various actors involved will often exhibit 
elements from a different "category," depending upon the time, issues and circumstances. 
Still, the taxonomy included below is organized in such a manner so as the diverse 
individuals and groups will be identified by the primary intent of their ideologies and beliefs, 
and major differences can then be derived from that basis. 
While starting with the flawed term of Islamic revivalism to describe the 
comprehensive phenomenon (although with a more political-based meaning than compared 
with its use in this analysis), Husain takes a valuable first step by identifying the broader 
range of actors, or "revivalists," who have encouraged the all-encompassing environment 
from which Islamism originates; he succinctly defines them as "anyone who has contributed 
significantly to the revival of Islam." (Husain, 1995, p. 11) By using such an initially broad 
definition, he includes political leaders and ideologues that would not come under Ayubi's 
(or many other's) definition of an Islamist. In focusing on this larger group, however, 
Husain highlights how these other actors help create the conditions for Islamism to thrive 
within their societies and elsewhere-often with unintended consequences. He develops 
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four ideal-type categories-the Muslim Traditionalists, the Muslim Modernists, the Muslim 
Pragmatists, and the Muslim Fundamentalists-which with minor modifications will aid in 
this analysis of political Islam. It should be noted here that members of each of these groups 
display a variety of views and they use various approaches to promote their version of 
political Islam or support their policies with Islamic symbology. To portray the political 
manifestations of Islam as monolithic, or to describe anything but the most general 
ideological consensus between these ideal-type actors, is to misrepresent or misinterpret the 
nature of political Islam and Islam's broader relationship to politics across the region. 
1. The Muslim Traditionalists 
With a more puritanical and revolutionary ideology than the others, the 
Traditionalists include Islamic scholars and conservative activists, like the salafis, who seek 
to preserve the Islam of the classic period and subsequent historical eras--especially its 
laws, customs and traditions. Controversy over the proper normative period is often one of 
the more divisive problems separating the ulama from the Fundamentalists and other groups. 
As might be expected, Traditionalists often have a narrow, parochial vision of modernization 
and scientific advances, and are very concerned with the spread of secularization in their 
societies. While well-schooled infiqh, or Islamic jurisprudence, they typically are ignorant 
of modem scientific theories and believe Islam provides all the necessary information to 
meet the challenges of the day. Likewise, they have little understanding or interest in the 
complex institutions and processes involved in modem government, and are somewhat naive 
to the realities of global interdependence and international relations. Their focus in most 
aspects of the socio-political environment is on application of shariah law, and the various 
principles governing social and economic interaction within Muslim society. (Husain, 1995, 
pp. 11-12, 93-94) 
They reject the use of iftihad-independent reasoning concerning issues oftheo1ogy 
and law-and instead call for taqlid-strict, unquestioning adherence to the primary sources 
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of Islamic law (the Quran and Sunnah) and rulings of the great legal scholars of Islam's 
medieval period. Fearful of potential undermining of Islamic tradition and their 
corresponding social status, ijtihad is often seen as an assault on established religious values 
and practices. Some Shi'i Traditionalists support the right of certain Islamic scholars who 
have gained the stature of a mujtahid-a member of the ulama who has earned respect for 
knowledge of Islamic laws-to exercise such independent judgement. However, most 
adhere to a more rigid interpretation like the majority of Sunni Traditionalists. (Husain, 
1995,pp. 11-12,90-92) 
Most Traditionalists also diverge from the Fundamentalist view on "folk" or "popular 
Islam," being more tolerant of cultural and historical tradition's impact on religious practice 
and belief. They correctly believe that Islam is more than a collection of abstract and 
utopian regulations, and is instead a comprehensive, "lived" experience. Viewpoints on 
political matters are similarly divergent. Husain, like Ayubi, notes that most Traditionalists 
generally support the established order and are apolitical; with a fatalistic outlook, they 
generally are detached from politics, and when involved are often coopted by regimes in 
support of the status quo: 
Belief that man could not conquer and control his environment led the 
Traditionalists, often considered as the spiritual guides of the Muslim 
community, to adopt a passive and scholarly orientation. In moments of 
crisis or during distressing times, they encouraged the ummah to seek refuge 
and spiritual strength in the omnipotence and generosity of God. This st~W:£.e 
was challenged by the gross corruption and hypocrisy of politics and Hie 
decline of central authority .... In disengaging themselves from active 
politics and the worldly temptations of power and wealth, the Traditionalists 
sincerely believed that they were protecting the integrity and cherished ideals 
of Islam. Thus, they tolerated the de facto separation of "church and state" 
where none existed in Islamic theory or history. Sometimes they were co-
opted and reduced to impotent passivity by shrewd rulers. (Husain, 1995, pp. 
92) 
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Some ulama members become politically active at certain times, especially if they perceive 
"Islam" to be endangered or local conditions reach a critical point of social upheaval. 
Examples of Traditionalist ulama activities in the Iranian Revolution will be provided in a 
case study below. However, most Sunni ulama display a general "detached attitude" and a 
"reluctance to change" that is often seen as a significant weakness by Muslims who decry 
the "stagnation of the Muslim world"; this perceived "impotence" on the part of the 
Traditionalists leads many Muslims to seek guidance from more activist actors/ideologues 
on the political scene. (Husain, 1995, pp. 11-12, 80-94) 
2. The Muslim Modernists 
On the other hand, the Muslim Modernists, often called apologists or revisionists-or 
as Ayubi notes, reformers-display a combination of religious devotion and vigorous 
support for "modem" ideas of science and logic. Unlike the Traditionalists, they do not 
support the dogma of taqlid and instead seek to reopen "the gates of ijtihad' to permit the 
reinterpretation oflslamic beliefs and reformulation of religious laws to adapt to the modem 
environment: 
The Modernists are devout and knowledgeable Muslims whose mission is 
threefold: first, "to define Islam by bringing out the fundamentals in a 
rational and liberal manner"; second, "to emphasize, among others, the basic 
ideals of Islamic brotherhood, tolerance and social justice"; and third, to 
interpret the teaching of Islam in such a way as to bring out its dynamic 
character in the context of the intellectual and scientific progress of the 
modem world. (Husain, 1995, pp. 11-12, 95) 
Sayyid Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani ( 183 8-1897), the "father of Islamic modernism," is credited 
with generating the principles of the Modernist outlook. Concerned with the relative decline 
in his time of the Muslim world with respect to the West, he held that Islam could regain its 
strength through a greater acceptance of reason and a selective borrowing of Western 
science, technology and processes. Al-Afghani decried the "medieval mentality" of the 
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traditional ulama (Husain, 1995, p. 96), blaming them and their adherence to taqlid for 
Islam's backward state: 
The strangest thing of all is that our 'ulama' these days have divided science 
into two parts. One they call Muslim science, and one European science. 
Because of this, they forbid others to teach some of the useful sciences. They 
have not understood that science is a noble thing that has no connection to 
any nation, and is not distinguished by anything but itself. Rather,. 
everything that is known is known by science, and every nation that becomes 
renowned becomes renowned through science .... How very strange it is that 
the Muslims study those sciences that are ascribed to Aristotle with the 
greatest delight, as if Aristotle were one of the pillars of the Muslims. 
However, if the discussion relates to Galileo, Newton, and Kepler, they 
consider them infidels. The father and mother of science is proof, and proof 
is neither Aristotle nor Galileo. The truth is where there is proof, and those 
who forbid science and knowledge in the belief that they are safeguarding the 
Islamic religion are really enemies of that religion. The Islamic religion is 
the closest of the religions to science and knowledge, and there is no 
incompatibility between science and knowledge and the foundation of the 
Islamic faith. (Al-Afghani, 1982, pp. 18-19) 
Al-Afghani had a significant impact on a number of other Modernist figures who also sought 
to free Islam from the bonds of taqlid, highlighted by his disciple, Muhammad Abduh (1849-
1~05). 
An extremely important figure in the development of modem Islamic political 
thought, Abduh served as a newspaper editor, as a member of the Al-Azhar administration, 
and later as Grand Mufti (the supreme religious guide) of Egypt. Well respected for his 
moderate and modernist outlook, Abduh set in motion a number of reforms, including 
changes in the Egyptian system of higher education and a reinterpretation of Islamic 
principles to revitalize the religion. Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935) followed his 
mentor Abduh and continued a mission of Islamic reform. He also called for the ulama to 
adapt their thinking and accept the need for ijtihad and a comprehensive reform of the 
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shariah. Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) and Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) were both 
very influential Modernists in South Asia, while Ali Shariati, an Iranian Shi'i, was a pivotal 
figure in the development of an Islamic modernist line-of-thought among Iranian 
intellectuals and student activists prior to the Islamic Revolution. (Husain, 1995, pp. 99-1 04) 
The Muslim Modernists, while diverging from the Traditionalists in many areas, can 
be primarily distinguished by their knowledge of and exposure to Western ideas, and their 
corresponding belief that a selective application of certain non-Islamic beliefs and practices 
would be a valuable aid to Muslim society. In order to accomplish this task, they 
"imaginatively synthesize Islamic and Western ideas to produce a reasonable and relevant 
reinterpretation of Islamic thought with enlightened, cosmopolitan, liberal, and realistic 
perspectives" (Husain, 1995, p. 11 0). Modernists often focus on areas such as educational 
reform and upgrading the status of women in society in their efforts, as well as striving to 
bridge the various divisions and tensions between the madhabs (sects) within Islam. While 
the other groups may support the idea of the universal Islamic ummah and the notion of a 
Pan-Islamic version of political Islam, the Modernists go further than the rest in focusing on 
this idealistic goal. While Afghani was renowned for his pan-Islamic rhetoric, Shariati also 
sought to unify the faith and often decried the influence of Traditionalist thought which 
emphasized divisions within the "House of Islam." (Keddie, 1981, p. 220) In seeking 
solutions to the problems of the contemporary environment in their societies, Islamic 
Modernists strive to reform the comprehensive, historic religion which they devoutly believe 
in and practice. While having an affinity for modernization and Western-style development 
-similar to the Muslim Pragmatists, the Modernists' religious devotion-and abhorrence of 
the impact of secularization that has tended to accompany these influences--distinguishes 
them from the pragmatic line-of-thought. Thus, the Modernists tend to "carve" for 
themselves a difficult task of pursuing answers to the difficult array of modem problems 
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confronting Muslim societies today, while facing fervent opposition :from most of the other 
groups represented here. (Husain, 1995, pp. 107-113) 
3. The Muslim Pragmatists 
While Husain includes the Muslim Pragmatists within his broader category of 
revivalists, it must be stressed that their importance in the socio-political environment is 
most likely to be in aspects often seen as unrelated to religion. They are a minority within 
their countries, but are usually wealthy, wield considerable power and occupy positions of 
leadership in the government bureaucracy, the military, the media, professional associations 
and the business community. Members of this group are the least religious, and often are 
perceived as "unbelievers" by some devout Muslims. Although they are Muslims by name 
and birth and often have a significant impact in the political arenas of their respective 
countries, the primary reason for their inclusion here is that, while usually displaying a 
secularist outlook with little initial interest in political Islam, Pragmatist political leaders are 
often seduced by the power and potential of an Islamic ideology. Thus, based upon specific 
sociopolitical conditions and the unique requirements of their regimes, Muslim Pragmatists 
will-sometimes reluctantly-promote a version of Islamic inspired ideologies, further 
stimulating the broader Islamic revival and legitimizing ideological struggles within the 
religious and political spheres. (Husain, 1995, pp. 114, 122-123) Husain describes them as 
such: 
Muslim Pragmatists often do not observe the ritual obligations incumbent 
upon all Muslims .... Despite their nonchalant attitude toward ... their 
religion, they return to it in moments of personal crises or when they find it 
necessary to conform to social or political pressure exerted by devout 
Muslims. The Pragmatists are nonpracticing Muslims who subscribe to a 
liberal and eclectic version of Islam. Frequently, their faith is reduced to a 
few basic ethical, moral, and spiritual principles emphasized by Islam and 
other religions .... [Their] lax approach to Islam is decried by devout 
Muslims, who consider them "wayward souls" at best and "unbelievers" at 
worst. ... Western educational experiences encourage them to view classical 
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and medieval Islamic doctrines and practices as anachronistic, reactionary, 
and impractical for today .... the Muslim Pragmatists wish to modernize 
their societies along the lines of Western societies, and they believe that 
secularization is not only inevitable but desirable. (Husain, 1995, pp. 114-
115) 
Thus, secularization of society that accompanies Western-style modernization is the key area 
of disagreement between the Pragmatists and other Islamic activists. 
Typically, these opportunistic political actors follow a path of transition from 
championing secular nationalism to what becomes a more potent version of "Islamic 
nationalism." Key examples include Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat (1918-1991) ofEgypt, as 
well as Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1875-1948) and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928-1979) of 
Pakistan. Husain even adds Saddam Hussein to the group, based upon his use of Islamic 
rhetoric during Operation Desert Storm. It is true that Saddam was able to incite a populist 
Muslim response in various countries throughout the Greater Middle East at that time. 
However, Saddam's longstanding reputation as a "warrior against Islamic 
Fundamentalism"-highlighted by his initiation of war against the newly-formed Islamic 
Republic of Iran--coupled with his quick reversion to a hard line, secularist stance in 
combating the Shi'i and Kurdish uprisings after the second Gulf War, and the subsequent 
solidification ofhis authoritarian rule in the face ofthreats from the Coalition and the UN 
to his country's sovereignty-make it difficult to label him a Muslim Pragmatist at this stage 
(even using Husain's broad definition of a revivalist). The author himself states that "except 
for a brief period during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the [Iraqi] government 
has not permitted the mixing of religion and politics. Devout Muslim activists and Islamic 
Fundamentalists are called terrorists and are hunted down by Saddam' s elaborate secret 
police apparatus." (Husain, 1995, pp. 114-115) Still, the example of the transnational 
potency of the Islamist ideology, even from an unlikely-or unbelievable-source such as 
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Saddam Hussein, is significant and provides testimony to the varieties of influential actors 
and environments that should be considered for analysis. 
Sadat, on the other hand, was the consummate Muslim Pragmatist. As will be shown 
in the case study below, he was able to meet the tremendous challenge of assuming power 
after the death of the highly popular, charismatic Gamal Abdel Nasser by promoting Islamist 
organizations to offset the Arab socialist ideology his predecessor had instilled. To 
neutralize the pro-Soviet leftists, he freed Islamic Fundamentalists from prison, permitted 
religious leaders to take active roles within the government, and introduced compulsory 
religious education in schools. Jinnah and Bhutto were similar secularists who found a 
valuable asset in the ideology oflslam during the development and early formative years of 
Pakistan. Their manipulation of the symbols and ideas of Islam-which also will be 
discussed below--demonstrated the power of mass mobilization that successful 
encouragement of political Islam can provide. Of note, Jinnah initially hoped to broaden 
Muslim political influence and protect their minority rights within the soon-to-be-formed 
independent Indian state that would be under Hindu majority rule. Divisions between the 
sides eventually grew too great and he then promoted the famous "two-nation theory" as a 
basis for an independent Muslim state of Pakistan. Years later, when Bhutto was faced with 
waning public support for his secular brand of socialism and a national crisis of identity in 
the aftermath of the 1971 loss of the eastern portion of Pakistan (now Bangladesh), his 
quickly adopted a message which "injected a heavy dose of Islam" into his socialist 
programs and implemented Islamic reforms to please the masses. While less than pious in 
his personal life, Bhutto 's passionate espousal of Islamic causes led to an increased 
interaction with the rich oil states of the Gulf and an enhanced international stature for the 
country. (Husain, 1995, pp. 116-150) 
In general, Sunni Muslim Pragmatists benefit from the fact that the ulama do not hold 
a privileged political status within their traditional beliefs, and are to be respected only for 
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their religious expertise. This situation is then expanded by the Pragmatists-in a dual 
emphasis that marginalizes the Traditionalists: They stress that, in personal life, all Muslims 
are responsible to Allah alone for their behavior and religion is a private affair; and in the 
public milieu, the Pragmatists hold that the ulama have no right to interfere in political, 
economic, international and non-Islamic legal matters. Still, at certain times, the benefits 
from political Islam are too great to be dismissed: 
[D]espite their essentially secular worldview and their firm conviction that 
religion is a personal affair between man and God, Muslim Pragmatists often 
find it expedient to promote and implement Islamic policies and programs to 
capture the support of the Muslim masses. The Pragmatists' use of Islamic 
programs allows them to gain or enhance their legitimacy, integrate and unite 
their fragmented societies, and inspire and mobilize the people. (Husain, 
1995, pp. 122-123) 
Still, each example of the Pragmatists shown also provides evidence of the dialectical 
aspects of this opportunistic approach to Islamic ideology-while often creating an 
environment of increased Islamic fervor within their countries and beyond, these leaders 
were unable to control the powerful forces they unleashed nor could they maintain their new-
found "Islamic" legitimacy in the face of a barrage of denouncements from the Islamist 
groups. Each leader followed programs which were opposed by religious ideologues among 
the Fundamentalist and Traditionalist groups in their societies. In summary, they were 
unable to capitalize on short-run gains from their appeal to Islam, because ofth~.!£ng-term 
problem of a failure to properly adapt non-Islamic concepts and ideologies-that formed the 
true basis of their policies-to the indigenous Islamic atmosphere. (Husain, 1995, pp. 148-
151) 
Before moving on to the more pivotal Muslim Fundamentalists, it is important to 
remphasize the need for differentiation of ideological viewpoints such as this typology of 
ideal-type groups. While these various categories may seem somewhat rough, the lack of 
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hard distinctions in certain aspects between many of these group types-and the overlapping 
character of some of their social, cultural and economic agendas-are simply qualities that 
must be recognized and remembered during any discussion of political Islam. The ambiguity 
created in the environment of a general Islamic revival reemphasizes the need to focus on 
the political aspects of the Islamists' goals, activities and programs. Moreover, to truly 
capture the diverse (and even intricate) qualities of the general phenomenon, as well as to 
avoid the obvious negatives of grouping all Islamic activists in a limited, and naturally more 
threatening arrangement, any analysis must include a further differentiation within the 
general "subgroup" of Islamists between those movements espousing a more moderate 
approach (i.e., 'working within the system,' etc.) to achieve their goals and those neo-
fundamentalists who favor a more militant strategy. Unlike Ayubi's Taxonomy, Husain fails 
to emphasize this critical consideration in his broad survey. To avoid this oversight, a 
distinction between Islamist goals and tactics must be incorporated in any attempt to better 
understand the multifaceted nature and the broad breadth of political Islam. Simply viewing 
Islamists as a unified whole possessing a strict, unwavering stance on any particular subject 
will merely increase the current problems of stereotyping and biased analysis. 
C. MUSLIM FUNDAMENTALISTS: DIVERSITY IN IDEOLOGY AND 
METHODS 
As mentioned in the introduction the term "fundamentalism" is inappropriate to 
describe the overall phenomenon under study here, however, there are elements within this 
_broader grouping which they can logically label fundamentalist under the guidelines of 
scholars such as Ayubi and Husain, etc. The objections raised over use of the term are still 
a consideration, but as long as a differentiation in made as to the "subgroup" activities the 
term remains useful. For example, among scholars participating in a five-year "interdis-
ciplinary cross-cultural study of modem religious "fundamentalisms" focused on 
determining potential "family resemblances" among these disparate movements, it was gen-
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erally understood that religious fundamentalism is a reaction to a potential threat to a reli-
gious community's "identity." (Marty and Appleby, 1991, pp. xi-xii) Of note, the "findings" 
of this study-the Fundamentalism Project, sponsored by the American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences-are found in three separate volumes entitled Fundamentalisms Observed, 
Fundamentalisms and Society, and Fundamentalisms and the State. The first and third 
volumes of this set are used as references in this thesis. In Further discussion of the topic, 
they find that in order to preserve this distinctive identity, "beleaguered believers ... fortifY 
it by a selective retrieval of doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past," often modi-
fYing them or including "unprecedented claims or doctrinal innovations." (Marty and 
Appleby, 1991, pp. xi-xii) Despite claims that revivalists are 'Medieval' in orientation, by 
drawing from past religious experiences to fashion a response to today's problems these reli-
gious groups actually use their identity as an "exclusive and absolute basis for a recreated 
political and social order that is oriented to the future rather than the past." (Marty and 
Appleby, 1991, pp. xi-xii) While such generalizations do apply to these movements, a great 
degree of diversity also exists in their activities and rhetoric; care must be taken to analyze 
specific sociopolitical circumstances, plans/means of action and the indigenous qualities of 
the groups to avoid inaccurate or mistaken assumptions. (Marty and Appleby, 1993, p. 5) 
Opposition movements, which are the primary emphasis here, reflect this variety in a wide 
spectrum of organizations ranging from moderate groups such as the Jamaat-I-Islam in 
Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in contrast with the militancy of the Egyptian 
Takfir wal Hijra, the Lebanese Hizbullah, and Indonesia's Commando Jihad. 
1. A Typology of Islamist Ideologies 
In yet another typology-a necessary distinction which further emphasizes the 
diversity of the phenomenon-examples this variety can be roughly grouped into four 
general types: Gradualist-Pragmatic, Revolutionary Shi'i, Revolutionary Sunni, and 
Messianic-Puritanical. The first type, the Gradualist-Pragmatic groups, includes the majority 
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of the Sunni Arab Islamists which are aware of the danger from following a revolutionary 
orientation and primarily confine their work within the legal bounds of the state. In this 
variant of the focused effort on developing an "Islamic" state, the "gradualist" approach 
centers on increasing religio-political consciousness within society and promoting the 
adoption of shariah laws. The Revolutionary types, both Shi'i and Sunni, are essentially 
modem developments which vary greatly from both sects traditional acceptance of the status 
quo and political quietism. While the most prominent Shi'i version of this category is the 
ideology ofK.homeini, which eventually led to clerical rule over the state in Iran, most Sunni 
revolutionary groups reject such a situation and merely rely on clerical "support/guidance" 
for the lay leaderships' efforts. Finally, the Messianic-Puritanical groups are most closely 
associated with the "Orientalists" version of the "fundamentalists," in that they seek to 
emulate the example of the Prophet in strict adherence to lifestyle, mannerisms, etc., and 
thus are the most "anti -modem" of these types of groups. Again, the variety of groups that 
extends across this spectrum is yet another indication of diversity, and the need to focus on 
specifics before conducting analysis of the broader environment. 
2. Patterns of Evolution of Islamist Movements 
Dekmejian (1995, pp. 67-69) outlines an identifiable "pattern" in the life oflslamist 
groups-further indications of which can be seen in the case studies below-which develops 
relationships between five attributes of the organizations: the group's lifespan, type of 
leadership, size, level of militancy and political status. His analysis indicates that: 
A high statistical association was discovered between small size, high 
militancy, clandestine status, recent nascene, and charismatic leadership. 
Conversely, a high statistical association was found between large size, low 
militancy, public existence, longevity, and bureaucratic leadership. 
(Dekmejian, 1995, p. 68; emphasis in original) 
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While much of these relationships can be seen as "common-sense," such as the 
militancy/clandestine correlation, this analysis at least describes a rough "road map" for the 
evolution of such movements, from small, cult-like groups of young adults surrounding a 
charismatic figure that meet/operate in secrecy to later growth into a larger, more moderate 
organziation led by bureaucrats who favor a less-militant approach to achieving their goals. 
Further evidence of such a pattern of development can be seen in the case studies below. 
D. ISLAMIC REGIMES: "MONARCHS, MULLAHS, AND MARSHALS" 
This diversity of Islamic political thought can also be seen in the various regimes in 
power proclaiming an Islamic ideology, ranging from the traditiqnalist monarchies in Saudi 
Arabia and Morocco, to the theocratic nature of the Islamic Republic of Iran,' to the military-
backed regimes in the Sudan and Pakistan, to finally the radical "state of the masses" in 
Libya. Ibrahim Karawan (1992) discusses this great range of "Islamic" governance in an 
article from which the title of this section is borrowed. He notes how not only do the bases 
for legitimization by the regimes involved vary, but also that each has come under "attack" 
on religious grounds by political rivals within the national environment. Several important 
factors can be drawn from this usage of Islam a legitimation device-similar to conclusions 
drawn from analysis of development and its impact on transitional societies-namely that 
the political beliefs/programs of individual leaders, and the relative power and resources at 
their command, are the most important determinants ofthe transitional state's sociopolitical 
environment. As such, these same factors will go a long way in determining the nature of 
the Islamic "threat" to their regimes. Should regimes opt for repression as a means to quell 
opposition, a radicalization of some elements and at least a politicization of a broader group 
is likely. Conversely, attempts to incorporate Moderate elements from the Islamist 
movement will likely lead to a fragmentation among the groups and a marginalization of the 
more radical factions. Efforts to move toward democracy, and include Islamists within the 
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state's structure, not only legitimizes the political system but also exposes the Islamists' 
actions to public scrutiny-the determination of whether "Islam is a sufficient answer" in the 
contemporary transitional environment is open to direct question, rather than simple 
speculation. With this general overview of the regimes and opponents that promote their 
versions oflslam both within the national environment (the majority, as Zubaida has stated) 
and outside the "bounds of the state," analysis can turn to specifics case studies to provide 
greater depth of information into the phenomenon of political Islam. 
E. ISLAMISTS GAIN POWER: THE UNIQUE CASE OF IRAN 
The examples provided by the Islamic Revolution in Iran will indicate both the power 
oflslam to "bridge the gaps" between a variety of groups within society and mold them into 
a mobilized oppositional grouping which can threaten even the most powerful regimes. 
Moreover, once the revolution was a success, the continued interplay between various 
factions displayed the diversity of beliefs and programs which have played off each other 
throughout the past decade and a half in the Islamic Republic. The Iranian case can be 
distinguished as unique, however, due to the essential historical attributes ofShi'ism which 
presented a fundamentally sound basis for a radical opposition ideology with broad popular 
appeal. In addition, the charismatic figure of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was pivotal in 
providing a strong leader to rally the disparate elements of Iranian society together, to form 
a common effort of confrontation. Of note, while some elements within the Iranian clerical 
establishment will be labled "pragmatists," this key group should not be confus~J,with the 
"Muslim Pragmatists" outlined in Husain's typology. 
On 31 December 1977 during a state visit to Iran, President Jimmy Carter toasted 
Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi by stating: "Iran under the great leadership of the Shah is an 
island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world. This is a great tribute to 
you, your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, admiration and love which 
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your people give you."(Bill, 1988, p. 233) Yet, in less than a year the country was in the 
midst of revolutionary upheaval, and by 16 January 1979 the Shah boarded a flight for Egypt 
and left Iran for the final time. In the interim, a coalition of opposition forces-representing 
a broad spectrum of Iranian society-had grown and slowly come under the hegemonic 
control of the Islamists. (Farhang, 1992, p. xi) While even the most rudimentary analysis 
oflran would note the impact oflslam on politics and the ulama's key role within society, 
this case study will initially seek to determine why the radical Islamic ideology of Ayatollah 
Ruhollah Khomeini superseded various other ideological discourses within opposition 
groups in pre-revolutionary Iran and achieved the overthrow of the Shah's regime. Though 
the clerics would undoubtedly have played some role, the premise of this study is that the 
ascent of more radical Islamic activism led by the ulama against the state, much less the rise 
ofKhomeini as recognized leader of the revolution, was not 'inevitable' and was in fact the 
outcome of a unique conjunction of political events and socio-cultural factors that existed 
in pre-revolutionary Iran. 
Revolutions are brought about by a combination of factors, with two general develop-
ments being crucial-namely a structural breakdown of the state's political machinery or its 
inability to resolve a crisis situation, and the endeavors of opposition groups or organizations 
to mobilize people towards revolutionary goals that exploit the state's political exigencies. 
(Kamrava, 1990, p. 51; Kimmel, 1990, pp. 220-221) Moreover, unless there is some 
concurrence between these two developments, with the opposition providing a political 
alternative to the weakened regime, a true revolution-which entails displacement of a 
political system-cannot occur. In addition, to be successful the revolutionary leaders must 
develop and propagate an ideology that not only appeals to the public's cognitive processes 
as it attempts to respond to immediate conditions but also causes the public to willfully 
permit its manipulation in the hopes of bringing about key sociopolitical changes. As a 
reminder of the introductory section on ideologies, they are understood to be a highly 
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articulated strategy for action that provides a cultural model outlining how human beings 
should live and act. Also, they are a product of the broader socio-cultural environment, 
taking into account meaning systems, social outlooks, cultural practices, and-most 
importantly-the prerevolutionary regime's prevailing ideology, within what Farideh Farh! 
(1990, pp. 83-84) describes as a "dynamic, ongoing social process"-similar to assertions 
by Salem noted above. Third, as ideologies are generated by a cognitive process through 
which subjects are created and transformed by human actions, they must be seen as readily 
changing and subject to "the willful actions of more or less knowledgeable actors." (Farhi, 
1990, pp. 83-84) Finally, while an ideology does outline a specific plan of action and cultural 
model for the future as envisioned by the revolutionary leadership, it is the perception of the 
ideology within the minds of the various individuals within society that has the greatest 
impact on its potential for widespread appeal. 
1. The Weakened Pahlavi State 
Though being one of the two 'crucial developments' required for a revolution, the 
factors involving the decline of the Shah's regime have been well documented and thus will 
be reviewed quite briefly in this section. The Pahlavi dynasty, which was just over 50 years 
old by the time of the revolution, had not established deep roots within Iran. Mohammad 
Reza Pahlavi had been placed upon the thrown after his father was ousted in 1941 by the 
Allied powers, and was only able to retain his position in 1953 in the face of rising civil 
unrest due to a CIA-planned military coup. Through harsh repression of the opposition, the 
Shah brought stability back to Iran over the following decade, only to have renewed unrest 
in the period of 1962-63 as he attempted to implement more liberal political and economic 
reforms. Still, his 'White Revolution' caught hold and Iran saw tremendous economic 
growth in the late 1960s and early 1970s-with concurrent impact upon its socio-cultural 
environment. An area that did not see positive growth or modernization was the political 
realm; here the Shah actually strengthened his autocratic rule, extending state control over 
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ever greater aspects of the people's lives while enacting policies that seemed increasingly 
arbitrary and antagonistic. In fact, Iranians were increasingly presented with the regime's 
apparent retrenchment, as in 1975 when the Shah abolished Iran's political parties and 
formed a single party-an action he had previously claimed he would never take-the 
Rastakhiz (Resurgence), which not only upset previous political activists but forced 
previously apolitical citizens to publicly affiliate with the royal political party. As political 
opposition steadily rose, economic conditions also worsened and resentment grew as the 
public's inflated expectations of improved standards of living, better jobs and educational 
opportunities were dashed; the effects of hyperinflation from the country's quadrupled oil 
revenues after the 1973 oil embargo impacted all members of society. Regime responses 
only exacerbated the problem, as the business community faced an onslaught of repressive 
measures and government projects were cut back. (Bill, 1988, pp. 15-260; Rubin, 1980, pp. 
3-251; Bakhash, 1984, pp. 9-18) 
This myriad of internal difficulties coincided with increased tension from abroad, 
including pressure from international organizations on such issues as care of political 
prisoners, and tension from the U.S. due to the Carter Administration's human rights and 
arms control campaigns. Seeking to regain the initiative, the Shah introduced some minor 
political and legal reforms while easing press restrictions. Political activists took advantage 
of this meager opportunity, demanding further reforms such as increased constitutional 
liberties and greater independence for the judiciary. As deadly repression of riots in January 
1978 created a great cycle of violence and martyrdom involving successive mourning 
ceremonies and processions over the next several months, the regime seemed in a perpetual 
reactive mode-apparently oblivious to the revolutionary threat massing against it. This 
new phase of the unrest differed from the previous protests led by the intellectuals and 
professional organizations-now the ulama directed the opposition, bringing a radical bent 
to their mosque-based protest and demonstrations. Hesitant responses by the regime, 
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presented by a series of new governments from late Summer to the end of 1978, were seen 
as signs of weakness by the ever-emboldened revolutionaries. By then, Khomeini and the 
radicals had seized the 'reigns of power' behind this ponderous, yet potent force for 
change-the other opposition groups began lining up behind him in solidarity against the 
Shah's regime. It was only a matter oftime until "turbaned mollahs occupied the palaces 
ofkings" (Bakhash, 1984, p. 3). 
2. Centers of Opposition 
While the evolution of the opposition and its ideology of political Islam over the 
turbulent period of 1978-79 is described later, this section briefly reviews elements involving 
the revolution's second "crucial development"-the three primary opposition groupings in 
Iran during the Shah's reign: political parties and guerrilla groups, members of the intelli-
gentsia and the ulama. 
a. Political Parties and Guerilla Groups 
One key political organ in Iran was the National Front-a coalition of several 
parties with liberal nationalist orientations which originally banded together to provide a 
non-communist alternative to the communist Tudeh party in the aftermath of World War II. 
It was formed in October 1949 when a group of political activists and intellectuals led a 
protest calling for greater regime accountability under the 1906 Constitution and decrying 
the lack ofbasic civil liberties within Iranian society. The National Front reached the peak 
of its strength in 1951 when its leader, Dr. Mohammad Mussadiq, became prime minister 
and a number of popular programs were initiated. However, his turbulent time in office, 
punctuated by the campaign to nationalize the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC), soon led to the alienation of many National Front supporters and finally his ouster 
in a CIA-engineered military coup in 1953. Of note, Mussadiq and the National Front 
initially had the support of a broad range of political groups, including the Tudeh and the 
clergy-as represented by the Society oflslamic Combatants, headed by Ayatollah Kashani. 
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However, his refusal to cooperate with the communists and his uncompromising secularist 
policies led to the disenchantment of both these key groups. Moreover, the military, which 
had a strong loyalty to the Shah, never gave Mussadiq strong support; his efforts to 
neutralize the military's power only led to greater resentment among the senior leadershiP.. 
(Bill, 1988, pp. 67 -97) 
Following the 1953 coup, the National Front was on the verge of collapse as 
its key leaders and many members were arrested; continued regime repression limited 
attempts to regain lost political momentum through the end of the decade. However, a 
second National Front was formed in 1960, drawing strong support among university 
students and the Bazaari merchants in the politically-charged atmosphere at the onset of the 
Shah's 'White Revolution.' With the regime crackdown on political activists in the 
aftermath of unrest following passage of the Land Reform Bill, however, the group again lost 
strength. Further problems arose due to disputes between secular members and those 
becoming increasingly interested in religious ideology, eventually forcing a split within the 
coalition and a new group being formed. This third coalition, which included the Liberation 
Movement headed by a Muslim Modernist, Dr. Medhi Bazargan, continued its anti-regime 
activities throughout the 1970s, primarily outside of the country. The Liberation Movement 
was particularly active during this time, sponsoring numerous lectures and debates on 
political topics within Iran and conducting an intense propaganda campaign outside the 
country against the Iranian regime. Additional endeavors abroad included the coordination 
of protests and other anti-regime activities of Iranian students and expatriots-primarily 
under its affiliate, the Iranian Students' Society (ISS), actions which were particularly 
damaging to the Shah in terms of his image with world leaders and the international press 
in the late 1970s. Many ofthe founders and leading activists ofthe ISS later became key 
members of the Khomeini regime. (Kamrava, 1990, pp.59-60) 
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An ideological rivalry to the liberal nationalists of the National Front came 
from another key political organization, the Tudeh Party, Iran's original and most important 
communist party. Formed in 1941, it attained a great degree of popularity due primarily to 
its strong anti-imperialist stand-a particularly favorable position within the turbulent socio-
political environment of the postwar period which saw Iranian nationalism gain increasing 
significance. The group received strong support among urban Iranians and developed a 
robust organizational apparatus, providing the Tudeh with a monolithic character contrasting 
sharply with its ideological competitors in the National Front. The party's leadership 
primarily consisted of members of the intelligentsia such as professionals and university 
professors, while its membership base drew from urbanized industrial workers and later 
shifted to wage-earners and salaried middle-class workers as the economy's modernization 
grew. While generally supportive ofMussadiq and his nationalization campaign in the early 
1950s, Tudeh members were never allowed to participate in his government, and in the end 
believed they had little to lose from his ouster. Nevertheless, the party's condition did not 
improve after the Shah's return and the subsequent clamping down on all political activists. 
Particularly wary of the Soviet-supported communists, the regime arrested many Tudeh 
members and others fled the country for East Germany and the Soviet Union. With most of 
its leadership in exile and lacking significant influence, the Tudeh languished through the 
period leading up to the revolution and was heavily infiltrated by SA V AK. The group was 
further hindered by internal strife and the eventual separation of a Maoist faction in 1965, 
·~ .... ;,)1,:, 
which later formed the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Tufan (Storm). Tufiin never 
achieved much significance, much like its "parent" Tudeh group, and played no noticeable 
role in the events ofthe revolution. (Karnrava, 1990, pp.52-56) 
As both the Tudeh and the National Front were suppressed after the 1953 
coup and again following the unrest of 1963, the heavy-handed tactics of the regime led to 
increased frustration among some opposition members who saw previously passive tactics 
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aimed at reinstating constitutional primacy as futile. Such disillusionment led to the 
spawning of groups with a more militant ideology-the guerilla organizations of the 
People's Mujahadeen Organization of Iran and the Organization of the Iranian People's 
Fedaiyan Guerrillas. 
The Mujahadeen, founded in 1965, devised an ideology which synthesized 
Islam and socialism, similar to Dr. Ali Shariati, and promoted an argument that the Shi'ite 
culture oflran provided 'great revolutionary potential.' They held that original Islam had 
been distorted in modem times, and what was required was a return to a tauhidi society-a 
society of unity between man, nature and God-in which Islamic principles would guarantee 
social solidarity. By concluding that the Shah's Land Reform Program had effectively 
altered Iranian society and nullified the revolutionary potential of the rural peasantry, the 
Mujahadeen focused on the urban centers as the potential origin of revolt. While the 
strength of the regime's military and security forces was imposing and limited the people's 
hope for victory in an armed struggle, the formation of a 'liberation army' to wage guerilla 
warfare and 'shatter the police atmosphere' was necessary to demonstrate the possibility of 
armed action. In line with these strategic goals, the Mujahadeen actually sent some members 
to Lebanon in 1969 for training under the Al-Fatah organization. A major setback occurred 
in 1971, however, when SA V AK was able to expose some members of the group and 
eventually arrest most of the Mujahadeen leadership. With its leaders unable to provide 
necessary. strength and unity among the remaining members, a split between 'Islamic' and 
'Communist' factions occurred in 1975 and infighting between the two groups limited their 
attempts to regain momentum. Internal discord, coupled with effective repression by state 
security forces, limited these groups to minor sabotage and assassination activities in the 
prerevolutionary period. Beyond these difficulties, the Mujahadeen were never able to 
effectively present their ideology in a cohesive format to the public; its membership was 
restricted to a limited number of university students and middle-class professionals, despite 
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attempts to propagate its ideology and increase its contact with the 'revolutionary petit-
bourgeois.' In addition, the regime successfully countered the organization's propaganda 
efforts by characterizing the Mujahadeen as 'Islamic-Marxists' and provoking public 
suspicion of its activities. (Kamrava, 1990, pp. 60-62, 64) 
The other Iranian guerrilla organization, the Fedaiyan, originated from a 
secret communist discussion group in 1971 and also took urban guerilla warfare as a tactical 
approach to opposing the regime. Unlike the Mujahadeen, however, the Fedaiyan had no 
grand ideological program or doctrine under which it conducted its activities; it merely held 
that the party represented a 'revolutionary vanguard force' which used violence in reaction 
to the tactics of the police state. Again the efficiency of the regime security forces limited 
the development of the group as a major source of opposition, and restricting its activities 
to minor bombings and 'revolutionary executions.' Fears of penetration by SA V AK 
hindered recruitment by both the Fedaiyan and Mujahadeen, and limited contact with the 
general populace left them conspicuously out of touch with the contemporary political 
currents. (Kamrava, 1990, pp. 62-64) 
b. The Intellectuals 
Yet another group which formed part ofthe opposition to the Shah's regime 
was the intellectuals. As is typically seen in most modernizing societies-where such 
individuals typically exert a high degree of influence-members of the intellectual elite 
voiced disagreement with the Iranian regime's programs and policies, and the social and 
cultural values which it attempted to promote. It is the individual's relationship to these 
-social and cultural values that is the primary determinant of his position or stance within 
societal groupings; the more fragile a society's acceptance of values fostered by the regime, 
the greater role played by intellectuals. While not all intellectuals will oppose the political 
system or regime activities, the means of influence, association with the general public, and 
common aspirations of those who do is generally described as follows: 
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Through the utilization of ideologies, intellectuals elicit, guide and form the 
expressive dispositions of a society, thus either reshaping or reinforcing 
certain norms and values around which matters of social and political 
controversy revolve. Intellectuals speak against their society's dominant 
cultural frame of reference and choose deliberately to estrange themselves 
from the cultural superstructure. Such estrangement often arises out of the 
intellectuals' alienation from their surrounding environment and from other 
social groups with whom they cannot communicate and for whom they 
remain enigmatic and little understood. Social alienation and psychological 
frustration often lead intellectuals to be politically oppositional and to view 
themselves as the future leaders of a political movement. (Kamrava, 1990, 
p. 65) 
While Iranian intellectuals did play a key role in the anti-regime activities of the late 
1970s-actually creating the initial basis for the revolution-such ventures were nothing 
new and political activism had been building among this group since the 1960s. 
One of the greatest contributions to the revolutionary movement provided by 
members of this group was the construction of a general doctrine of political Islam, which 
played a key role in bringing the positions of the intellectuals closer into line with the clergy. 
While somewhat divergent with the clergy on the specific character of reforms and their 
desire for a secular orientation to the political realm-which thus hampered a unified 
theoretical discourse-the intellectuals recognized the need for an authentic basis from 
which to challenge the social and political orders, and saw the benefits of an ideology 
grounded in the sound cultural footing oflslam. Among those intellectuals who helped the 
evolutionary process involving political Islam were a few key individuals truly represented 
to core ideals of this Muslim Modernist trend: Jalal Al-e Ahmad, Medhi Barzargan, Ali 
Shariati, and Abolhassan Banisadr. 
Jalal Al-e Ahmad, a former Tudeh party member who grew disillusioned with 
the communist ideology, laid the original theoretical groundwork for the effort to 'politicize' 
Islam in Iran with his 1962 publication Westoxication. This intriguing social commentary, 
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which sharply criticized Iranian society and culture as beginning 'Westoxicated'--or 
dominated by Western culture and technology-became exceedingly popular due to both its 
provocative nature and plain, easily understood writing style. While Westoxication served 
as a "diagnosis" of the disease plaguing Iran, Al-e Ahmad wrote On the Service and 
Disservice of Intellectuals as a "prescription" for the "doctors" he sought to place society 
in the care of. Written in a much more 'complicated' style of writing, this book was not 
aimed at the broader audience but rather the key actors, the intellectuals, who had failed to 
fulfill their responsibilities to society. Alienated from the people and the culture of Iran due 
to their Western educational backgrounds, the intellectual elite must quit viewing Iran as a 
Western country and seek to develop solutions to the unique problems of society. While 
these two sociological works received the greatest attention, in a number of short stories Al-e 
Ahmad also pointed to the important role of Islam-and Shi'ism in particular-in 
overcoming cultural Westernization and reviving Iran's cultural and national identity. 
Nevertheless, he did not formulate a specific doctrine of political Islam, only going as far 
as criticizing the potential negative effect of traditional Shi'ite institutions and customs on 
Iran's future progress. (Kamrava, 1990, pp. 68-72) 
The longtime political activist and Dean of Tehran University's engineering 
college Mehdi Bazargan attempted to move beyond Al-e Ahmad initial efforts and sought 
to create the theoretical basis for an ideology of political Islam. Seeking to create a doctrine 
of"rejuvenated" Islam which could regain compatibility with contemporary Iranian culture, 
he saw the need for a "renaissance" based on Koranic doctrine to overcome the perversion 
of Islam from a "religion of action" to a source of retardation and misery. However, 
Bazargan did not compose an overarching theoretical work to illustrated and expanded upon 
his ideas. Moreover, his association with Mussadiq and previous political 
activism--combined with the fact that his writings had much more confined audiences 
(primarily other intellectuals and politically minded students)--further detracted from his 
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recognition as an ideologue. Still, within the small forum available to Bazargan, he did 
provide at least some interesting criticisms and insights, and expanded further the view of 
Islam as an ideology for both technological progress and national independence. (Kamrava, 
1990, pp. 72-73) 
At least one intellectual who agreed with Bazargan's recommendation of a 
"rejuvenated" Islam as the key to Iran's recovery was Ali Shariati, a noted teacher, lecturer 
and graduate of the Sorbonne. After leaving a teaching position at Ferdowsi University to 
join the new Hosseini-ye Ershad religious institute in Tehran in 1969, he was imprisoned 
along with many other of the school's officials when the regime closed the school in 1973. 
After a period of house arrest from 197 5 to 1977, he was permitteq to depart for England and 
soon after was found dead-reportedly of a heart attack, though SA V AK was widely 
suspected as involved. Shariati's main contribution to the development of a doctrine of 
political Islam is the argument that original Islam was a religion of tauhid (unity), or literally 
monotheism, which inspired revolution as a means for man to realize his divine culmination. 
Far from the tauhidi religion of Mohammad, contemporary Islam is no longer a compre-
hensive ideology; it has lost its revolutionary dynamism, become a tradition and been 
"depoliticized" to where it is only the concern of the clergy. As a demonstration of the 
corruption oflslam---especially Iranian Shi'ism-Shariati provided an extensive comparison 
of the Shi'ism as practiced by Imam Ali with that of the official Safavid Shi'ism initiated by 
Shah Ismail Safavi in 1501 that limited it to issues of ethics and jurisprudence. He made 
assertions similar to Al-e Ahmad in claiming that the intellectuals must overcome their 
detachment from society and assume leadership of the move toward the all-embracing 
society oftauhid; foreign 'isms' must be avoided, with guidance provided from their religion 
and Iran's nationality-the role models for the people should be Islamic personalities such 
as Mohammad, Ali and Fatimeh. (Sachedina, 1983, pp. 197-213) His criticism oflslam's 
grim state was not only crucial to the politicizing oflranian Shi'ism, but was also part of a 
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dedicated effort to provide an alternative system of future Islamic government; he was joined 
with another individual tasked with developing this option-Abolhassan Banisadr- who, 
in Paris in 1962, agreed to collaborate with Shariati to achieve their mutual goal. 
Also educated at the Sorbonne, Abolhassan Banisadr was born into a religious 
family and had been active in the National Front before going abroad. Continuing his anti-
regime activities in France, he agreed to jointly work with Shariati by focusing on the 
theoretical foundations of a society to be established after an "Islamic Revolution." As 
indicated by the titles of his key works-Tauhidi Economics, The Manifesto of the Islamic 
Republic and The Main Principles and Guidelines of Islamic Government-Banisadr 
provided the basis for a system of government, which he entitled an "Islamic republic." 
Starting from similar position as other intellectuals, namely criticizing the influence of 
"Westernism" on Iran's socio-cultural, economic and political conditions, he calls for 
installation of an Islamic republic based upon the principles of tauhid to regain national 
independence and overcome the ills of despotism and autocracy. Banisadr's system of 
Islamic government centers around the premise that authoritarian institutions of control 
should be removed and political power shared among the masses. The government is always 
under the peoples' charge, and is responsible for defense of the population and redirecting 
the economy to provide basic necessities and facilitate the transition to tauhidi society. To 
overcome to detrimental influence ofWestemism, all programs affecting social or cultural 
and educational issues must be guided by Islamic principles. Thus, the development of an 
ideology which not only "politicized" Iranian Shi 'ism but provided distinct programs for the 
implementation of an Islamic system of government was achieved. The next step was to 
gain support of the Iranian masses behind the effort to bring about a radical change in the 
Iranian state and society. (Kamrava, 1990, pp. 76-77) 
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c. The Ulama 
The opposition group with the broadest popular base that provided the 
eventual "deciding force" behind the revolutionary movement was the ulama. While this 
group's specific actions and involvement in the revolt itself-particularly the role played by 
Ayatollah Khomeini-will be covered later, the precursors to the ulama's rise to power amid 
revolutionary upheaval will be briefly covered first. Although the chief contribution of the 
intellectuals was to bring about the evolution of Islam as an active political force, some 
members of the clergy had also sought a reinvigoration of the religion's political aspects 
while also attempting to overcome the stagnation and isolation of the ulama from the rest of 
society. In 1960, Ayatollah Merteza Mottahari, a professor of theology at Tehran 
University, began presenting a series of lectures to the Monthly Religious Society on Islam's 
role in politics. Other politically-minded members of the ulama, including key figures in the 
revolution such as Ayatollahs Mohammad Behesti and Mahmud Taleqani, also participated 
in these activities. (Farsoun and Mashayekhi, 1992, p. 12) The Society went on to publish 
a monthly journal and a book, Considering Leadership and Clericalism, which 
recommended the clergy take more interest in temporal issues and to seek greater influence 
within society concerning communal affairs and individual values. The Society became 
quite popular among religious students and younger clergy members, but was forced to 
disband as part of the overall crackdown by the regime on the ulama's political activity 
following the unrest in Qom in 1963. 
The activist stance of the Monthly Society was in direct contradiction with 
the policies of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, the most prominent Marja-e Taqlid (source of 
imitation), who held that non-interference in politics would prevent political forces from 
disrupting the ulama's religious duties. An active leader of the clergy since the 1940s, 
Boroujerdi was one of the most influential Marjas of modern times and played a key role in 
rebuilding and expanding the theological center at Qom-eaming him the moniker AI-
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Mojadded (the innovator). Still, his desire to remain within the recognized "limits" of the 
clergy, stemming from its "removal" from politics after the Constitutional Revolution and 
subsequent suppression by Reza Shah, had resulted in the ulama being seen as somewhat 
"out of touch" with society or backward in its outlook. (Borghei, 1992, pp. 58-62) Thus, it 
was not until Boroujerdi's death in 1961 that a situation was presented where some ofthe 
Monthly Society's proposals-including a diversification of the ulama's area of expertise 
within Islamic theology (essentially the delegation of higher authority among other 
ayatollahs; Kamrava, 1990, p. 79)-might be considered and some ofthe clergy's lesser-
known members could attempt to play a greater role in its overall affairs. 
One of these little-known Ayatollahs, Ruhollah Khomeini, had not yet 
developed a strong network within the clerical hierarchy or major links to public supporters 
like other members, such as others like the eminent Ayatollahs Golpaygani, Najafi and 
Shariatmadari. Nevertheless, he had established a strong reputation among the clergy for 
his scholarship and piety, and for his belief the ulama should increase its role in politics. In 
addition, he was well-known for his interest in the concerns of the younger generations and 
his support of revising religious doctrine to meet contemporary requirements. As such, he 
had attracted a number of younger clergy and laymen who disapproved of the ulama's 
backwardness. It was not until 1962, however, when religious elements played a key role 
in anti-regime unrest that the opportunity arose for Khomeini to enter upon the national 
political scene, and simultaneously place the clergy firmly behind the effort to politicize 
Islam in Iran. (Borghei, 1992, pp. 65-66) 
Disturbances originated on 8 October 1962, when announcements were made 
of a draft bill for the Majlis granting voting rights to women and religious minorities, as well 
as removing the requirement of being a Muslim for qualification for candidacy and election. 
While secular opposition forces were uncertain of their most appropriate stance-having 
little against this specific (progressive) law but viewing any political victory by the Shah 
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with repugnance-the clergy wasted little time in decrying the bill as an intentional effort 
by the Shah to assail Islam and weaken their role in the application of Islamic laws. The 
religious leadership in Qom-including Khomeini-sent telegrams to the Shah and the 
prime minister claiming that the law threatened the very principles of Islam and began to 
attack the regime's efforts through the mosques. Eventually the government succumbed to 
the ulama's pressure and repealed the law in November 1962, thus ending the first "round" 
of conflict with the ulama in that period. (Borghei, 1992, pp. 66-67) 
The next period of unrest began in January 1963 when the Shah announced 
the "Revolution of the Shah and People," a program of politico-economic improvements 
with a centerpiece of land reforms. Again the secular political parties were unable to mass 
the opposition and the clergy assumed the leadership position. Gaining confidence in this 
new role from their previous victory, the ulama came together to protest the pending 
referendum on the regime's program; opposition mounted, with Bazaaris conducting strikes 
and student protests at major universities. The Shah struck back, denouncing the religious 
groups as "black reactionaries" whose followers were "a bunch of stupid bearded Bazaaris." 
(Borghei, 1992, pp. 71-72) Khomeini continued his attacks on the regime during this period, 
as part his lectures at the Feyziyeh seminary in Qom. In March 1963 security forces struck 
back, forcibly occupying the seminary and killing several students before arresting 
Khomeini. A strident campaign denouncing the government's actions soon led to 
Khomeini' s release, but his continued criticisms of the government led to his arrest again on 
4 June. This time the news of his arrest precipitated riots and anti-regime demonstrations 
in several major cities, including Tehran and Qom, in which several people were killed. 
Harsh suppression by regime forces ended the disturbances. Khomeini spent time in and out 
of prison over the following year and was eventually exiled on 4 October 1964. (Kamrava, 
1990, pp. 78-80) 
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While these events are seen as the emergence of Khomeini as an independent 
and progressive member of the ulama, in actuality it can be seen as merely a fortunate set 
of circumstances which allowed an opportunistic Ayatollah to advance further toward his 
long- term goals. He had long believed in the strength oflslam as an institution-with its 
vast network of mosques and influence throughout Iranian society-and understood the 
power it could generate if mobilized politically. Yet the clergy, as previously noted, had 
long focused on purely religious and personal concerns under the guidance of Ayatollah 
Boroujerdi. Khomeini knew the only way to alter the clergy's role was through the seminary 
itself-thus achieving a position of recognized leadership within the ulama was the key to 
his plans. Boroujerdi's death provided an opportunity to apply additional pressure on his 
colleagues for change, but he wisely avoided extremist positions to both avoid distancing 
himself from others and creating enemies. (Borghei, 1992, pp. 69-71, 76-79) 
Evidence of Khomeini' s cautious approach can be seen in his push for a 
common declaration from the ulama, engaging Ayatollah Shariatmadri and others in a 
unified attack on the elections bill. His calculated plan established links between the clergy 
and other political forces like the secular parties and some intellectuals, while gaining 
personal support from key Bazaari figures. His later efforts to politicize the establishment 
were bolstered by the "taste of power" provided by the victories of 1962-63, and he gained 
broad and active support among the younger clergy in his attempt to take a greater leadership 
role. Manipulation of these groups later gave him the force necessary to confront his 
competitors among the religious leadership, coercing them to cooperate or risk being an 
outcast. Most important, Khomeini carefully avoided exposing the differences between the 
factions of the clergy at that time, maintaining a solidarity which helped propel the ulama 
to the forefront of the protest movement, and avoided the infighting which had paralyzed its 
efforts at leading the opposition in previous periods of unrest over the last century. Though 
this crucial period actually strengthened the "philosophical" split within the ulama-with 
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some clergy deploring the tactics of Khomeini and the radicals-its unity was maintained 
while demonstrating to all the ability and skill of the traditionalist forces to energize the 
masses through the power of religion. Seemingly no regime observers and few of the 
intellectuals noticed this transformation-the focus of "political protest" through the periQd 
leading up to the revolution remained upon those secular activists and guerilla groups 
previously "under the regime's eye." (Borghei, 1992, pp. 76-79) 
3. The Islamists Take Control 
The preliminary phase of the revolution began within Iran as early as April 1977, 
when a number of secular political activists and professionals formed the Iranian Society for 
the Defense of Freedom and Human Rights, taking advantage of a relaxation of regime 
policies on political dissent. The reactivation of the Writer's Association in June was even 
more unique-the previously-banned group's readings became open political protest 
meetings. Criticism of regime activities picked up both outside the country, as expatriots 
and students demonstrated against "the Shah's dictatorial regime," and internally, where 
open letters to the press from the intellectual community decrying SA V AK brutalities and 
calling for the government to uphold the principles of the Constitution created an uproar. 
Key members of the hastily reassembled National Front also wrote an open letter, 
condemning the Shah's single-party system and calling for restoration of people's rights. 
One of the most significant events of the "formative period" of late 1977 was the untimely 
death of Khomeini's son, Mostafa, in Najaf from an apparent heart attack. The incident 
sparked popular speculation that SA V AK was involved and Khomeini, who had "dropped 
out of sight" on Iran's national scene over the last decade, reemerged as a mystical figure 
who was hailed as a crusader against the oppression of the Shah. For many Iranians first 
learning of his prior record of anti-regime activities, he began to symbolize the need for 
urgency in the struggle to bring change to their country. For his part, Khomeini continued 
his unceasing, "routine" attacks on regime policies, and gathered more and more coverage 
142 
in the relaxed atmosphere of Iran's press. In closing this discussion of the 'preliminary' 
period, however, it must be reemphasized that the early fervor for change was provoked by 
an outburst of criticism from the intellectuals; the secular political parties remained in a 
dormant state, key elements in the lower echelons of society-though increasingly unhappy 
with the declining conditions around them-had not openly vented their frustrations, and the 
ulama in Iran had yet to 'feel the fire' soon to come. (Menashri, 1990, pp. 18-24; Kamrava, 
1990, pp. 88-89) 
By January 1978, the regime pinpointed Khomeini as a focal point of anti-regime 
feeling and decided to launch a preemptive attack on his character through an article in the 
widely-read Ettela'at newspaper. The report accused Khomeini of exploiting religion for his 
personal goals and causing the deaths of innocents in the 1963 rioting. Personal attacks 
included claims of his being under the influence of the imperialists and slanders of his 
knowledge of theology. The ulama took these blatant slurs as an attack on the entire religi-
ous establishment and led rallies in Qom on 7 and 9 January, the second of which turned into 
a violent clash with police where at least six protestors were killed. On 12 January, 
Bazaaris in Tehran staged a strike to mourn the deaths, the first such concerted protest since 
the 1963 riots. Further riots on 18 and 19 February coincided with the end of the traditional 
Shi'ite 40-day mourning period and additional deaths occurred, launching a cycle of sporadic 
violence which spread to most major cities by the summer. At that time the "cyclic" nature 
had passed as rioting and demonstrations were nearly continuous from mid-June 
·~~:.: .. A, 
onward-fed by the furor over a variety of social and economic grievances, any event or 
significant date/anniversary could spawn a new protest action. On 19 August a tragic fire 
in an Abadan theater killed almost 400 people and galvanized the opposition, who widely 
ridiculed the regime's accusations oflslamists as the culprits. (Menashri, 1990, pp. 25-27) 
The government's actions over this time was inconsistent, and somewhat restrained 
in light. of the severity and magnitude of the unrest. Policies aimed at liberalizing of the 
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socio-political environment and gaining support both at home and abroad merely "blew up 
in the Shah's face" as opponents took full advantage of the opening to blast the regime 
further. In keeping with previous policies, however, the regime made clear distinction 
between the clergy and other political activists-attempting appeasements of the ulama 
while cracking down on the others. The Abadan fire and resultant furor led to the change 
of government and the installation of Ja'far Sherif-Emani as prime minister. Initial steps at 
appeasement-restoration of the Muslim calender, closing of bars and gambling houses, 
legalizing the formation of political parties, etc.,-were seen as an attempt to split the 
opposition, and were rejected initially by Khomeini who was soon joined by others in 
denouncing the measures. As demonstrations continued and strikes virtually shut down the 
country's commercial sector during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, the regime was 
forced to institute martial law on the night of 7 September. The next day, demonstrators 
clashed with troops at Jaleh Square in Tehran, with heavy civilian casualties. With the 
entrance of the Army into the turmoil, the Shah had used his last remaining source of 
strength, and it proved to no avail. The incident at Jaleh Square quickly turned many 
uncertain Iranians into fervent revolutionary activists and gave the military a taste of the 
unpleasantness ofkilling people it was meant to protect. (Menashri, 1990, pp. 33-44) 
The Shah, seeking to boost a badly damaged image in the international press, rejected 
further direct action against Khomeini, believing instead that his ouster from Iraq would lead 
to an exposure ofhis backward and primitive mentality in the West. In October 1978, the 
Iraqi government agreed to Tehran's request and Khomeini was expelled to France. This 
proved a major miscalculation-one of many, both previous and forthcoming, by the 
regime-as Khomeini was able to use the increased attention of the Western media to great 
advantage, gaining a persona of piety and strong conviction. In addition, the Ayatollah's 
asylum enabled the gathering of a nucleus of revolutionary activists who developed an 
impressive organization that quickly began to assume a leadership role in the revolt and 
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actively coordinate the activities of the protestors. This group also began laying plans for 
post-revolutionary period-again distancing themselves from most other opposition groups 
who were not yet sure of the regime's imminent destruction-which later allowed them to 
consolidate their hold on power amid the disarray of the more moderate "allies" in the ulama 
and secular political organs. (Kamrava, 1990, pp. 89-91) 
The remaining days of the revolution saw little change from this pattern of 
events-the regime attempted further policies of appeasement to no apparent advantage and 
the opposition followed the Khomeini line of holding firm for the ouster of the Shah and the 
installation of an Islamic republic. Even before the Shah had left and the triumphant return 
of Khomeini in February 1979, the radicals had won a great victory while realizing the 
benefits of a little luck and a dedication to achieving his goals. It also must not be forgotten 
that Khomeini received much assistance-and legitimacy for his plans-from other members 
of the religious leadership. As the various factors reviewed previously came into line and 
he rose in prominence, neither Shariatmadari nor any of the other ayatollahs sought to openly 
disagree with his stand--often providing greatly needed approval or endorsement for his 
actions or statements-and maintain a fairly solid front among the ulama. Besides the 
Bazaaris, the ulama were the only group which the regime had been unable to somewhat 
pacifY or coopt prior to the revolution's preliminary phase. This independence, strength and 
unity, coupled with the plan of action implemented by Khomeini and his followers created 
a unique force that the regime had no hope to withstand by the time it realized its true 
adversary. (Kamrava, 1990, pp. 92-94) 
The real key to the successful overthrow of the Shah was the ideological force which 
mobilized and unified the disparate forces of Iranian society to seek a change in the socio-
political order. The revolutionary propaganda of the ulama was successful for a number of 
reasons: 
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• It was easily presented to a broad spectrum of Iranian society through the vast 
network of mosques and religious schools throughout the country, with particular 
receptivity from two key groups: the rural immigrants and the traditionally-
oriented Bazaaris and middle class. 
• It was an ideology that was seen as part of the basic cultural and social 
environment of the people, a key part of Iran's national character and, most 
importantly, the antithesis of the regime's Westernized and secularized approach 
that had "created" all Iran's problems. 
• It became a symbol of Iranian self-realization and authenticity that went well 
beyond a mere strategy of political activism. 
• Its language was easily communicable and held a distinct cultural advantage over 
the discourses of the other opposition groups. Moreover, it eclectically drew on 
historical features which not only identified Shi'ism as a religion of protest and 
sacrifice--dating to its very founding-but also placed the ulama in a position of 
leadership and strength within society and in relation to the political structure. 
As has been shown, the ascent of the ulama--especially the radicals allied under the control 
ofK.homeini-as the primary force behind the overthrow of the Shah was not "inevitable." 
The fortunate circumstances and opportunistic character of Khomeini, coupled with his 
charismatic leadership skills and dedication to a sound plan of action, created a unique 
situation that produced the remarkable outcome of the Iranian Revolution. The lack of an 
independent ulama class, coupled with the current absence of an opposition leader of 
Khomeini's stature/charisma anywhere in the region, makes a similiar occurence in the Arab 
world unlikely in the near term. Moreover, while providing a "demonstratio~,-~ffect" for 
Islamists elsewhere, Iran fails to provide an ideological center (see section on the "Green 
Menance" below) to support similar revolutions-there have been no comparable occurences 
in other countries in the over fifteen years since the Islamic Revolution. 
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4. Iran as an Islamic Republic 
Since the time of the revolution, Iran has withstood many critical events and crises, 
and through it all has managed to strengthen the Islamic "credentials" of the regime. Even 
more important, the regime withstood factional infighting both among the disparate groups 
of revolutionaries who banded behind Khomeini and within the ranks of the Iranian clerical 
establishment itself. Overcoming the calls by leftist groups seeking a Marxist orientation 
to the state and the demands by liberals and nationalists for liberal democracy, Khomeini and 
his more radical supporters among the clerics were able to install an "Islamic" government. 
The features of the Islamic republic include an eclectic gathering of Western political 
concepts, such as a parliament and political parties, but was 4ighlighted by Khomeini' s 
development/active role as Vilayat-e-Faqih, or guardianship of the supreme religious leader. 
Just as in the revolution and years prior when he justified a more militant approach to 
politics rather than the traditional Shi'i quietism of the past, he drew from Shi'i theory on 
political legitimacy and the central notion of the Imamate to develop the conditions where 
the ulama became the guardians of religious tradition. Khomeini was innovative and 
extracted portions of his legal justification from a range of Shi'i principles to formulate the 
basis for the country's government. Shari 'ah law was instituted, school reform conducted, 
and religious matters gained relatively high priority throughout society. When compared 
with the previous regime, the militant Muslims and clerics who took control of the 
government have been similarly intolerant of political dissent and have limited political 
participation, forcing public "debate" into a narrow field limited to discussion of current 
policies. (Hunter, 1988B, pp. 265-269) 
However, the most important aspect of political activity in Iran remains the ongoing 
"conflict" between more pragmatic elements within the government and those hardline 
clerics who refuse to compromise on their ideological beliefs: 
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One of the most remarkable features of the "rule of the ayatollahs" has been 
the degree to which this relatively small group of men, in spite of their many 
similarities in social origin and intellectual background, have disagreed on 
some of the most fundamental issues concerning the nature of an Islamic 
society and government, and have formed alliances and counter-alliances 
based on ideological affinities or political expediences. . . . [D]ifferent 
"Islamic tendencies" coalesced into two major camps, the "conservatives" 
and the "radicals." ... Iranian elite politics during the 1980s was a story of 
rivalries, shifting alliances and conflicts between these two factions .. 
(Banuazizi, 1994, pp. 2-3) 
While this tension is felt across various spheres of government activity, it is in foreign policy 
where the pragmatists' attempts to develop a more moderate, less confrontational stance 
toward other states have been hindered by the actions and influence of hard line 
elements-at great political and economic cost to Iran. (Banuazizi, 1994; Hunter, 1993, pp. 
181-205) 
Without the charismatic leadership ofKhomeini and the national-level distractions 
brought on by the long war with Iraq, the consolidation ofthe regime might have been more 
difficult and more emphasis placed on the role of popular forces in government. Major 
reforms were undertaken in other sectors such as the economy, social welfare, the legal 
system, the "moral" codes and the media. The primary focus of these efforts was the 
desecularization of Iran, an endeavor that was greatly aided by the ongoing war and the 
political weakness of non-clerical elements within the political environment. In addition, 
the clerics sought to downplay aspects of Iran's "national" heritage that, while not 
necessarily secular, had been the major force behind the Shah and his father's regimes 
popular mobilization efforts. This was a difficult task when the war had been underway, but 
nationalist sentiments were mostly refocused in an "Islamic" direction, and thus permissible. 
(Hunter, 1988B, pp. 265-270; Schahgaldian, 1989, pp. 9-10) 
Major effort has been placed behind attempts to transform the economy and deliver 
social justice and equality to the mustad'aji.n, the disinherited, of society from their 
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oppressors, the mustakbarin-a view of society held by K.homeini that certainly permits 
great leeway in developing appropriate programs. Rural development, interest free banking, 
and redistribution of land were among the programs instituted, but the Islamic regime has 
failed to meet its promise of bringing social equality and prosperity to the majority of 
Iranians. Much of the blame can be placed upon the leadership, which has haphazardly 
implemented often poor planning, held rigidly to its ideology in the face of complex 
problems requiring flexible responses, and failed in many cases to enunciate clear policies 
in such areas as property laws and state involvement in the economy. Beyond these areas 
of focus much of the activities and doctrines of the Islamic republic have maintained a 
startling consistency with the Shah's policies. Despite fervent denouncements of corruption 
and abuse of privilege under the previous regime, much of the same activity has 
continued--or grown worse-under the clerical establishment's control. A massive black 
market has been so significant that a new class of rich "merchants" has been created, and 
similar distinctions in social position and economic level have shown continuity with pre-
revolutionary Iranian society. (Hunter, 1989B, pp. 270-274) 
In the area of foreign policy, aspects of Iranian nationalism are readily evident when 
the clerical-led regime interacts with foreign elements. National interests even take primacy 
over Islamic "revolutionary" activities, as more pragmatic forces have usually prevailed in 
foreign policy making. Still, other aspects show a distinctly new approach-reflecting the 
worldview.ofK.homeini which parallels his societal view, noted above, of"oppressors" and 
"oppressed"-when Iranian relations with foreign states are surveyed. To Khomeini, the 
superpowers were the chief oppressors, and their division of the world into Eastern and 
Western spheres of influence simply allowed greater influence and cultural domination of 
client states. Believing Islam was an alternative, he espoused the credo "Neither East nor 
West," a slogan which fit comfortably into the Islamic notion of spheres of peace and war, 
and into the Iranian national vision ofbeing a focal point of foreign competition and intrigue 
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for centuries. In taking a militant Third Worldism-type stance, Tehran has donned the garb 
of a champion of the world's oppressed societies, driven more by pragmatic attempts to gain 
influence and establish ties than by strict ideological reasons. Politico-religious motivations 
have also played a role, however, primarily through support to Shi'i groups around the 
Greater Middle East and also through the activities of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. 
This organization is responsible for Iranian Islamic "public relations," using sponsorship of 
clergy visits to Iran, religious scholarships for foreign students, and religious propaganda to 
spread Iran's message. Finally, there has been some effort placed behind "exporting the 
revolution," which is a direct reflection of the ideological split within the clerical 
establishment. While more pragmatic elements believe that such ideologically-driven 
policies serves primarily a negative end in isolating Iran and hindering its development, 
more hardline elements see this as the defining feature of the continuing Islamic revolution. 
(Hunter, 1989B, pp. 275-277) 
In conclusion, while the Iranian revolution has brought great changes to the country 
and the region as a whole, much of the "lessons" to be learned is that once the Islamists have 
been in charge they have been forced to confront the standard complex issues of 
administration and foreign policy: 
Iran's experience seems to warrant the prognosis that in the case of a victory 
of militant Muslims in other countries, their domestic and foreign policies 
will be determined by their national peculiarities and historical experience as 
well as by Islam. Moreover, they, too, in time will have to take into account 
external factors and adapt themselves to them. This means that in the case 
of a victory for other militant forces, a total rupture of the Muslim states' 
relations with the West will not occur and that current Western anxieties 
about such a rupture may prove to be exaggerated. (Hunter, 1989B, p. 278) 
While certainly hampered by the lingering detrimental effects of the revolution and 
devastating war with Iraq, the decidedly poor showing in terms of economic improvement 
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of Iranian society and the general lack of planning displayed in most other areas of 
government presents a poor image for Islamists. Thus, the key factor of Iran as a 
demonstration effect-both the Islamic revolution and the Islamic Republic-must be seen 
in its entirety to gain proper insight into perceptions among Muslims abroad. Its lack of 
stunning successes (after the shah's overthrow) and the predominant Shi'i character of its 
ideology impede its "exportability" to other Muslim communities. (Bill, 1989, p. 134) 
Finally, Iran provides yet another example of the inherent diversity in Islam, as the continued 
factional infighting that has hampered the country's efforts to overcome the various 
liabilities noted can be broken down into basic differences in interpretation and belief of the 
core, "unifying" tenants of the Shi'i faith. 
F. POLITICAL ISLAM "AT WAR": THE CASE OF EGYPT 
The next case study focuses on the country often seen as the heart of the Arab world, 
Egypt. This country is a good subject for examination in this analysis because it is often 
considered a "mirror" of Arab society in general (Ajami, 1992), and thus can demonstrate 
significant continuities with other regional states. Moreover, the history of modem political 
Islam begins here as well, and the lengthy period of interaction between the phenomenon and 
Egyptian governments and society in a variety of situations and conditions provides insight 
into the life spans and reactions to change of Islamist groups. Finally, Egypt's influence 
across the Sunni Arab world makes it imperative to study the general thrust of the ideologies 
and political thought patterns which have developed there, due to their typically strong 
-influence elsewhere in the region. 
Egypt, with its large Arab population and key geo-strategic location, has been a focal 
point of much of the political and ideological activity that has occurred in the region, and has 
especially been influenced by the factors of transitional society related to the growth of 
political Islam common throughout the Greater Middle East. The stressful impact of foreign 
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influence on a society with deep traditions and values was generated by successive waves 
of "invaders" including the Ottomans, French, and British (not to mention the initial 
conquests by Muslim's of the Arabian peninsula). These outside sources brought 
information and technology which facilitated the country's start on the path to 
modernization-with all its corresponding social discontinuities. It was also here that the 
influence of Islamic Modernists such Al-Afghani and Abdu was most strongly felt. This 
conjoining of traditional and modern influences took shape in the early form of Egyptian 
nationalism, preceding most similar movements by several years with the strong popular 
support of secular nationalist elements led by Sa' d Zaghlul in the early years of this century. 
His leadership of a "delegation" (wafd) seeking independence at the Paris Peace Conference 
following WWI was one of the crucial factors that eventually led to Egypt's nominal 
independence by 1922. Nevertheless, the British retained real control over the country and 
it was not until 1952 that the revolt of the "Free Officers" removed foreign domination of 
Egyptian daily life. (Munson, 1988, 75-77) 
1. The Muslim Brotherhood 
It was in this environment that one of the leading figures of all the Islamist groups, 
Hassan Al-Banna, founded the Muslim Brotherhood-"the ideological and institutional 
epicenter of fundamentalism in the Arab sphere and the Islamic world" (Dekmejian, 1995, 
p. 73)- in 1928. The son of an Imam and religious teacher, Al-Banna also became a teacher 
and had been involved in the nationalist riots against the British in 1919. However, the 
continued failure of both secular nationalists and Islamic reformers to free Egypt from the 
British yoke, led Al-Banna to advocate a return to Islam as the key to Egypt's future and 
began to organize a movement for that purpose; in his words: 
My Brothers: you are not a benevolent society, nor a political party, nor a 
local organization having limited purposes. Rather, you are a new soul in the 
heart of this nation to give it life by means of the Quran; you are a new light 
which shines to destroy the darkness of materialism through knowing God; 
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and you are the strong voice which rises to recall the message of the Prophet. 
... You should feel yourselves the bearers of the burden which all others 
have refused. When asked what it is for which you call, reply that it is Islam, 
the message of Muhammad, the religion that contains within it government, 
and has as one of its obligations freedom. If you are told you are political, 
answer that Islam admits no such distinction. If you are accused of being 
revolutionaries, say 'We are the voices for right and for peace in which we 
dearly believe, and of which we are proud. If you rise against us or stand in 
the path of our message, then we are permitted by God to defend ourselves. 
against your injustice.' ... (Quoted in Mitchell, 1993, p. 30) 
In developing the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Banna established a recognizable pattern in the 
leadership oflslamist movements, with activities centered around his charismatic personality 
and organized by his comprehensive vision for the organization. From its modest beginnings 
in Isma'iliyya, the group soon grew and moved its headquarters to Cairo. There it began to 
attract many followers from all levels of society, and-despite Al-Banna's statement that the 
group would remain outside the political realm-soon gained an increasing role in Egyptian 
politics. 
Even beyond this effort at gaining followers and influence, Al-Banna's 
comprehensive plan included: 
[A ]n elaborate apparatus covering virtually all aspects of social 
existence-propaganda, labor, peasants, students, professions, family life, 
athletics, legal services, the press, publications, and financial and economic 
affairs. Unlike Egypt's political parties, the Brotherhood emphasized its 
commitment to a moral order transcending politics. True to its Islamist 
creed, the society had attempted to build an ummah .... (Dekmejian, 1995, 
p. 76) 
The growing strength of the Brothers soon led to a perceived threat to the monarchy, and the 
government moved to dissolve the society. Prime Minister Nuqrashi's assassination by a 
Muslim Brother was followed by a "reign of terror against the society" and Al-Banna's 
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eventual retaliatory assassination. The group languished until the arrival of first a Wafdist 
government and then the 1952 Revolution of Nasser and the Free Officers. While not 
involved in the actual coup planning, the Brotherhood supported the coup and hoped to see 
an increased emphasis on Islam within the new government. However, they soon dashed 
that hope and the Muslim Brothers became one of the many groups demonstrating in support 
of a replacement civilian government. An assassination attempt on Nasser was linked to the 
Brotherhood in 1954, leading to a campaign of repression against the Society. (Dekmejian, 
1995,pp. 75-77;Munson, 1988,p. 77) 
2. Cycles of Change 
This period began a series of high and low points for the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. 
For a decade, Nasser was able to build his strength-capitalizing on the powerful ideology 
of Arab nationalism, as previously discussed, to provide a more unified Arab front against 
Western imperialism, socioeconomic injustice, etc.,-until the onset of series of dilemmas 
such as the breakup of the United Arab Republic with Syria, the lingering war in Yemen, and 
economic problems, led him to loosen the reins on the Muslim Brotherhood (most likely out 
of concern for growing communist influence). However, yet another assassination attempt 
was uncovered that implicated the Brothers, and thousands were arrested. It was during this 
period of repression that another key figure of the movement, Sayyid Qutb, gained greater 
prominence. As the key ideologue of the group at that time, he was implicated in the 
conspiracy, later tried and then hung. However, during his time in prison, he continued 
writing and produced some of the most important works of the modem fundamentalists. 
Moreover, it was this period of misery that many of the younger members of the group began 
to question the tactics of the older leaders. Once out of prison, many of these disillusioned 
Brothers would become founders and leading members of the more radical neo-
fundamentalist movements. (Dekmejian, 1995, p. 78; Ansari, 1984, p.135) 
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It took another crisis to see an increased acceptance of the Brotherhood by Nasser's 
regime-the disaster of the 1967 war with Israel. In the gloomy period of the war's 
aftermath, the soul-searching of the Arabs led many to the belief that Israel's implausible 
victory over the forces of Arab nationalism was due primarily to religious factors-namely, 
that the Israelis had remained true to their faith and were rewarded with victory, while the 
Arabs had turned their back on Islam and been handed defeat as a lesson. Nasser helped in 
this national re-embracing of Islam by using Islamic symbology and ideas within his 
speeches. Nevertheless, it was the death of the great Arab leader that led to the full-fledged 
upsurge in Islamist activities in the country. As noted, Anwar Sadat found the Muslim 
Brothers and their colleagues in smaller Islamists groups to the most effective weapon to use 
against the core ofNasserite supporters which threatened his hold on power. By allowing 
them to establish networks on University campuses across the country, Sadat had a powerful 
force to contain the socialists. The key event which also aided him in affirming his 
legitimacy was the relative success of Egyptian troops in the 1973 war with Israel, and 
Islamic symbology was prominent throughout the episode-the operation was codenamed 
"Badr" after the first victory of Muhammad over his rivals in Mecca, and it was conducted 
in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan. Still, the Muslim Pragmatist Sadat had further plans 
which eventually undercut his efforts to use Islam as a "legitimation device": his drive for 
economic benefits from a policy of infitah--or opening-to the Western powers coupled 
with his moves toward peace with Israel angered many of the traditional elements within 
Egyptian society, as well as the newly emerging neo-fundamentalist groups such as the 
Takfir wal-Hijrah and Tanzim al-Jihad. After a series of abortive moves by these small 
militant movements, Sadat instituted his own campaign of repression which eventually 
combined with the unpopularity of his peace treaty with Israel and failing economic efforts 
to politicize the masses against his regime. Civil unrest grew as tension between Muslims 
and Coptic Christians led to clashes, and riots sparked by food shortages and other economic 
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concerns. In September of 1981, Sadat moved to contain the violence, with massive sweeps 
that eventually led to the arrested of over 3000 militants-primarily Islamists, but also 
Copts, and Nasserists. Within one month, he was assassinated by members of one of the 
small militant groups (Al-Jihad) and simultaneous clashes broke out between Islamists and 
security forces in towns in upper Egypt. Hosni Mubarak assumed the Presidency and 
harshly suppressed the violence before it got out of hand. (Dekmejian, 1995, pp. 79-84; 
Ansari, 1984) 
The assassination of Sadat has been described as a sort of "catharsis" for the 
Egyptian state, which provide "breathing room" for the Mubarak regime to seek solution to 
the underlying problems which were the cause of civil unrest and Islamist support. 
(Dekmejian, 1995, pp. 176-177) While lacking the economic and symbolic assets to 
adequately meet these needs, Mubarak was at least able to devise a strategy by which the 
moderate Islamist movements were encouraged to lend support to regime reform efforts 
while the government sought to marginalize the smaller, radical groups. These policies 
helped stabilize the situation in the short term, but the crucial problems of the "crisis" 
environment remained. By the late 1980s, however, renewed violence between the security 
forces and several new groups oflslamists (who also targeted Coptic Christians) erupted in 
Upper Egypt and in the urban slums of Cairo. Based upon their activities and limited 
information on the composition of these groups, the brief summary that follows provides a 
good illustration of the nature of this "subgroup" of the broader phenomenon. Examples of 
these new movements are the Al-Gamaa al Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) and the "New 
Jihad." The Gamaa is reportedly an umbrella-type organization, with a Da 'wa wing of 
supportive clerics and laymen who are separated from its militant groups. Such "secret cell" 
activity frustrates government efforts to suppress its activities and determine its relative 
strength. In addition, the Gamaa reportedly has a militant "Afghan" wing based in 
Peshawar, Pakistan which provides training and arms for members in Egypt. This group has 
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been blamed for most of the widespread violence that has occurred over the last several years 
in Egypt, including bombings, assassinations and attacks on foreign tourists. The secretive 
nature of these groups hinders available information, but there are indications that a schism 
might have developed between the various wings of the movement over future means of 
action and targets for violence-a plausible occurrence given the ideological basis for their 
activities. Now, it seems that the "Afghan" wing may be working to discredit attempted 
negotiations between the regime and at least some Gamaa elements within the country. 
Meanwhile, another example of these newer neo-fundamentalist groups is the "New Jihad," 
which has tenuously been labeled either another branch of the Gamaa or a revitalized version 
of the original Jihad organization of the early 1980s. This group has been accused of 
attempting to infiltrate the armed forces and has conducted attacks against government 
officials and tourist sites. (Dunn, 1993, pp. 75-76) 
3. Conclusions 
This brief review of the development of Islamic groups over the recent history of 
Egypt provides evidence of both Dekmejian's proposed "patterns of evolution" of the 
Islamist groups and Salem's theories on the "dynamics of ideologies." The Muslim 
Brotherhood began as a small, more radical movement that soon grew much larger and 
subsequently more conservative in its outlook. Frustration among the younger members 
with the conservative approach followed by its leaders led to the growth of offshoots to the 
original movement which favored more aggressive tactics. The ebb-and-flow of the Islamist 
ideology in relation to the regimes can be directly related to specific crises or other 
significant events such as the wars with Israel, major assassinations, etc. The question 
remains: How powerful are these groups? Will Egypt become another Iran? As noted the 
evidence is sketchy at best concerning the strength of these groups, and much comes from 
potentially suspect government sources. However, the inherent strength of Egyptian society 
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and general abhorrence of violence common among its members make support for radical 
groups minimal at best (Dunn, 1993, p. 77). Fouad Ajami recently echoed such sentiments: 
We must not exaggerate the strength of the theocratic challenge or the 
magnitude of the middle class' defection. In our fixation on the Iranian 
Revolution-the armed imam chasing Caesar out of power-we have looked 
for it everywhere and grafted its themes and outcomes onto societies possed 
of vastly different traditions and temperaments. There never was a chance 
that Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian preaching fire and 
brimstone in Brooklyn, would return to his land, Khomeini-like, to banish the 
secular powers and inherit the realm. Even the men who gunned down Sadat 
were under no illusions about their own power in the face of the state. No 
fools, these men knew the weight of the state, the strength of all they were 
hurling themselves against. They sought only to punish the "tyrant," sparing 
the lives ofhis lieutenants (Hosni Mubarak included) who stood inches away 
.... Sadat's inheritors would be humbled [and] they would refrain ... the 
kinds of violations Sadat . . . committed against the mores of the land. 
(Ajami, 1995, pp. 75-76) 
The real danger in this atmosphere of unrest comes from regime efforts to suppress insurgent 
activities, with indications of more moderate elements being included in arrests during 
security sweeps, etc. Mishandling of the delicate balance between legitimate counter-
violence and brutal repression can only serve to harm regime legitimacy and mobilize greater 
opposition to its tactics, especially among moderate Islamist groups such as the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Even if such "radicalization" of the moderate movements and potentially the 
Egyptian masses occur, however, it is unlikely that "another Iran" will occur, and'll\is is due 
to several factors: first, the strength of the regime is much more stable than in pre-
revolutionary Iran, and the target has been identified for security forces to act against; 
second, the opposition currently lacks a figure even close to the charismatic ideal presented 
by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Moreover, the lack of Iranian traditions of firm clerical 
hierarchies with a history of political involvement coupled with the typically more 
conservative Sunni stance on political violence point toward limited appeal for ideologies 
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espousing militant means of action. While continued unrest is quite likely, given the 
continuation of the "sources" for Islamist support generated by the "crisis" environment, an 
Islamist takeover is remote; more plausible, though still unlikely would be a military 
takeover of the government to "rescue" the country from the chaos of spiraling violence and 
counter-violence. 
G. COOPTED POLITICAL ISLAM: THE CASE OF PAKISTAN 
The issue of military involvement in government is an appropriate transition when 
moving to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, for as will be shown, the military has held the 
primary role as the "foundation" upon which the state rests-~hile Islam is the "mortar" 
which holds its various subgroups together. Developed under the unique circumstances of 
decolonialization of British India, Pakistan today is a good example of what Palmer 
describes as a consociational state, in which the primary loyalties of its people remained 
directed to tribal, ethnic, religious or sub-state groupings. Leaders of these parochial groups 
distribute resources to members of the group as patronage, thus reinforcing claims to the 
members' loyalty. In this way, national resources are used to support tribal or ethnic 
loyalties and not to foster a sense of national political community or build loyalty to the 
nation. "Such consociational arrangements work well as long as the major leaders can strike 
a bargain acceptable to all parties and as long as the parochial leaders can control their 
followers and ensure that they, too, will play by the rules. If one major group withdraws 
from the contract, or if the members of that group refuse to accept the contract, violence is 
usually the result." (Palmer, 1989, p.106) The history of Pakistan has shown significant 
examples of such violence, and this lack of national unity has been a key reason for the 
continued appeal oflslamic ideology as a basis for legitimation in Pakistan. 
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1. A Prototype Islamist Group: The Jamaat-i-Islami 
In pursuing an assessment of political Islam's impact on the Pakistani sociopolitical 
environment, the focus of this case study will be on the relations of fundamentalist 
movements with the government and foreign states or groups, and the future prospects of the 
Islamic resurgence there. Conclusions based upon this survey will likely have broader 
relevance to other Muslim countries and general U.S. policy toward the phenomenon of 
Islamic fundamentalism since much of the following discussion involves Pakistan's Jamaat-
i-Islami (The Islamic Group, JI). Mumtaz Ahmad (1991A, p. 462) describes JI as the 
prototypical Islamic fundamentalist movement; it has served as an actual model for many 
other Islamic political groups. Based upon research of JI, he provides some "core ideas of 
contemporary Islamic fundamentalism" which serve as key links between these various 
groups-an recap of some of the primary points concerning Islamists and their ideologies, 
but with a focus on JI: 
• First, the Jamaat-i-Islami seeks to restore the original teachings ofthe Qur'an and 
Sunna and to re-create the socioreligious system established under the direct 
guidance of the Prophet and his first four successors-"the rightly guided 
caliphs." 
• Second, at least in theory it tends to reject the later developments in Islamic the-
ology, law, and philosophy as well as the institutional structures of historical 
Muslim societies that evolved during the period of empires. In actual practice, 
however, like most of the other fundamentalist groups, it does not deny outright 
the legitimacy ofhistorical Islam. 
• Third, unlike the conservative ulama, who for all practical purposes, maintain 
that the gates of ijtihad (independent legal judgement) have long been closed, the 
Jamaat-i-Islami upholds the right to ijtihad and fresh thinking on matters not 
directly covered in the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah. But, unlike Islamic 
[M]odemists, who would like to institutionalize the exercise of ijtihad in the 
popularly elected assemblies, the Jamaat restricts this right only to those who are 
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well versed in both the classical sciences of Islam and in modem disciplines ... 
However, if we look at the major issues with which the Jamaat-i-Islami and other 
fundamentalist movements have concerned themselves in modem times and at 
their opposition to the liberal-modernist trends in Islam, we see very little 
difference between them and the conservative ulama. Besides their demand for 
the establishment of an Islamic state and the introduction of an Islamic constitu-
tion-the two demands that have become their trademark-the other main 
questions on which the fundamentalists have taken a rigid and uncompromising 
position include abolition of bank interest, introduction of the zakat system 
(obligatory alms tax for charitable purposes), introduction of Islamic penal and 
family laws, enforcement of a strict sociomoral code in sex roles, prohibition of 
birth control as a state-funded program, and suppression of heretical groups. 
None of [which] distinguishes them from conservative Islam. 
• Fourth, fundamentalists do differ from the conservative ulama in their concept 
of Islam as a din, which they interpret as a "Way of life." The Jamaat-i-Islami 
criticizes the conservative ulama for reducing Islam to the five pillars- profes-
sion of faith, prayer, fasting, almsgiving, and pilgrimage. For them, Islam means 
the total commitment and subordination of all aspects of human life to the will of 
God. 
• Fifth, ... the Jamaat-i-Islami seeks to replace the folk and popular practices of 
Sufi Islam with the approved rituals of orthodox Islam .... They present Islam as 
a dynamic and activist political ideology which must acquire state power in order 
to implement its social, economic, and political agenda. 
• Sixth, ... one of the most important defining characteristics of the Jamaat-i-
Islami and other Islamic fundamentalist movements: unlike the conservative 
ulama and the modernists, the fundamentalist movements are primarily political 
rather than religio-intellectual movements. While both the ulama and the mod-
ernists seek influence in public policy-making structures, the fundamentalists 
aspire to capture political power and establish an Islamic state on the prophetic 
model. They are not content to act as pressure groups, as are the ulama and the 
modernists. They want political power because they believe that Islam cannot be 
implemented without the power of the state. 
• Finally, as lay scholars oflslam, leaders of the fundamentalist movements are not 
theologians but social thinkers and political activists .... The main thrust of their 
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intellectual efforts is the articulation of the socioeconomic and political aspects 
oflslam. (Ahmad, 1991A, pp. 462-464) 
With this summary of Ahmad's analysis of JI as a basis of understanding the primary 
Islamist group in Pakistan, the examination can now proceed to a comparison of the various 
other actors involved in religio-political activity. 
2. Fundamentalist Movements in Pakistan 
Within the broader framework outlined in the preceded "overview" of somewhat 
typical Islamist movements, three general "categories" of Islamic groups exist in contempo-
rary Pakistan: the ulama-based religious organizations, the non-political da'wa-type revival-
ist movements, and the lay religio-political movements like the JI. (Ahmad, 1991B, p.156) 
Such a breakdown of these Pakistani groups helps to further display the diversity of similar 
groups elsewhere in the Greater Middle East region. 
a. Ulama-based organizations 
Among those in the first group--the ulama-led Islamic movements-there 
are four main organizations that have become significant actors within Pakistani politics. 
The Jamiyat Ulama-i-Pakistan (The Society of Pakistani Ulama, JUP), led by Maulana Shah 
Ahmad Noorani, has a religious ideology based on folk Islam and Sufism. Its political plat-
form has focused on the introduction of Shari 'a, with the proviso that its own 
"denominational domain" (Religious shrines, Muslim Family Laws, endowments) is 
safeguarded. It draws much of its support from the Urdu-speaking regions of urban Sind, 
as well as many rural areas ofPunjab not under the influence of the intellectual and doctrinal 
influence oflslamic orthodoxy. Second, the Jamiyat Ulama-i-Islam (The Society of Muslim 
Ulama, JUI) is an ultra-conservative party which presents a platform based upon the purest 
form oflslamic orthodoxy. The ulama members of JUI are associates of the Indian Deoband 
Islamic seminary who espouse a strict translation of the rules of the Shari 'a (as interpreted 
by the founders ofthe four classical Sunni schools of jurisprudence) and rigid adherence to 
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religious beliefs. As such, they are opposed to the JUP's syncretic form of religion, and con-
sider any "creative" religious activities such as Sufism or Islamic modernist revisions as 
bida'(innovations). They envision the role of the ulama in politics as retaining the ultimate 
authority to determine whether laws developed by Parliament conform to the Shari 'a. Also, 
they place great emphasis on enforcing a strict Islamic moral and social code, and are 
especially incensed at the growing influence of Western culture and mores on Pakistani 
society. (Ahmad, 1991B, pp.l57-158) 
A third ulama-based movement is the Jamiyat Ulama-i-Ahl-i-Hadith (The 
Society ofUlama of"the people of the Hadith," JUAH), otherwise known as the Wahhabis 
as they adhere to an ultra-conservative theocratic stance similar to Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, the eighteenth century Arab puritanical reformer who was a co-founder of modem-
day Saudi Arabia. The fundamental tenet of its religious ideology-the primacy of Hadith 
(the traditions of the Prophet) over juridical opinions or decrees--coupled with its 
uncompromising monotheism and rejection of purely rational sciences (i.e., philosophy, 
some forms of theology, etc.) lead to a political "crusade against the 'religious excesses' of 
syncretic Islam" as followed by members of the JUP and Sufi orders. (Ahmad, 1991B, 
p.l59) In addition, JUAH is fervently opposed to the concept and supporting institutions of 
Western democracy, finding no support within the Shari 'a for legislative authority, universal 
suffrage or multiparty elections. It has a limited following, primarily among businessmen 
in Karachi and some towns in Punjab. Finally, the Shi'ite Tahrik-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh-i-Ja'afriya 
(Movement for the Enforcement of Ja'afiri Law, TNFJ) is the primary organization 
representing the religious and political concerns of Pakistan's minority Shi'i population. 
The TNFJ was formed in reaction to General Zia al-Haq's Sunni-oriented Islamization 
programs, seeking to protect the religious freedom of the Shi'i, safeguard their religious 
endowments, to seek the parallel introduction ofShi'ite Ja'afiri law along with any Sunni-led 
plan for Shari 'a implementation and to maintain close relations with the neighboring Shi' ite 
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majority state of Iran. Despite the TNFJ's close ties with Iranian supporters, its scattered 
support base translates into a lack of a majority Shi'i population in most electoral 
constituencies and thus hinders its ability to directly capture political power through the 
electoral process. (Ahmad, 1991B, p.160) 
b. Da 'wa-type Organizations 
The most prominent of the non-political da 'wa-type revivalist groups, the 
Tablighi Jamaat (Association for the Propagation oflslam, TJ), is a grass-roots, lay Muslim-
led movement drawing support from all levels of society. Eschewing political 
activities-and thus not directly matching the established "core idea" of a fundamentalist 
group as seeking political power-TJ members view religion as a more personal, private 
affair for individuals. TJ focuses its efforts on propagating Islam's moral and religious 
principles as well as introducing orthodox Islam as a paradigm for reforming indigenous 
socio-religious customs. Nevertheless, the great scope of their work and extensive support 
within certain sectors of Pakistani society make TJ a key actor in the continuing infusion of 
Islam into the sociopolitical order of the country-in an obviously different manner than the 
Muslim Pragmatists of Husain's typology. With itinerant-based da 'wa techniques, this 
group has been highly successful in spreading its influence throughout South Asia and be-
yond, with activities in over one hundred countries worldwide. With its focus on missionary 
work and communal revivalism, TJ has not needed a hierarchical leadership group or 
bureaucratic organization-it remains "a free floating religious movement," in contrast with 
most of the politically oriented groups, especially the Jamaat-i-Islami. (Ahmad, {§91A, pp. 
459, 51 0-524) 
c. Lay Religio-political Organizations 
The third category-lay religio-political movements-is eclipsed by the 
Jamaat-i-Islami. Founded by Abul Ala Maududi in 1941, it has become the most important 
South Asian Islamic political movement. In stark contrast to the Tablighi Jamaat, JI has 
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developed into a "highly structured, hierarchically organized, bureaucratic-type organi-
zation" with numerous departments and branches across the nation. (Ahmad, 1991A, p. 459) 
Initially against partition (Maududi favored preserving the united Indo-Muslim community 
instead), JI has been active in Pakistani politics since independence in 194 7, playing a major 
role in shaping the discourse oflslamic society and politics. Unlike the other groups, which 
are mostly content to acknowledge their minority status and simply seek to influence politi-
cal debate in favor of religious principles, the Jamaat is focused on a political ideology that 
is more assertive and assumes the need for an Islamic order instituted from above. Its goal 
remains an actual change of political power in which the Islamists would take charge of re-
forming the government and redirecting the sociopolitical culture of the country in order to 
establish an Islamic state, with the Quran and Sunna (the way of the Prophet) as its constitu-
tion and Shari 'a as its law. Strongly unified and effectively organized, JI has taken on the 
challenges presented over the years from Islamic modernism, secular liberalism, communism 
and "Islamic socialism" and fervently sought to voice its message of Islamic conservatism 
and activism. The Jamaat has also established close ties with other Islamic movements 
throughout the Muslim world, and has often taken a strong stand in support of the more 
"militant" Muslim causes (Kashmir, the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Soviet Invasion of Afghani-
stan, etc.). While the other groups are active in Pakistani politics, the Jamaat stands well 
above the rest, and will be a key focal point through the rest of the paper. 
3. Islam and the Nation of Pakistan 
Pakistan is a unique country, created in 194 7 solely as a homeland for Indian Mus-
lims--Islam is its reason d'etre. With few of the historical roots, common ethnic or linguis-
tic bonds, or even fully recognized borders typically claimed by most nations, Islam serves 
as the primary cohesive unifYing element for the country. At its inception, the "nation" of 
Pakistan was a composite of diverse peoples, separated not only by distance (the provinces 
ofEast and West Pakistan were divided by over one thousand miles oflndian territory) and 
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strong regionalist interests (five distinct regional "identities" were incorporated in the new 
state), but also by numerous spoken languages (thirty-two different languages drawn from 
five major linguistic families). 
While desirous of implementing a suitable process for nation-building, the 
Pragmatist founder and first governor-general of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Jinnah, and his 
early successors were severely constrained by the harsh truths associated with the post-parti-
tion period: Hindu-Muslim communal rioting, the displacement of vast numbers of refugees, 
the conflict over Kashmir with India, the subsequent social and political upheavals, the 
breakdown oflaw and order, and the tragic death of Jinnah barely a year after independence. 
Moreover, the intellectual elite adhered to a more modernist viewpoint, which downplayed 
the emphasis on Islam as part of that nation-building process. Thus, while efforts were made 
to formulate the new state's ideology, and its employment through government policies, pro-
grams, and institutions, no clear understanding or consensus could been found of the 
requisite relationship between Islam and the state. Jinnah, despite fervent calls for a separate 
"Muslim" state prior to partition, focused on implementing secular institutions taken mostly 
from the system provided by Pakistan's former British rulers. This direction of effort 
(towards secularism) was understandable given the Muslim Pragmatist background of Jinnah 
and his close associates, but it was an embodiment of the feared results of partition for the 
members ofthe fundamentalist groups and the ulama. (Esposito, 1991, pp. 113-114) 
4. Islam and Government Policy 
Given the diverse makeup and fragile polity of Pakistan, an Islamization program can 
thus be seen as an attempt at nation-building, centered on the single factor from which a 
shared culture and national identity can be derived. (Mayer, 1993, p. 123) While presenting 
a diverse orientation and interpretation of"Islamic ideology," each of Pakistan's successive 
governments have employed Islam as both a source of legitimization for their power and 
policies, and a weapon to weaken or suppress their political opponents. In a cyclical manner, 
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alternating between a liberalist and conservative interpretation, the early leaders of 
government sought (unsuccessfully) to find the proper blend oflslam with modem (Western) 
concepts of government and social order. Unresolved differences led to ad hoc approaches 
in search of tentative compromises rather than firm solutions, resulting in no firm attempt 
''to define and implement Pakistan's Islamic identity and ideology." (Esposito, 1991, p. 121) 
Little agreement was seen beyond the need to establish a Muslim homeland, but even that 
general definition was ambiguous. 
Early events which indicated the struggle between modernist and traditional factions 
included the nine-year effort to frame the first constitution (which essentially paid "lip-
service" to Islamic principles while installing modem constitutional concepts as law); 
(Esposito, 1991, p. 114) the sectarian strife over the Ahmadiyya-a modem Islamic sect 
seen as heretical by most ulama and Fundamentalist group leaders (Which resulted in a 
national court of inquiry report that was unable to find agreement on such fundamental 
questions as: What is Islam?, What constitutes a believer? and What is the nature of an 
Islamic state?); (Esposito, 1991, pp. 114-115) General Ayub Khan's abrogation of the 
original constitution and promulgation of a new, modernist constitution in 1962 (which was 
even more limited in its "Islamic" character and seen as a grave "defeat" for traditionalists); 
and the harsh debate over the liberalized Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (which predictably 
drew widespread criticism from the religious establishment and the fundamentalists). 
(Esposito,. 1991, pp. 116-120) 
A revealing event in the history of Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan was the elec-
tions of 1970. The announcement was met with some surprise when General Aha Khan an-
nounced elections for December 1970, seeking to reinstate civilian rule in an attempt to over-
come the debilitating effects of concurrent clashes between Islam and Bengali nationalism 
in East Pakistan and between Islam and socialism in West Pakistan. Fundamentalist 
organizations, headed by the Jamaat-i-Islami, sought to contest the elections, with a platform 
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of Islamic solidarity in the face of the twin dangers of separatism and atheistic socialism. 
The Jamaat, employing its massive network of supporters, was predicted to win a great num-
ber ofNational Assembly seats, but in the end the formidable campaign effort delivered only 
four seats out of three hundred in the national legislature. Despite basing twenty years of 
struggle to attain free elections, in the belief that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis 
would vote for Islam if given free choice, the Jamaat ended up with a total disaster. It was, 
in short, "the greatest political set-back the Jamaat had received ever since its inception." 
(Ahmad, 1991A, pp. 475-476.) 
Nevertheless, the Jamaat-i-Islami sought to overcome the extreme disappointment 
of the December 1970 election and learn from its mistakes. It redoubled its efforts to build 
a stronger support base by placing greater emphasis on practical social requirements which 
had been downplayed in its drive for an Islamic constitution. It decided to capitalize on the 
extensive strength of its students' wing, the Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba (Islamic Society of Stu-
dents, IJT), to employ a strategy employing "street power" (as opposed to parliament seats) 
to influence Pakistan's political system. Evidence of the success of this new approach was 
seen in the struggle against Bhutto as part of the Khatmi-e-Nabuwwat (finality of the 
Prophethood) and Nizam-e-Mustafa (System of the Prophet Muhammad) movements. 
Another likely occurrence might have been a realization that the democratic process was not 
the best potential for advancing their cause-a potential explanation for the JI' s readily 
accepting the military coup of General Zia in 1977 (and even joining his advisory staff for 
a time). 
Thus, it was a rather unexpected development that the regime of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
and his socialist Pakistan People's Party (PPP) became the initial source of a dedicated 
Islamization program in Pakistan. Many factors influenced this occurrence, namely the 
"identity crisis" which followed the 1971 war (the loss of East Pakistan led to soul-searching 
over Islam's place in the sociopolitical realm), the desire to gain financial support from the 
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oil-rich Arab Gulf states (leading to a reemphasis of Pakistan's Islamic bonds to the Arab 
world) and, most important, domestic political issues (as the fundamentalist opposition to 
Bhutto's policies grew, he made a number of concessions, including declaring the 
Ahmadiyya a non-Muslim minority and added "Islamic" provisions in the 1973 constitu-
tion). (Esposito, 1991, pp. 166-167) While focused on specifically on social development 
and solidarity with fellow Muslim Arab states, the platform ofBhutto's regime gradually 
began to emphasize a populist interpretation oflslam-under the standard of"Islamic social-
ism." Stressing social justice and musawat ("equality") as fundamental Islamic precepts, and 
basic features of historical Muslim societies that existed under the direct guidance of the 
Prophet and the Rashidun, the PPP pursued a domestic strategy of socioeconomic 
redistribution and broader political participation. (Karawan, 1992, pp.115-116) 
Nevertheless, civil unrest grew and the religious movements united in an effort to 
oust Bhutto in the 1977 elections, under banners of "Islam is in danger," etc. The opposition 
block, the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), was spearheaded by Maududi's Jamaat-i-Islami 
and drew widespread support from the "new" middle class and traditional businessmen who 
were alienated by Bhutto's economic and political reforms. To counter the groundswell of 
support for the PNA, the PPP forces moved increasingly towards a more "Islamic" platform 
and essentially dropped all reference to socialism. By the time of the elections in March 
1977, the lack of a truly broad-based support for the fundamentalists was evident once again, 
as Bhutto and the PPP scored an impressive victory. However, widespread charges of vote 
fraud became the spark for civil unrest, and the PNA forces led great opposition~~ches in 
protest of the regime. Seeking to appease the religious elements, Bhutto announced a 
number of further Islamization measures (including prohibition of alcohol and gambling, and 
measures to introduce Shari'a law into the constitution) but was unsuccessful in quelling 
disturbances. (Esposito, 1991, pp. 168-170) 
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5. President Zia and Islamization 
On 5 July 1977, the turmoil surrounding the anti-Bhutto movement was abruptly 
halted by the bloodless military coup of General Zia al-Haq. Appealing to Islam and prom-
ising to establish a social order based on Nizam-e-Mustafa to legitimate his over through of 
the Bhutto regime, Zia sought to form an alliance with the Islamic movements. While some, 
like the JUI, rebuffed his efforts, the JUP and the Jamaat-i-Islami welcomed the chance to 
provide advice and assistance in his effort to bring an Islamic government into being. Many 
JI members served as cabinet officials and in other key posts under Zia, who solidified his 
authority by successfully coopting the Islamic fervor of the PNA and denouncing Bhutto for 
"un-Islamic" behavior (Bhutto was subsequently executed on 4 April 1979). (Esposito, 1991, 
p. 171) With the aid of the fundamentalists, Zia announced plans for a broad program of 
Islamization, including educational and cultural reforms, the creation of Shari 'a courts, the 
institution Islamic taxes (zakat and ushr), and an Islamic penal code. Thus began the process 
of firmly imposing Islamic measures on Pakistan's sociopolitical environment, reenforcing 
an Islamic identity of the state. 
Nevertheless, much of Zia's effort was focused more on legitimating his continued 
authoritarian rule, and planned elections continued to be postponed due to the need to 
develop a truly "Islamic" form of democracy. Critics of Zia began to grow more vociferous, 
as members of the PPP were joined by PNA supporters angered over the continued 
implementation of martial law and the "highjacking" of democracy. It was not until 1984 
that Zia finally began the first concrete steps toward a return to civilian rule. After 
announcing a surprise referendum seeking a mandate for continuation oflslamization (and 
by default an extension of Zia's rule), martial law was finally lifted and non-party elections 
for national and provincial level offices were held, with civilian rule restored by late 1985. 
The tension between the modernist influences and the fundamentalists returned in political 
debates, as Jamaat-i-Islami Senate members introduced Shari 'a bills and proposed changes 
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to the Family Laws Ordinance in hopes of accelerating the Islamization effort. Still, Zia was 
able to moderate the pace of change through his continued hold on the reigns of power. The 
final event which ended the Zia era was not a planned transition of any sort, however, as the 
President was killed in a suspicious plane crash on 17 August 1988. (Esposito, 1991, PP.· 
172-181) 
6. Recent Events 
Pakistan's first party-based national elections were held in November 1988, with the 
efforts to gain power by the Islamic fundamentalists, again in a coalition-the Islami 
Jamhoori Ittehad, once again being thwarted by the PPP, now under the leadership of 
Benazir Bhutto. Her stormy rule as the Muslim world's first female Prime Minister was 
characterized as more of a fight for political survival than an effective exercise of political 
power. While her election could be interpreted as a referendum on Zia's Islamization efforts, 
the slim margin of victory (39% to 32% for the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), the 
"heirs" to Zia's legacy), coupled with Pakistan's fragile state of democracy, virtually ensured 
little efficient political action being taken. (Esposito, 1991, pp. 180-182; also Mayer, 1993, 
p. 129) Despite efforts to cultivate her own "Islamic profile," Bhutto was badgered by the 
fundamentalists and beset with a rising tide of domestic violence. More important, she was 
"held hostage" to the same powerful forces Zia had drawn support from: the Army and the 
U.S. Conditions continued to deteriorate, until President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed 
Bhutto and dissolved Parliament on 6 August 1990. In elections held on 24 October 1990, 
the PPP was pitted against another coalition led by the IDA, and including most of the 
fundamentalists. In a somewhat startling outcome, the IDA gained an overwhelming victory 
on a platform that promised to implement Shari 'a as the supreme law of the land. On 11 
April1991 IDA leader Nawaz Sharif introduced the Enforcement of Shari 'a Act 1991, with 
an address before a joint session of parliament that was punctuated with the statement "I am 
not a fundamentalist." (Mayer, 1993, p. 130) Despite the overt call for implementation of 
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Shari 'a, it seems that Sharif was, in fact, true to his word-he was not a fundamentalist and 
was especially careful to avoid that label in fear oflosing further support from the U.S. and 
other Western powers to his ailing country. He was more concerned with basic social and 
economic issues, and any major plans for renewed Islamization were hindered by various 
other events in 1990-1991 (the Gulf War, suspension of U.S. aid, etc.); the Bill placed before 
parliament was similar to measures pursued by Zia and deliberately left decisions on 
implementation of moral codes and other provisions vague and abstract. (Esposito, 1991, pp. 
180-182) 
Coming in the wake of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent influx of 
hundreds ofthousands ofWestem, and particularly U.S., troops into the Gulf States, the U.S. 
decision to cut all economic and military aid to Pakistani because of its nuclear program 
served as a key rallying point for the various religious groups. While none were supportive 
of U.S. efforts during this period, the most vocal critic was the Jamaat-i-Islami. Incensed 
that the U.S. would cut critical support over the vital, "defensively-oriented" nuclear 
program-a clear anti-Islamic stance given the U.S. stance on similar programs in India and 
Israel-and reduce aid to Islamic forces of the Afghan mujahedin still battling to free their 
country, the Jamaat took a cynical view of U.S. efforts to pursue a peaceful outcome in the 
Gulf war, decrying the Western drive to destroy Saddam and further weaken the Muslim 
world. (Ahmad, 1991B, pp. 161-166) Continued high tension involving Kashmir was yet 
another source of anxiety for Pakistanis. However, despite the rhetoric and strident efforts 
of the fundamentalists, Pakistan's Islamization program is still much the same as under 
Zia-an open public display but, in reality, of little substance. 
In 1993, Pakistan saw further political turmoil, and yet another government fall, as 
President Khan dismissed Nawaz Sharif and dissolved Parliament--on charges of 
corruption, maladministration and subversion. (Tripathi, 1993, p. 102) Sharif and Khan had 
been involved in a lingering dispute over political power and the functions of their respective 
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offices. Khan finally called on the Army to intervene-after arranging with Benazir Bhutto 
for a place in the caretaker government. (Tripathi, 1993, p. 1 03) Bhutto went on to win the 
latest round of elections, which again saw the fundamentalists marginalized. Through it all 
the basic questions of Pakistani identity and the relationship between Islam and the state 
have yet to be resolved; the conflict between Islamic ideology and a more secular 
understanding of nation building and state making lies at the heart of the instability of the 
country. 
7. The Pakistani Army 
Though not touched upon in the rest of the case study--except in terms of its leaders 
periodically taking over the government-the central position occupied by the Pakistani 
Army must be included in any analysis of Pakistan. In a country with a (previously noted) 
history of divisiveness like Pakistan has endured, there must be some type of "pillar" to 
support the rest of the state when conditions deteriorate-for Pakistan, that "pillar" is the 
Army. Since the time of partition, the Army has served as a moderating influence and likely 
delayed (somewhat) the advent of dissension over the question of Islam in Pakistani social 
and political spheres. A Westernized officer corps which maintained a rather "un-Islamic" 
appearance, along with the successive military regimes of Generals Ayub Khan and Y ahya 
Khan, had tremendous influence on the social and political environment of Pakistan. (Cohen, 
1984, pp. 88-89) The modernist influences of the Army provided a check on the 
fundamentalists' power, at least until the Zia regime. By that time, however, the Army had 
undergone a "soul-searching" period similar to that of the general populace in the aftermath 
of the 1971 war. With the advent ofZia, the Army took up the task ofls1amization; though 
remaining somewhat ambivalent about the mission, most officers realized the need to have 
some improvement in the conditions of the country. The inherent tension over the relation 
of Islam and the state within Pakistani society is also manifest in the Army, though it 
remains a strongly cohesive force which still provides the requisite "pillar" of support to the 
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country. Most of all, the post-Zia Army leadership has retained an active role in politics and 
will serve as a restraint on any potential fundamentalist excesses. (Cohen, 1984, pp. 91-94) 
8. Conclusion/Prospects for the Future 
In conclusion, the steady progress oflslam from the periphery to a central place in 
Pakistani politics has actually been somewhat of a paradox for most actors in the political 
process. Despite Zia's vigorous efforts to cloak his dictatorial rule in Islamic reformist-
attire, evidence shows the program was more of a legitimization device, and a lesser attempt 
to enforce a Islamic identity upon the country, as opposed to a genuinely broad-based 
campaign for religio-political reform. Despite the initial popular support for such efforts, 
backing later waned; even the Islamists became disconcerted evel).tually. The real downside 
was felt strongly in later years, as the excessive promises made under the Islamization plat-
form raised popular expectations while providing none of the desired improvements in social 
justice or living conditions. (Karawan, 1992, pp.116-117) 
A number of general conclusions can be made from the study oflslamic fundamen-
talist movements in Pakistan: First, despite the significant influence of the fundamentalist 
groups on policy-making and sociopolitical reforms, they did not bring about a "reversion 
to premodern Islamic Law" which has been a concern of Western political analysts interested 
in the progress of democratization in the Muslim world; in fact, the fundamentalists actually 
conducted a selective retrieval of key tenets of the Shari 'a which would support their current 
priorities and left a vast majority ofthe "Western" legal system untouched. (Mayer, 1993, 
p. 142) Efforts to introduce "Islamic" legal codes or religio-political reforms were met with 
vocal domestic unrest and external condemnation (such as from the U.S. and Iran; a lightly 
addressed issue in this study, but still a significant concern in terms of Pakistani foreign af-
fairs). Moreover, as in the past, it is unlikely that the Army leadership will allow any 
radical changes to the country's sociopolitical system; it is also doubtful that they would 
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allow fundamentalist control of the government, should the instance ever arise (an unlikely 
possibility in the near term). (Fuller, 1991, pp.36-37) 
The general "failure" oflslamization was noted in a 1989 interview by Dr. Akbar S. 
Ahmed, Chairman ofPakistan Studies at Cambridge, with the statement: 
... General Zia was not able to 'Islamise' Pakistan. He certainly made Paki-
stan and the wider world aware of some of the issues involved in Islamising 
a society. . . . Islam, as a consequence of the last decade, has begun to be 
identified with many of the more negative features in society, such as 
lashing, the cutting off of hands, the stoning of an illegitimate infant near a 
mosque .... The positive and permanent aspects of Islam have not been 
brought to the fore, the more permanent and fundamental aspects of Islam, 
such as the emphasis on piety, genuine humility, ilm (knowledge) and the 
respect for learning, as well as the encouragement of brotherhood and 
tolerance. Pakistan is essentially a plural and multi-ethnic society. When 
the culture and ideology of one group is firmly and forcibly thrust upon other 
groups there is a natural and historic reaction against that particular ideology. 
There was, therefore, a general kind of resistance to Islamisation, largely due 
to the more negative aspects ... identified. (Ahmed, 1989, p. 57) 
In addition, the influence oflslamic fundamentalism on government policy is often reflected 
in an accentuation of the authoritarian and repressive measures of the regime in power. 
Absolutist tendencies lead to stated claims (and possibly actual delusions) by regimes of a 
divine mandate, permitting them to enact measures that will strengthen their hold on power 
and diminish the status of opponents. The special military courts, staffed by fundamen-
talists, were usually the only place that "Islamic justice" was meted out; local bar 
associations and judges with Western educations have hesitated to implement Shari 'a law, 
seeing it as outside the bounds ofthe "rule oflaw." (Mayer, 1993, p. 142) 
Finally, while "Islam" and "the Shari 'a" have positive connotations for Muslims, 
once the fundamentalists are forced to provide specifics on programs or policies, their mes-
sage loses its popular support. Should the situation arise that the Islamists gained power and 
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attempted to strictly implement fundamentalist policies, it is unlikely that the population 
would allow them to remain in office long under fully democratic conditions (much less the 
Army under any circumstances). The more likely occurrence for Islamist influence in 
Pakistani politics will be under the watchful eye of a future "coalition" partner, possibly 
another political party, but most likely another military regime similar to that of Zia. (Mayer, 
1993,pp. 142-144) 
Thus, while the Islamist parties will likely remain a potent force in Pakistan--espe-
cially in the intellectual and social spheres-it is unlikely that they will achieve the popular 
support base necessary to come into power in Pakistan. The platforms they espouse have 
little to offer the primarily rural lower classes, the intellectuals are split between modernist 
and traditionalist factions, and the Army-most importantly-is quite reluctant to see further 
major progress on the Islamization campaign. The central issues that divide Pakistan, 
particularly the ethnic and social factionalization, will continue to hinder the ability for any 
party- not just the Islamists-to gamer widespread support for broader religio-political re-
forms. 
H. THE MYTH OF THE GREEN MENACE 
To close this chapter, some general thoughts on the transnational aspects of the 
phenomenon of political Islam are appropriate. The fact that the fundamental sources of the 
faith remain constant for all Muslims, and-more importantly-are invoked in similar 
rhetoric by a wide range of actors, leads to the basis for the "monolithic" label"M Islamic 
fundamentalism provided by some analysts and Orientalist scholars. Given the diversity 
evident in the case studies just presented, however, there are evidently actually a number of 
these so-called monolithic "!slams" within both the Sunni and Shi'i sects of the faith. These 
include "establishment" Islam-the traditional religious practice, as espoused by the regimes 
and ulama in the Sunni and Shi'i sects; "popular" Islam-a more personal orientation, often 
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manifesting itself as Sufi Islam and mysticism, and da 'wa-type "grass roots" revivalism; 
"modernist" Islam-which seeks to reconcile the beliefs of Islam with the contemporary 
environment and influences of Western rational thought; and that ofthe "Islamists"-with 
the various groups, both moderates and radicals, oriented towards an active quest for a 
political system which embodies the authentic and "unchanging" precepts of the faith. 
Still, the stereotypes brought on by years of viewing Islam as, at best, exerting a 
negative impact on Muslim society in terms of"Western-style" modernization and, at worst, 
as the precedent for a contemporary version of the Crusades, are hard to overcome. The 
analysis included here should help to clarify the subject, but further evidence helping to 
deflate the myth of the "Green Menace" comes from the history of political relations in the 
region. Contemporary analysis has sometimes offered Islamism or "Islamic funda-
mentalism" as a replacement for the global threat of communism. In an analysis of that 
phenomenon, Ken Jowitt finds that the crucial elements to a "global Soviet bloc" was the 
fact that Moscow acted as a coordinating "center" for the group, controlling much of its 
activities and relations with the "outside": 
The Soviet bloc was an international political organization based upon 
political replication of the Soviet "sacred center''' and political segmentation 
of its constituent "castle regimes." The Soviet bloc was a remarkable 
contemporary instance of autarkic, mutually isolated regimes linked to and 
through a center whose identity was replicated in detailed fashion at the 
expense of each non-Soviet regime's political "personality." (Jowitt, 1992, 
p. 175) 
Given this requisite "center" as a basis for the previous monolithic bloc, a potential means 
of identifying the likelihood for a similar "Islamic international" would be to find the focal 
point of Islamic activities. As has been shown; however, the evidence of solidarity among 
the states across the Greater Middle East is scant at best. Zubaida, among others rightly 
points to the primacy of the nation-state in both government and opposition activities. An 
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alternative, then, is to look at those organizations which do link together various Muslim 
states, on an institutional or at least symbolic basis of mutual interests. 
One of the most important of the groups is the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC). While the common Western perception is that a Muslim-led OPEC bloc 
dominates the world oil markets by skillfully manipulating prices, evidence shows that in 
reality the contemporary markets have expanded to such a degree that OPEC production 
significantly lags production from the rest of the world. This situation is in stark contrast 
to conditions in the 1970s where the cartel controlled approximately 70% of the world's 
production, and oil shocks where routine. Not only have the Western countries sought out 
and expanded alternative sources of oil, but they have also increased their efficiency in 
energy usage, thus decreasing the requirements for oil per unit of production. Now, the West 
still relies on a large amount of 0 PEC oil, and that group's reserves are the world's largest 
by far, but the crux ofthe matter is that the national interests of the OPEC states has come 
first ahead of any strong solidarity in recent years. Production quotas are routinely broken, 
and the savy producers realize the "special" relationship that exists between producer and 
consumer. (Richards and Waterbury, 1990, pp. 59-68) Moreover, these countries have 
failed to use their wealth to significantly advance common "Islamic" causes, preferring 
instead to use "their vast petrodollar wealth and petroleum resources to support and to 
encourage their particular views of Islam and the prerequisites for their national interests" 
(Husain, 1995, p. 208). 
Another grouping which seems a likely candidate around which to build an "Islamic 
international" is the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). Initially organized by 
Saudi Arabia in an attempt to promote its version of pan-Islam to combat what it saw as the 
unpleasant effect ofNasser's pan-Arabism in the 1960s, and then serving as a rallying point 
for all Muslims in the aftermath of the 1967 war, this organization today includes over fifty 
countries and has a tremendous impact on the broader Islamic "revival" that exists in the 
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Muslim world. Many Muslim states that are opponents in other areas use this organization 
as a means of unification and communication on mutual interest and problems. Again, 
however, the substance of concern-a concerted effort to unify the disparate countries and 
Islamist movements into a bloc capable of coordinated action contrary to Western (or any 
other) interests is just not evident in reality: 
[T]he national interests of OIC members states far outweigh any commitment 
to Islamic solidarity. The OIC's attempt to study and coordinate Muslim 
Affairs, particularly in political matters, may prove unproductive since the 
OIC itself is handicapped by significant internal contradictions. The OIC 
purports to represent its members, but its members prefer to represent 
themselves; the OIC wishes to unify the umma, but the umma and the modem 
nation-state system have a difficult time coexisting. (Husain, 1995, p. 214) 
While these two organizations are the most prominent of the transnational groups, other 
institutions do exist, but primarily on a sub-regional (i.e., the Gulf Cooperation Council, etc,) 
or ethnically-based groupings (the Arab League). These organizations also fail to meet the 
requirements for the necessary center to coordinate and control an "Islamic international." 
The truth is that solidarity along Islamic lines is symbolic at best, and the nation-state and 
related national interests have increasingly become the primary level of focus: 
No common cultural identity binds the scores of Moslem nations which have 
vastly different histories. There are serious debates among Islamic 
theologians. Rivalry among Moslem leaders is fierce. In the post-1945 
period, more Moslem countries have been at war with each other than with 
non-Moslem countries. Sectarian, ethnic and tribal conflicts ... seem 
endless .... Even the Palestinians, with the most distinct single objective and 
target-a homeland-are divided into deadly factions. Iran, Egypt, and 
Saudi Arabia all claim the mantle oflslamic leadership but none has obtained 
it. The variety of Islamic movements under diverse internal conditions and 
different foreign sponsorships further attests to the absence of an "Islamic 
international," and the lack of a central command-and-control headquarters . 
. . . [R]ecent history dispels the notion of a mass movement. On the contrary, 
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tumultuous diversity describes what has happened. (Amuzegar, 1993, p. 
129-130) 
While not an exhaustive survey, this review of organizations, coupled with the prior 
discussion of the transitory basis of most previous ideologies, is at least sufficient to cast 
significant doubt as to the potential for the "clash of civilizations" deemed imminent by 
many leading scholars and analysts. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
With the end of the Cold War and the concurrent changes in the international security 
environment, political Islam has gained new significance as a potential threat to U.S. 
interests. Assessments have varied, ranging from an Islamic resurgence viewed as a global 
replacement for the communist ideological menace-or a harbinger of global state-spon-
sored terrorism and anti-Western Holy War-to that of a more legitimate expression of 
social and political activism, representing a competitive challenge potentially supportive of 
greater self-determination and democratization. In order to formulate a consistent and coher-
ent long-term policy toward this resurgent ideological force, an objective assessment of 
Islamic fundamentalism must be developed to enable policy-makers to understand the true 
nature and aspirations of Islamists, and to craft the appropriate responses. This study began 
with a brief recounting of various exaggerated caricatures and threatening themes common 
to the popular literature on "Islamic fundamentalism," and then asked: "What is the true 
nature of the phenomenon? How powerful is it? What are the potential threats?" 
In contrast to a monolithic "Green Menace" or fears of civilizational-level conflict, 
analysis has shown that political Islam-while influenced by unifying aspects of a common 
Third World "crisis" environment and the standard symbology, history and ideas of the 
Islamic faith-is paradoxically a diverse grouping of ideologies that is polycentric in 
character. These ideologies vary in specific origins and emphasize a political fcrt;us aimed 
primarily at the local, intrastate levels. While some elements within this broad grouping are 
militant in their approach and antithetical to a peaceful resolution of regional problems, it 
is far from monolithic and contains other elements that are potentially supportive to 
endeavors to bring a strong, lasting peace to the region: 
[Just] as Christianity is not a monolithic faith, Islamic revivalism is also not 
a homogenous movement. Radicalism cannot best represent the orientations 
of adherents to the Islamic faith. The United States must look at the diversity 
in Islam and reach for reformist forces that in the past have been in the 
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forefront of fighting authoritarianism and urging the establishment of 
democratic institutions. Only then can the United States find moderate 
reformers and democrats in the Muslim world and understand the fallacy of 
the claim that "Muslim countries have the most terrorists and the fewest 
democracies in the world." (Noorbasksh, 1993, p. 95) 
This pervasive, yet polycentric character of political Islam-determined so significantly by 
local factors-leads to the realization that there is no one easy answer to questions of the 
power or the threats linked to it. What can be said is that the phenomenon, which 
"encapsulates" the multifaceted "identities" political Islam assumes throughout the Greater 
Middle East region, is based upon most underlying causes that generate the "crisis" 
environment where political Islam thrives. Since these conditions are pervasive throughout 
the region, and unlikely to disappear in the future, it is likely that political Islam is here to 
stay as well. The power and correlated threats from Islamist opposition groups is more a 
question of the combined strength of the movements versus potential weaknesses of the 
states themselves. Again, variety and diversity across the region are the norms, as certain 
states have developed plans to marginalize radical elements by working with or coopting 
moderate Islamist groups; others have resorted to the problematic methods of repression. 
Some regimes focus on the bigger picture, seeking to solve the fundamental problems, while 
others simply react to the latest Islamist activities. 
With an understanding of this inherently localized nature of the phenomenon, the 
corresponding threats can be seen deriving from it as primarily twofold: the ever present 
potential for terrorist activity, sometimes with transnational aspects but mostly focused 
against the regime within the country in question; and a broader insurgent campaign aimed 
against the regime that gains populist support from an ideology of political Islam. While the 
threat from Islamic militants employing terrorism is probably the most likely threat, it is of 
a more "common" nature in terms of both the threat itself and required threat deterrence (i.e., 
anti-terrorism/counterterrorism measures) and also less significant in overall impact. 
Conversely, the more important danger, though less common and less likely is the possibility 
for Islamic fundamentalists to overthrow the government of an ally-such as Egypt or Saudi 
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Arabia-in the Middle East. This significance-level of the potential threat is the consider-
ation when discussing "importance": while terrorism does have an impact on international 
security-and US. security especially after the World Trade Center bombing-the gravity 
of situation potentially leading to "another Iran" makes Islamic fundamentalist-inspirec;l 
insurgency a much more compelling concern. While beyond the scope of this thesis, 
analysis of U.S. and regional regime capabilities to counteract violence from sub-national 
groups-in the context of low-intensity conflict (LIC)-becomes a key feature in general 
threat projections. This constitutes yet another variable in the analysis of this complex 
threat. 
At least one factor that adds to the "threatening" aspects of political Islam is the 
contradictory nature of a religion-based ideology when viewed from the perspective of 
Western theories of modernization. The seemingly paradoxical nature of a 'revitalized' 
religion assuming the role of a powerful social and political force in the modern era, when 
modernization was supposed to hail the rise of secularized ideologies and the decline of 
more traditional influences, is viewed with both wonder and fear. It is a phenomenon that 
is not limited strictly to the Middle East or to the religion oflslam: 
Ideas about the separation of religion and politics were based upon the 
observation ofthe Western experience .... secularization was expected to 
be a universal phenomenon that would be replicated in other areas of the 
world. Under the impact of modernization, conventional societal outlooks 
and organizations would be undermined and traditional religions would be 
shoved aside. . . . The 1970s and 1980s, however, have proven such 
expectations to be wrong. The political revitalization of religious groups in 
the United States, Latin America, the Middle East, and other areas of the 
Third World during these decades, seriously undermined many widely held 
assumptions about modernization. Urbanization, advancement in education, 
and occupational diversity, did not lead to the decline in the importance of 
religious values and the rejection oftraditions. On the contrary, the social 
upheaval produced by modernization resulted in a renewed interest in 
traditional religions. (Sahliyeh, 1990, pp. 3-4) 
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This variation in the accepted "norm" of modernization theory points to the need for change 
in the way the phenomenon-typically described as anti-Western, anti-modem, etc.,-is 
viewed; a more specialized means to interpret the true nature of political Islam is required 
to overcome these stereotypical thought patterns when conducting analysis and permit an 
objective assessment. More discussion of this topic will follow in the next section. 
In this study, an attempt to reach such a goal was undertaken by examining the 
paradoxical aspects of political Islam, its features of unity as well as diversity, and then 
combining these results to form conclusions. First, the commonalities of the phenomenon 
were discussed as a general overview to "set the stage"for further analysis. Briefly, political 
Islam is an example of a "native" response to the resultant "crises" of discontinuous 
development and secularization common to transitional societies of the Third World. As 
transitional regimes often lack the mobilization capacity or the legitimate capability to 
manage the myriad problems that besiege their societies, the appeal of ideologies based upon 
religio-political thought can gamer widespread support in opposition to regime activities. 
However, these broad similarities should not be seen as the only aspects of concern. More 
important to this discussion, political Islam is a "localized" response to the common "crisis" 
atmosphere, a selected eclectic gathering of Third World and Islamic symbols adapted and 
oriented to the specific time and place involved. The paradoxical nature of the phenomenon 
continues when examining the variety of "adaptations" and conflicting tendencies that are 
so pervasive within it: 
Islam, except for Qor'anic scriptures, is not a monolithic religion. Nor is it 
inherently belligerent, menacing, or a radical force for change. Along with 
the fundamental schism that exists between its two principal sects, ... there 
are numerous warring factions within each sect. The scriptures themselves 
offer boundless room for interpretation . . . virtually guaranteeing the 
legitimacy of opposing policies and strategies. (Amuzegar, 1993, p. 129) 
More important, when viewing political Islam as the latest in a series of ideologies that have 
swept through the region, additional "wisdom" can be found in comparisons with those that 
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preceded it. The high levels of religious-based rhetoric common to both regime and 
opposition today are simply the recycled populist speeches of previous ideologues of the 
developing world, wrapped in the Islamic garb of the primary ideology of opposition today: 
[O]nce stripped of its Islamic symbolism, the Muslim revivalists' discourse 
regarding the Islamic world's relations with the West closely resembles that 
of the anticolonial nationalist and other Third World radical movements of 
the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s. In other words, it is not Islam as a 
religion or even as a political ideology that is the source of tension between 
the west and the Muslim revivalists. Viewed in this perspective, Western-
Muslim conflict becomes far more amenable to resolution ... (Hunter, p. xi, 
1988) 
Though armed with this insight, to take advantage of it in resolving some outstanding issues, 
analysis must accommodate the paradox of political Islam and incorporate components of 
the "big picture" environment along with the requisite specifics to achieve a comprehensive, 
differentiated basis of analysis. Other aspects-such as factors involving the broader Islamic 
revival, the correlation with the failures of a series of various preceding ideologies, the effect 
of regime policies on Islamists responses-all play variety of roles that must be 
incorporated. 
Before moving to a proposed solution to the problems of analysis just described, it 
must be restated that the cumulative nature of the 'negatives' in the region-the burgeoning 
population, the scarcity of resources, the lack of education, mal-distribution of wealth, and 
general social, political and economic underdevelopment that plagues most coun-
tries-create conditions where greater and greater numbers of people are receptive to 
alternatives to the continued failure of their inept governments. Such deficiencies are likely 
to persist, as no comprehensive policies are being developed to deal with these compounding 
problems. These "causes" of Islamism are an important aspect of the analysis of the 
fundamentalism "symptoms" and, as will be discussed below, should be incorporated in any 
policy dealing with this phenomenon. 
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A. ISLAMIC DIALECTICS AS A TOOL FOR ANALYSIS 
Based upon the complex, localized nature of political Islam, any attempts to develop 
a broader assessment of geographic regions, it then becomes necessary for an in-depth 
review of individual countries, which can then be sorted out by critical factors such 
population, geo-strategic location, "ties" to the U.S. etc., to gain a greater sense of priorities. 
Once this more localized "target area" is developed, a more "in-depth" approach to analysis 
provides the start needed to eventually return to broader conclusions, if required. The 
proposal here is that the complexities of political Islam are related to dynamic aspects of 
several "mulitifaceted dialectical relationships" between Islam and the social, political, 
economic, and cultural dimensions of its environment. These correlations serve to both 
hinder simple definition or conceptualization of political Islam, but can also form the basis 
for greater understanding of the phenomenon as a whole. While the overall concept of these 
dialectics was developed by R. Hrair Dekmejian (1995, pp. 19-22) primarily as part of a 
simple illustration of diversity within the Islamic revival, by adding addition associations 
and then elaborating upon them, these dialectical relationships can be used to form more 
complex, probing "questions" needed to gain generalized answers to the questions above. 
The proposal here is that-with appropriate modifications included-these general 
associations can be "applied" to a particular level-of-analysis (such as the Greater Middle 
East or the Gulf States or Egypt) as a method to aid in making general determinations 
concerning political Islam and related threats. Each relationship is understood as interrelated 
and forming part of the greater whole; the cumulative results of a survey provide the 
"answers" sought. Again, given the enigmatic nature of the overall phenomenon, two 
aspects are particularly important when applying this methodology: first, to gain optimum 
advantage from this type of analysis, the survey must closely account for each of the 
contrasting factors of the dialectic when forming conclusions about an aspect of political 
Islam-to avoid inaccurate descriptions and implications; and second, improved "accuracy" 
comes with limiting the variables involved-by limiting the scope (geographic range) of the 
survey whenever possible-to minimize the variations inherent in the phenomenon. While 
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an imprecise process--especially in the context of region-wide assessment-this 
methodology will allow for the best possible analysis. 
The primary dialectical relationships for analysis include: 
• Secularism vs. lslamism: the central factor within the overall correlation, friction 
centers on the relationship between Islam and politics within society; proponents 
of the secular state, including the Muslim Pragmatists, are influenced by Western 
theory/concepts of modernization. They are opposed by the Islamists and Muslim 
Modernists, who seek to establish an "Islamic" state, with a variety of specific 
interpretations. 
This is a central "debate" within Muslim society, which feels the effects of a series of 
failures by succeeding secular ideologies and the harsh impact of moderni-
zation/Westernization on the indigenous culture and social structure. Given the problematic 
issue concerning the separation of "church" and state within Islam, concerns over this 
relationship are likely to always be a factor within Muslim political spheres to some degree. 
The outcome of the "conflict" is influenced by environmental conditions and the 
personalities involved, their values and ideologies/methods for approaching the problem 
(revolutionary, conservative, etc.). Since ruling elites "control" the sphere of political debate 
in almost every regional society, this conflict will likely take less "open" forms than might 
have in a different structural environment for politics. Unless regimes decide to broaden 
political discourse, or are forced-typically out of a position of weakness-to institute some 
form oflslamic reforms within society to build legitimacy, the evidence of"strength!<on each 
side will be more concealed. 
• Ruling Elites vs. Islamist Ideologues: the leaders of the two "sides" in the 
struggle involving political Islam; the elites, by definition, will promote an 
ideology which supports the status quo. Appeals to Islam will be "sanctioned" 
by coopted members of the ulama. The Islamists have the "favored" position of 
the opposition, and base their ideological strategy for change on an eclectic 
reading/interpretation of the fundamentals oflslam. 
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The critical factor here is the level of legitimacy among the masses that either side can 
generate/maintain in the face of "attacks" by the other. Can the regime use symbolic or 
economic assets to aid in its mobilization efforts or must it rely on coercive means to enforce 
compliance? Also involved is the relative success of the opposing ideologies-does the 
regime produce results and improve the citizenry's lives, or does the "Islamic" solution have 
broader appeal based upon the failures of the dominant ideology? Is the dominant ideology 
deemed "authentic" and understood by the majority of the people? 
• Theology vs. Ideology: the relationship between Islam the religion and Islam the 
political ideology is a key factor in differentiating the phenomenon from the 
broader aspects of the Islamic revival. While general aspects of religiosity are 
higher across the region, the necessary focus must be on the political agenda of 
the Islamist groups to distinguish pertinent aspects/levels of support. 
With an understanding of political Islam as an ideology, the concept clarifies the primary 
reason behind the diversity of the phenomenon: the inherent flexibility of the symbols and 
other attributes of the religion which can be interpreted in a variety of ways and applied to 
various aspects of any issue of concern. Religion is a key component of the basic cultural 
makeup of a society and forms the basis for potentially broad-based appeal. This powerful 
combination's potential threat stems from the fact that, in the words of James Piscatori, "the 
answers hinge on what one hopes to find." The various factors, such as generational change, 
crises, etc .. which contribute to the ''transitory" nature of ideologies in general must be kept 
in mind, along with the related shifts in reformist-revolutionary or conservative-"ness" that 
occurs when the power relationships of ideologies change. Distinctions must be made 
between evidence of increased religiosity and politically-oriented activity. 
• Islamic Modernism vs. Islamic Conservatism: conflict between two sides of the 
debate, with Modernists seeking to adapt or reform Islam in order to apply it to 
the modem context, while the conservative Traditionalists reject foreign influence 
o any kind and support traditional interpretation of Islamic precepts and their 
roles in society. 
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Analysis of this debate goes far in determining the level of sophistication required by the 
society in question for its dominant ideology. While the Modernists often have a difficult 
time defending some aspects of their reforms, their overall effect can be positive for 
development if their positions are couched in forms with broader appeal. Their ability to 
translate Islam into a relevant ideology for today' s environment is crucial to the viewpoints 
of the elites and eventually the masses within a society. Otherwise, the traditional ulama and 
the Islamists will garner the central positions in the societal debate, marginalizing their often 
mutual foes, the Modernists. 
• Establishment Islam vs. Populist Islamism: the traditional ulama, typically 
supporting the established order and a conservative brand of Islam, versus the 
Islamist opposition, promoting a more revolutionary strategy of socio-political 
action. 
This is the crucial arena that determines such factors as the legitimacy of the ruling elites and 
the potential for mass mobilization on religious grounds versus the regime. If the ulama 
continues to support the status quo, thus lending at least some religious credibility to ruling 
elites, then the opposition is unlikely to gain mass support in any but the most uniq1:1e 
circumstances. 
While this is a brieflist of some of the key dialectical relationships, it provides some 
insight into an area that appears promising for the development of a better means of analysis 
for this complex problem. Further research and refinement is required, but the general thrust 
can be seen as getting closer to a "true" assessment of the phenomenon. By taking such a 
comprehensive and individualized estimate, much of the potential for misunderstanding due 
to variations in the aspects noted above will be greatly reduced. 
B. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 
Based upon the nature of the phenomenon and the lingering "crisis" environment, 
both political Islam and the broader Islamic revival will likely be a long-term challenge 
within the Greater Middle East region. As such, given the radically changed environment 
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ofthe post-Cold War world and the resultant freedom of maneuver provided to the United 
States, U.S. policy makers seeking to "deal with" political Islam must take the overall 
atmosphere surrounding the phenomenon into account and focus on the long-term aspects 
of its sources/origins. The question then becomes, is the goal to try to solve the 
problem/minimize the threat from political Islam, or simply to safeguard our interests in as 
easy a way possible and "keep our powder dry" for the eventual fights that come? If, in fact, 
U.S. policymakers sought to take full advantage ofthe new gee-strategic environment and 
seek to resolve some of the fundamental sources of unrest and violence, there are several 
factors that would figure prominently in the success of such an effort. 
First, a generally more "comprehensive" foreign policy than typically pursued must 
be developed and implemented-this is a key concern everywhere, not just for the Islamic 
world! The piecemeal activities typically employed hurt our credibility with both friends 
and potential enemies, as contradictory signals and ambiguous stances are given out when 
a firm "line in the sand" is required. An appropriate example comes from the U.S./Westem 
powers stance on the early years of the recent fighting in the former Yugoslavia. While 
Western analysts and policy makers paid little heed to the broader impact of their (in)action, 
the Muslim world was aware-and perceived a familiar "double-standard" in the West's 
(especially the U.S.'s) interaction with Muslim communities across the globe: 
Newspaper editorials across the breadth of the [Middle East] region, have 
railed at the contrast between the action taken in Iraq and not taken in 
Bosnia. Not just across the region either, nor even just in the Arab world. 
As far afield as Bangladesh, even Indonesia, Islamic groups have taken the 
affair as a stick with which to beat the United States and-which in time may 
matter more-their own governments. ("America v Islam," The Economist, 
July 3, 1993) 
This is but one example of the need to incorporate a more comprehensive approach to 
foreign policy-for ifU,S. inactivity in a place like Bosnia were somehow to spark cycles 
of increased violence elsewhere as part oflocal protest efforts, U.S. interests could be even 
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further damaged, beyond the already obvious loss of stature by not showing consistency in 
our stance on aggression worldwide. 
In addition, a comprehensive policy would also unify the "thrust" behind various sub-
policies of the overall U.S. foreign policy effort to avoid contradictions and ensure they are 
executed in a balanced manner. Obviously, promoting the values that America stands for 
is an important part of this effort, but we must realize that policy statements should apply 
universally-i.e., democracy should be good enough for both countries of the former Soviet 
Bloc and Middle Easterners such as the Algerians, aggression in the Bosnias ofthe world 
is just as intolerable as aggression in oil-rich Kuwait, etc. A common sense approach, yes, 
but a culturally-sensitive one as well. However, policymakers must remain aware that issues 
such as democracy and human rights can be a "double-edged sword," and be cognizant of 
the potential backlash effect of certain policies such as "enlargement." Modernization has 
come quickly to most of the Greater Middle East, and we must realize the benefits of a 
slower pace-with "measurable" progress geared to its unique socio-cultural environment. 
The transitional countries of the region are still quite new to the "state making" effort when 
compared with their European/development model counterparts. 
Also, in a related point, U.S. policies must seek to confront the root "causes" (the 
crisis environment) as well as extremist "symptoms" (the radical Islamists' activities) when 
dealing with the problems associated with political Islam. This might seem like an idealist 
position, but in point of fact it is the only solution to the potential threat from political Islam. 
While an absolute removal of the variety of ailments afflicting the Muslim world-and the 
Third World in general-would be a utopian goal, attempts should at least be made at 
international-level cooperation toward that end. Even limited progress will be rewarded, as 
long as the perception of a genuine effort being made is maintained. With that in mind, the 
limitations of both our capabilities and the general environment itself must be recognized, 
along with the overall consequences of any efforts we make. The historical baggage the 
West brings with its aid and best intentions in the region is not easily lost. Moreover, the 
U.S. has not been very good at maintaining a low profile in our activities in the past. 
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However, sensitivity to the overall situation and a sophisticated foreign policy effort can 
produce great benefits for the U.S. now and into the future. 
In addition to the more fundamental approach to a strategy of action versus potential 
threats from political Islam, U.S. policy must distinguish between the religion oflslam and 
the varieties of Islamic ideologies-Islam is not the "problem," extremist ideologies (and, 
more importantly, actions) are. Over the past five years successive Administrations have 
made a point of saying that Islam as a religion is not the threat of concern. However, since 
actions and perceptions (again) speak louder than words, careful effort must be made to 
consider all sides of a proposed policy-it becomes more of an issue of cultural sensitivity 
and an attempt at empathizing with Muslims across the globe. . 
As a separate part of this effort, contrast must be made between the ideology and 
rhetoric ("words") of the Islamists and potential intolerable actions that they might take-we 
should "draw the line" in advance where we differentiate between what is acceptable 
behavior and what is not. Terrorist activities must be forcefully dealt with, and the U.S. 
response to actions taken against our personnel or interests in the region must be seen as 
appropriate, measured, and "expected." However, moderation in our overall policies will 
avoid the danger of creating "self-fulling prophecies," as has happened often in the past 
when dealing with this region. Once boundaries have been drawn and intolerable activities 
outlined, retaliation or repression should be concentrated on those groups or actions which 
really pose a threat. This goes for both the U.S. and regimes across the developing, 
including the Muslim, world in general-the goal must be to not create a bigger problem by 
radicalizing a majority of the population in reaction to the unacceptable behavior of an 
otherwise smaller minority group. As the phenomenon can be seen as a long-term factor in 
the region, tactful policies of inclusion and cooperation with its moderate elements, while 
demanding and enforcing appropriate conduct from its more radical fringe, are a difficult but 
necessary first step. 
Most important, attempts must be made not only to ensure U.S. actions or statements 
are not be seen as anti-Islam-that will be a no-win situation against the fastest growing 
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religion in the world-but also to take into account the "Third World" aspects of the 
phenomenon of concern. Fighting political Islam is not the answer; the real answer is to 
fight-and it will be a hard one, for sure-the conditions spawning the more radical 
ideologies of the phenomenon across the various dimensions noted. This comprehensive 
goal, with direct linkage to the North-South dispute, could have major benefits in areas well 
beyond the immediate concerns of the Greater Middle East and political Islam. 
The problem with being the sole "super power" is that everyone is attentive to the 
slightest U.S. activity, because even the least amount of effort can have a relatively great 
effect. When putting a concerted effort behind an undertaking, the U.S. has developed a 
considerable reputation of effectiveness and success. Our current foreign policy focus on 
enlargement and engagement appears to reflect the "best" that America has to offer the rest 
of the world, leading to conditions of mutual benefits to all. However, given the U.S. stance 
on related developments in the Greater Middle East, our strategy of "Dual Containment" 
seems to portray more accurately the U.S. "vision" for the region. Instead of approaching 
foreign policy in an honest and straightforward, undifferentiated manner across regions and 
cultures, the U.S. has often seemed to "segregate" our principles, leaving the appearance of 
a "double-standard" in which the U.S. supports popular reform elsewhere but works to 
maintain the established order in the other lesser-developed regions like the Middle East. 
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